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ABSTRACT
Despite its three hundred year existence, the American
newspaper is being devastated as the Internet becomes the go-to
source for news. Despite the rise in Internetjournalism, the sharp
increase in online readership, and the precipitous drop in the
number of print newspapers, policymakers still have a dismissive
attitude toward alternative news sources. Such attitudes must
change. In particular, the government should give online-only
journalists increased access to the Galleries of the House of
Representatives, the Senate, and other state-owned facilities where
mainstream journalists are permitted. With a world-wide audience
of millions of readers, Congress and the courts can no longer
afford to relegate Internet journalism to a second-class news
medium.
In Consumers Union v. Periodical Correspondents'
Association, the plaintiff the non-profit organization that
publishes Consumer Reports, questioned the constitutionality of
certain rules governing the issuance of press credentials to the
Galleries when it was denied admission on ground that it was not
an independent publication. Based on separation-of-powers
concerns, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit avoided the constitutional issue with the political
question doctrine, deeming the matter nonjusticiable. Since then,
many courts have taken a similar path when faced with the
exclusion of a journalist from an established press facility,
completely skirting the constitutional issue of whether denial of
access violates the freedom of the press protected by the First
Amendment. Given the switch from traditional print media to
websites and Kindles, the question of who has access to the places
where the news is made becomes extremely important. If and when
a court will be forced to decide the constitutional issue, it will need
a set of principles that balance the constitutional concerns of
Congress with the constitutional rights of the online journalist.
This Article will attempt to set forth those principals while
at the same time explaining the history, the nature of the rights,
and the state of the law as it exists today.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 1, 2009, the Guardian announced that it would
cease print publication after one hundred and eighty-eight years in
business and begin publishing exclusively on Twitter via one
hundred and forty character "tweets," or instant messages.' The
newspaper cited the unprecedented challenge for all newspapers to
begin harnessing the power of the Internet and social networking
Web sites to maintain readership. While historical events would be
condensed to the bare essentials--OMG Hitler invades Poland,
allies declare war see tinyurl.com/b5x6e for more"-the
newspaper was confident that brevity would be the key to its
2continued success.
* Ryan Witte is an associate in the Miami office of Boies, Schiller & Flexner,
LLP. I would like to thank Judge Robert Sack of the U.S. Circuit Court of
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With traditional print media giants going out of business
over the last few years, the unobservant reader might have missed
the fact that the above story was an April Fool's Day gag by the
Guardian itself. Since March 2007, dozens of newspapers have
gone out of business, and still others, like the Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, the Capital Times, and the Christian Science Monitor
have moved to the Internet to stay afloat.3 Since 1990, a quarter of
all American newspaper jobs have been lost. 4 As Eric Alterman
notes, "Few believe that newspapers in their current printed form
will survive. Newspaper companies are losing advertisers, readers,
market value, and, in some cases, their sense of mission at a pace
that would have been barely imaginable just four years ago."5
Despite its three hundred year existence, the American newspaper
is being devastated in the span of a decade.
The Internet is becoming the go-to source for news,
information, weather, movie reviews, and classified
advertisements. 6 A recent study by the Pew Internet and American
Life Project found that the Internet is now the third most popular
news platform behind television and radio, with about sixty-one
percent of people turning to the Internet as a source of news, and
around ninety-two percent of Americans are utilizing multiple
news platforms such as Internet and print media on a typical day.
7
With websites like Craigslist allowing anyone with a computer to
post free classified ads, it is no wonder that users are refusing to
shell out $325 to place an employment notice in the New York
Times. 8 As the money in traditional print media dries up, the same
3 See William Yardley & Richard Pdrez-Pefia, In Seattle, a Newspaper Loses Its
Paper Route, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2009, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/business/media/l7paper.html. See
generally Newspaper Death Watch, http://www.newspaperdeathwatch.com (last
visited May 28, 2010) (tracking newspapers experiencing financial difficulties
and noting that some papers have switched to print/Internet hybrid, while others
became online-only publications).
4 See Eric Alterman, Out of Print: The Death and Life of the American
Newspaper, NEW YORKER, Mar. 31, 2008, at 48, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/03/31/080331fa fact alterman.5 Id.
6 See Kristen Purcell et al., Understanding the Participatory News Consumer:
How Internet and Cell Phone Users Have Turned News into a Social
Experience, 2010 PEW RES. INST. 5, available at http://pewinternet.org/Reports/
2010/Online-News.aspx (studying the rise of the Internet as source of news); see
also PHILIP MEYER, THE VANISHING NEWSPAPER: SAVING JOURNALISM FROM
THE INFORMATION AGE 37 (2009) (describing how sources of newspaper
revenue have shifted over past few years).
7 See Purcell et al., supra note 6, at 31.
8 See New York Times Classified Marketplace, http://www.nytimes.com/ref/
classifieds (last visited Mar. 26, 2010) (listing current advertising rates in the
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cannot be said for the ink destined for its pages. News
dissemination is just as vital to our democratic heritage as it has
always been-even if the "ink" is now digital.
Despite the rise in Internet journalism, the sharp increase in
online readership, and the precipitous drop in the number of print
newspapers, 9 policymakers still have a dismissive attitude toward
alternative news sources. Such attitudes must change. In particular,
the government should give online-only journalists increased
access to the Galleries of the House of Representatives, the Senate,
and other state-owned facilities where mainstream journalists are
permitted. With a "world-wide audience of millions of readers,
viewers, researchers, and buyers," Congress and the courts can no
longer afford to relegate Internet journalism to a second-class news
medium.' 0 In Consumers Union v. Periodical Correspondents'
Association, the plaintiff, the non-profit organization that publishes
Consumer Reports, questioned the constitutionality of certain rules
governing the issuance of press credentials to the Galleries when it
was denied admission on ground that it was not an independent
publication." Based on separation-of-powers concerns, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
avoided the constitutional issue with the political question
doctrine, deeming the matter nonjusticiable where the defendant
acted in good faith and "pursuant to [its] express delegation of
authority as aides.., of Congress."' 12 Since then, many courts have
taken a similar path when faced with the exclusion of a journalist
from an established press facility, completely skirting the
constitutional issue of whether denial of access violates the
freedom of the press protected by the First Amendment.
Given the switch from traditional print media to websites
and Kindles, the question of who has access to the places where
the news is made becomes extremely important. 13 If and when a
9 See Rachel Metz, U.S. Newspaper Circulation Sees Steeper Decline,
ASSOCIATED PRESS FIN. WIRE, Apr. 27, 2009, available at http://www.ksdk.com
/news/local/story.aspx?storyid = 173635.
10 Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997).
11 515 F.2d 1341, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
12 Id. at 1346-47; see also Schreibman v. Holmes, No. 1:96CV01287, 1997 WL
527341, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 1997).
13 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 728 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
("No less important to the news dissemination process is the gathering of
information. News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for without
freedom to acquire information, the right to publish would be impermissibly
compromised."); see also id. at 723 (Powell, J., concurring) ("A popular
Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a
Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever
govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm
4
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court will be forced to decide the constitutional issue, it will need a
set of principles that balance the constitutional concerns of
Congress with the constitutional rights of the online journalist.
It is important to note at the outset that the term "blogger"
will not be found in very many places within this Article. This is
because I believe there is a distinction between "bloggers" and
online journalists that is rarely, if ever, clarified. For one, anyone
with a computer and an Internet connection can be a blogger-
online journalism requires the writer to engage in activities that are
typically associated with traditional print reporting. Rather than
simply posting commentary or opinion based off of someone else's
work, an online journalist would attempt to gather his own news
information though investigation, sources, and access. Indeed, the
right to access the source of the news is at the heart of this Article.
These distinctions are important not only to First Amendment
press jurisprudence, but to ensure that "commentators in pajamas"
are not defining the right of access to the Galleries. 14 The online
journalist might be a former reporter for a major publication who
decides to research, report, and publish his own news online. She
might be a journalism school graduate. Lumping all online
publication under the banner of "blogging" is sure to restrict
protections that should be rightfully afforded to journalistic
professionals who choose a "unique and wholly new medium of
worldwide human communication."
15
This Article will address several issues related to the
freedom of access to the Periodical Press Gallery. Part I will
briefly describe the history of the press and the history of
congressional reporting leading up to the passage of the Periodical
Press Gallery Rules. Part II will describe the rules that govern
admission to the Gallery as they exist today. Part III will describe
themselves with the power which knowledge gives." (citing 9 Writings of James
Madison 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910))).
14 This is not to say that bloggers are not necessarily real journalists, an issue
which is highly debated. Typing the search term "Are Bloggers Journalists" into
Google will reveal dozens of differing opinions on the subject. Rather, this
Article presupposes that most bloggers do not engage in original and
independent newsgathering, which is one of the hallmarks of traditional print
journalism. To the extent a blogger does engage in this type of activity, then the
protections discussed in this Article would be appropriate.
15 Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. at 850. Further validation for Internet
journalism came on April 13, 2010, when Pro-Publica became the first online
entity to win a Pulitzer Prize for investigative journalism. The prize was
awarded to Sheri Fink for her article Deadly Choices at Memorial about the
choices faced by New Orleans hospital workers in the days after Hurricane
Katrina. See Adam Goldman, New Media Recognized in Pulitzer Competition,
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the nature of the right afforded to journalists to access government
buildings which have already been opened up to the press. Cases
discussed within this Part challenge the denial of access to the
White House, the Gallery, and the Guantanamo Bay detention
facility. Discussion in this Part will reveal how the D.C. Circuit
Court has used the political question doctrine to avoid deciding
these Gallery cases on their merits, while taking a deferential
approach to denials from other established press pools. The final
Part will argue that Consumers Union was wrongly decided, and
address how the courts should decide cases which stem from a
denial of admission to the Galleries. If the courts still refuse to
decide these cases on nonjusticiability grounds, I will argue that
Congress should refine its rules to cabin the discretion of the
Executive Committee and permit more online journalists to enter
the Gallery. I will describe how the current Periodical Press
Gallery Rules act as an unconstitutional obstacle to the First
Amendment rights of online journalists, as well as a Fifth
Amendment violation of due process. Lastly, I will detail a few
substantive amendments to the existing Rules which would provide
for a fairer review of access for online journalists.
I. THE PERIODICAL PRESS GALLERY AND ITS RULES
A. History of the Periodical Press Gallery
What constitutes the press has changed dramatically since
the First Amendment was adopted in 1791. "When the First
Amendment was written, journalism as we know it did not exist."
16
In the eighteenth century, the press was a trade of printers, not
journalists, and "the press" meant "the printing press."'17 "Freedom
of the press referred to the freedom of the people to publish their
views rather than the freedom of journalists to pursue their craft."'
18
At that time, the right was enjoyed by pamphleteers and
individuals, rather than the media conglomerates of today.
In the later part of the nineteenth century, newspapers
began hiring their own employees for the purpose of gathering
news. Advances during the Industrial Revolution allowed mass
production of newspapers, and years later gave rise to the titans of
the newspaper industry that we know today. Industry pioneers such
as Adolph Ochs, William Randolph Hearst, and Joseph Pulitzer all
built their empires during the mid-to-late nineteenth century. Until
16 David Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEx. L. REv. 430, 446 (2002).
17 id
18 Id. at 446-47.
213
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recently, "own[ing] the dominant, or only, newspaper in a mid-
sized American city was ... a kind of license to print money."'
19
But, as the shift to online news continues, the press is in search of
new models to make money. The online journalist, just like the
pamphleteer of old, is in the business of publishing his own news
and opinions without the allegiances to major newspapers-
something the First Amendment originally envisioned.
The first congressional reporters were stenographers who
attempted to publish congressional proceeding in the form of
verbatim notes of speeches. 20 These reports were often marred by
incompleteness or inaccuracies leading to condemnation from
lawmakers. In addition to the stenographers, a group of unaffiliated
correspondents called "letter-writers" sent news and commentaries
to out-of-town newspapers. 2 1 Letter-writers were often critical of
congressional members, drawing criticism from Congress, which
retaliated by attempting to limit their access to congressional
activities. In 1839, Congress debated a proposal to deprive out-of-
town newspapers of access to congressional proceedings. The
proposal infuriated a number of newsmen, leading to biting
editorials. After being denied his usual seat in the Gallery, James
Gordon Bennett of the New York Herald wrote of the "most
outrageous, high-handed, unconstitutional act[] ever perpetrated by
any legislative assembly in a free land-an act of despotism,
tyranny and usurpation against the liberty of the press which the
House of Lords of England .. .would not attempt against any
newspaper in England."
'2
In response to Bennett's protestations, a Whig majority in
the Senate, led by Henry Clay, created the first "Reporter's
Gallery" for the press in July of 1841 .23 Clay's Senate resolution
created "suitable accommodations to be prepared in the eastern
gallery [for all bona fide reporters certified by the Editors of the
papers for which they reported] .24 In 1879, the press itself took on
the responsibility for monitoring the Galleries, drafting their
regulations at the New York Times office in New York. The rules
defined accreditable correspondents and barred lobbying by any
member of the Gallery. The House adopted the New York Times
19 See Alterman, supra note 4.
20 Brief for Vigdor Schriebman at 15, Schreibman v. Holmes, 203 F.3d 53 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (No. 98-5136) (citing Frederick B. Marbut, The Letter-Writers in the
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plan in 1879, and the Senate followed in 1884.25 This same system,
drafted by the institutional press in the latter part of the nineteenth
century, still controls admission to the Galleries today.
B. Rules Governing Gallery Access
The rules governing access to the Galleries come from
several sources. Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 of the Constitution
permits Congress to define the rules of its proceedings.2 6 Pursuant
to that authority, both houses of Congress passed their own rules to
delegate control of the Galleries. Senate Rule XXXIII permits the
Committee on Rules and Administration to make all rules and
regulations "respecting the reporters' galleries of the Senate,
together with the adjoining rooms and facilities, as will confine
their occupancy and use to bona fide reporters of newspapers and
periodicals, and of news or press associations for daily news
dissemination."2 7 Rule VI of the Rules of the House of
Representatives provides that a "portion of the gallery over the
Speaker's chair as may be necessary to accommodate the
representatives of the press wishing to report debates and
proceedings shall be set aside for their use.' 28 The rule notes that
"[r]eputable reporters and correspondents shall be admitted thereto
under such regulations" and that "[t]he Standing Committee of
Correspondents for the Press Gallery, and the Executive
Committee of Correspondents for the Periodical Press Gallery,
shall supervise such galleries, including the designation of its
employees, subject to the direction and control of the Speaker."
2 9
Pursuant to the authority of the rules, the Speaker of the
House and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration
established Rules and Regulations which govern the Galleries.
30
The rules give control of the Galleries to the Executive Committee
of the Periodical Correspondents' Association. 3 1 In order to qualify
25 Id.
26 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
27 S.R., Rule XXXIII, 11 lth Cong., available at http://rules.senate.gov/public/
index.cfi?p=RuleXXXIII.
28 H.R. R., Rule VI, cl. 2, 110 th Cong., available at http://frwebgate.access.
gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname = 110 _conghouse rules manual&docid = 110
hruletx-63.pdf.
29 Id.
30 Periodical Press Gallery of the House of Representatives, Rules and
Regulations, http://periodical.house.gov/rules.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2010)
[hereinafter House Press Gallery Rules].
31 Id. The current Executive Committee includes: Richard Cohen, National
Journal, Chairman; Jay Newton-Small, Time Magazine, Secretary; Lauren
Whittington, Roll Call, Treasurer; Heather Rothman, BNA News; Meg Shreve,
215
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for access to the Galleries, prospective members must meet two
criteria. First, prospective members must be "bona fide resident
correspondents of reputable standing, giving their chief attention to
the gathering and reporting of news." 32 Second, the applicants
"must be employed by periodicals that regularly publish a
substantial volume of news material of either general, economic,
industrial, technical, cultural, or trade character. . . . [which]
require such Washington coverage on a continuing basis .... 33
The periodical itself must be "be owned and operated
independently of any government, industry, institution, association,
or lobbying organization" and must be "published for profit ...
supported chiefly by advertising or by subscription, or .
published by a nonprofit organization [if additional criteria are
met]." 34 In addition, no member of the Gallery may be engaged in
any form of lobbying.35 Despite the apparent clarity of the rules,
standards such as "bona fide correspondent," or "regular[]
[publication of] a substantial volume of news" provide sufficient
latitude for discriminatory and arbitrary interpretations. While it
may seem the rules governing the admission of a journalist are
clear, the manner in which the Executive Committee applies the
rules is a real concern.
Members of the Periodical Correspondents' Association
enjoy a variety of advantages over reporters who are unable to
obtain admission. First and foremost, they are provided with a seat
in the Galleries without having to contend for space in the public
galleries. 36 In addition, Congress furnishes the accredited
correspondents with support facilities and staff.37 Members are
also permitted access to the House Speaker's Lobby and the Senate
President's Room where they may seek and conduct interviews38
with members of Congress. Lastly, members of the Gallery are
given exclusive access to attend the daily on-the-record press
conferences held by the Senate leadership and the Speaker of the
House.
39
Tax Notes; Paul Bedard, U.S. News & World Report. Periodical Press Gallery of
the House of Representatives, Executive Committee of Periodical
Correspondents, http://periodical.house.gov/executive-committee.shtml (last
visited Mar. 26, 2010).
32 See House Press Gallery Rules, supra note 30, R. 1.
33 Id. R. 2.
34 id.
31 Id. R. 1.
36 See Consumers Union v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 18,
21-22 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd, 515 F.2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
37 See id
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These considerable perks provide lucky members with an
advantage over all non-accredited journalists. The permanent
presence of journalists in the Gallery allows them to foster
relationships with members and cultivate valuable news sources.
The constant presence and strong relationships allow Gallery
journalists the opportunity to break stories and scoop the
competition. Overall, the exclusion of a reporter from the Gallery
"constitutes a permanent disadvantage with regard to the gathering
of news and has a significant impact.., both upon the publication
excluded and others in similar situations." 40 At this point in
history, it is the online-only journalist and her counterparts who
bear the disproportionate burden of these disadvantages.
II. ACCESS TO ESTABLISHED PRESS POOLS
Several court decisions have addressed the issue of access
to government institutions that have already been opened up to
newsmen. The first Section of this Part reviews the nature of the
right of access to these governmental institutions. The second and
third Sections describe how courts have addressed decisions made
by the Executive Committee of the Periodical Correspondents'
Association to exclude a particular journalist, analyzing decisions
where access was denied and decisions where access was granted.
The fourth section describes how "deference" has been shown to
the legislative branch when it comes to determining access, while
the executive branch has not been given the same judicial courtesy.
The final section attempts to distinguish seemingly inconsistent
holdings by the same court regarding access to governmental
institutions.There are two lines of cases relating to the right of
access involving established press facilities. In one line of cases,
the courts refuse to address the First Amendment issue of access,
relying instead on the nonjusticiability doctrine to determine that
the issue is one not appropriate for judicial intervention. In another
line of cases, courts have given protection to journalists who were
excluded from access on the basis of unpublished, unclear, or
arbitrary rules. The reasoning in the latter set of cases should
ultimately prevail as courts will have to contend with these issues
on a substantive basis and will have to give serious consideration
to the rights of online-only journalists.
40 See id. at 26.
217
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A. The Nature of the Right
The courts have come to varying determinations about the
nature of the constitutional right of access afforded to journalists in
Washington. This Article does not discuss the right to press access
where the government has denied access entirely. Rather, the cases
discussed in this Article are all examples of where the government
"has voluntarily decided to establish press facilities
forcorrespondents who need to report therefrom." 41 The courts
have treated these cases quite differently than situations where all
media access is denied to a particular event. All courts which have
reached the merits of these individual exclusion cases have
recognized a First Amendment right for journalists to access an
already open press facility.
In Sherrill v. Knight, the Washington correspondent for the
Nation was denied a White House press pass after the Secret
Service deemed him to be a security risky. Here, the Secret
Service did not publish guidelines governing the grant or denial of
press credentials, did not establish procedures to appeal a denial of
a press pass, and never informed the journalist of the precise
reasons for his denial.43 In fact, Sherrill did not learn why he was
denied access until five years after he applied, during the discovery
phase of his action.
44
The government argued that because the White House was
not open to the public and because the right of access due to the
press is generally no greater than the right of access due to the
public, there was no violation of the First Amendment unless the
denial was arbitrary or based on the content of the journalist's
speech.45 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit acknowledged that arbitrary or content-based criteria are
prohibited under the First Amendment, but noted that there were
other considerations besides these.46 The court noted that "the First
Amendment's protection of a citizen's right to obtain information
concerning 'the way the country is being run' does not extend to
every conceivable avenue a citizen may wish to employ in
pursuing this right. 4 7 In particular, the First Amendment claim at
issue did not demand that the President grant an interview to every
journalist, nor that the White House open its doors to the press,
41 Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
42Id. at 127.
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conduct press conferences, or operate press facilities at all.48
Rather, the court held that where the doors are already open, and
where press facilities are made publically available as a source of
information for newsmen, "the protection afforded to news-
gathering under the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the
press, requires that access not be denied arbitrarily or for less than
compelling reasons." 49 Judge McGowen also found that "notice,
opportunity to rebut, and a written decision are required because
the denial of a pass potentially infringes upon First Amendment
guarantees... [which] cannot be permitted to occur in the absence
of adequate procedural due process." 50 The court observed that, in
addition to the newsmen, "the public at large [has] an interest
protected by the first amendment in insuring that restrictions on
news-gathering be no more arduous than necessary, and that
individual newsmen not be arbitrarily excluded from sources of
information."
51
Because of the important First Amendment rights
implicated in the denial of individual access, the court determined
that the refusal of a press pass should be based on a "compelling
governmental interest." 52 In Sherrill, the court had no problem
determining that the physical security of the President of the
United States constituted a compelling-even overwhelming-
interest, but the standards and process used to deny the press-pass
did not pass constitutional muster.53 For one, the standard for
denial of a press-pass was never formally articulated or
published.54 In addition, informing journalists that they were
denied for "reasons of security" was unnecessarily vague and
subject to ambiguous interpretation. 55  In clarifying the
constitutional requirements, the court noted that while the specific
interest in that case (i.e., presidential safety) did not lend itself to
detailed articulation of narrow and specific standards or clear-cut
factors, the standard must provide a meaningful way for journalists
to be labeled a security risk and be sufficient to allow for
"meaningful judicial review."56 While Judge McGowen implored
lower courts to be appropriately deferential, he still opined that
notice, opportunity to respond, and a written statement of the
48 Id.
49 Id (citations omitted).
'o Id. at 128.
51 Id. at 129-30.




56 Id. (emphasis added).
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reasons for denial were "compelled by the ... determination that
the interest of a bona fide Washington correspondent in obtaining a
White House press pass is protected by the first amendment ...
[which] undoubtedly qualifies as [a] liberty which may not be
denied without due process of law under the fifth amendment."
57
The court decided that at a minimum, an unsuccessful applicant
must be informed of the factual basis for denial and provided an
opportunity to rebut the denial. As in Sherrill, where applicants
were only told that they were a "security risk," the Periodical
Correspondents' Association often denies applications by reference
only to a rule, setting forth no factual findings to be appealed. In
light of the First and Fifth Amendment interests articulated in
Sherrill, the Periodical Correspondents' Association's scheme is
likely to fail constitutional review, but, unfortunately, courts have
been hesitant to decide Gallery cases on their merits.
B. Access Denied
The seminal case regarding access to the Galleries is
Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical
Correspondents' Association.58 In 1972, Gilbert Thelen submitted
an application to the Executive Committee of the Periodical
Correspondents' Association for membership as a representative of
Consumer Reports. 59 The Committee rejected the application on
the ground that Consumer Reports was "not an independent
publication," as required by Rule 2 of the Periodical Press Gallery
Rules.60 The Committee offered no factual basis for rejecting the
application. Following the remedial scheme authorized by the
rules, Thelen asked the Executive Committee to reconsider its
decision, but the Committee again rejected the application. Thelan
then appealed to the Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration, and to the Speaker of the House, to no avail. While
Thelan pursued administrative remedies, the basis of the rejection
was later clarified. The Executive Committee contended that
Consumer Reports was published by Consumers Union, a
nonprofit organization "which is a self proclaimed advocate of
consumer interests and, among other activities, testifies before
Congressional committees on behalf of the interests of
consumers." 61 Because the parent company of Consumer Reports
17Id at 130-31.
58 515 F.2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
59Id at 1345.
60 Id.
61 Consumers Union v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 18, 22




Witte: IT'S MY NEWS Too!
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2010
IT'S MY NEWS Too! ONLINE JOURNALISM AND DISCRIMINATORY
ACCESS TO THE CONGRESSIONAL PERIODICAL PRESS GALLERY
was classified as an "advocacy group," rather than a publishing
organization, Thelen was denied his credentials.
In his action for declaratory relief, the plaintiff argued that
the Rules Governing Periodical Press Galleries were
unconstitutional both on their face and as applied to Consumer
Reports. More specifically, the plaintiff contended that Rule 2
"constituted a prior restraint upon, and otherwise abridged, its
rights to gather, have full access to, and report to its readers upon,
the news concerning Congress and of a public nature, in violation
of... the First Amendment... .,62 In addition, the plaintiff argued
that in "denying accreditation to Consumer Reports[,] the
Association acted in a discriminatory, arbitrary, capricious, and
unreasonable manner, thus violating Consumers Union's rights
under the Fifth Amendment."
63
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found
for Consumers Union and declared the Periodical Press Gallery
Rules unconstitutional on First and Fifth Amendment grounds.
64
Like the Sherrill case two years later, the court opined that where
certain journalists are excluded from gaining equal access to facts
of public consequence, limitations must be clearly justified by a
compelling and demonstrable governmental interest.65 In addition,
"means selected for furthering [the governmental] interest must be
no more restrictive of individual rights than is reasonably
necessary." 66 Finally, the district court concluded that the rules
may not be so vague or overbroad as to unnecessarily chill the
exercise of those rights or provide insufficient guidance to those
who must administer the legislation.67 Of particular note was the
finding that the Periodical Press Gallery Rules were too
ambiguous, despite being unmistakably clearer than the
unpublished Secret Service rules in Sherrill.
In applying the law, the district court held that the
exclusion of some reporters from an area which had been
voluntarily opened to other reporters for the purpose of news-
gathering poses grave constitutional problems. 68 The district court
found that when access to news sources is "unreasonably or
arbitrarily denied by congressional action or publishers meeting
under congressional auspices, [that denial] constitutes a direct
limitation upon the content of news as recognized in Branzburg v.
62 Consumers Union, 515 F.2d at 1346.
63 Id
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Hayes."69 The court recognized that "[a]ll types of news compete
and all types of publications are entitled to an equal freedom to
hear and publish the official business of the Congress," 70 and that
"[t]he Constitution requires that congressional press galleries
remain available to all members of the working press, regardless of
their affiliation." 71 The court held that the broad and generalized
grant from Congress to the Correspondents' Committee permits the
Committee to implement arbitrary and unnecessary regulations to
exclude publications they consider objectionable without any
72means to check the abuse of their delegated authority. This, the
district court held, violated the constitutional rights of Consumers
Union. The court concluded that more definitive rules were needed
to permit due process prior to exclusion and provide some
opportunity for adequate impartial review whenever a journalist is
excluded.73
In reversing the district court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held that the issue was
nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine. 74 Refusing to
address the matter on the merits, the court found that Article I,
Section 5, Clause 2 permits Congress to "determine its rules of
proceedings," and so long as the rule does not ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, it is no impeachment of a
rule to say that some other rule would be more just.75 The court
also noted that the rules need only have a "reasonable relation" to
the results that they seek to attain.
76
In evaluating the legislative purpose of the Periodical Press
Gallery Rules, the court found that the intent was to ensure that the
Galleries are only used for bona fide reporters who will not abuse
the privilege by lobbying on behalf of private interests. The court
found that the rules were reasonably related to the aforementioned
purpose and that courts had no power to second guess Congress's
exercise of its Article I powers.
69 Id.
70 Id. (emphasis omitted).
71id
72 See id.
73 Id. at 26-27.
74 Consumers Union v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n, 515 F.2d 1341, 1347
(D.C. Cir. 1975); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (stating that
issue may be nonjusticiable under political question doctrine if there is
"textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department").
75 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2; see Consumers Union, 515 F.2d at 1347 (quoting
United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892)).
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Invoking the Speech and Debate Clause under Article I,
Section 6, Clause 1, the court also found that the Correspondents'
Association was entitled to immunity from Consumers Union's
challenge. 77 The court opined that deciding the composition of the
Gallery is a legislative function, as evidenced by Congress's direct
and historical control over the seating of the press in the nineteenth
century. Furthermore, because the function was delegated to the
Correspondents' Association, the Association would be immune
from suit so long as an individual member would be immune if the
action was taken directly by him.78 The court was "content to rest
[its] ruling... upon the ground that, performed in good faith, the
acts of [the Correspondents' Association] were within the spheres
of legislative power committed to the Congress and the legislative
immunity granted by the Constitution."
79
The first and only case applying Consumers Union to an
Internet journalist was Schreibman v. Holmes.80 In 1997, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was again
confronted with the question of whether denying a journalist
access to the press galleries constitutes a violation of the First and
Fifth Amendments. In this case, Schreibman was the sole owner,
publisher, editor, and writer for Federal Information News
Syndicate (FINS), which published a biweekly Internet news letter
that reported on federal legislation and governmental policies.
FINS had a number of paying subscribers and even more who read
the publication online for free. The Executive Committee of
Correspondents denied Schreibman's request for accreditation on
the grounds that his publication did not meet the requirements
under Periodical Press Gallery Rules 1 and 2.81 The Committee
failed to provide factual basis for the denial, but at the plaintiffs
77 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1; see Consumers Union, 515 F.2d at 1349.
78 See Consumers Union, 515 F.2d at 1350 ("Appellants were acting by virtue of
an express delegation of authority as aides or assistants of Congress. If their
actions would have been immune from inquiry ... had they been performed by
Members of Congress, the same immunity would attach to appellants.").
79 Id. at 1351. Contra Consumers Union v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n,
365 F. Supp. 18, 24 (D.D.C. 1973) ("[I]t is well established that a congressional
rule which infringes upon the constitutional rights of persons other than
Congressmen presents a proper question for the judiciary .... [The conduct of
the Correspondents' Association] in barring the representatives of certain
publications from the periodical press galleries and admitting others neither
constitutes an integral part of nor has been shown to have a significant impact
upon the proceedings on the floor of either House .... In the absence of such a
showing, it must be concluded that the Speech and Debate Clause does not
shield the defendants from a challenge to their admission policies." (citing
Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 143-44 (1963))).
8 0 No. 1:96CV01287, 1997 WL 527341 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 1997).
81 See House Press Gallery Rules, supra note 30, Rs. 1, 2.
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request, held a public hearing to reconsider the application. Again,
Schreibman's request was denied. He finally appealed to the
Speaker of the House and the Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration, but no action was taken on the appeal.
In the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, the
Correspondents' Committee finally asserted the factual basis for
denying Schreibman's request. They contended that in
contravention of the Periodical Press Gallery Rules, FINS was not
published for profit, Schreibman did not receive a salary from
FINS, and Schreibman did not earn his livelihood as a journalist.
82
The Committee also maintained that their interpretation of the
Periodical Press Gallery Rules was immune from judicial review
under the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution.
83
Schreibman alleged that the Periodical Press Gallery Rules were
unconstitutional on their face and as applied to his publication.
84
Relying on Consumers Union, Judge Urbina held that
Schreibman's challenge was nonjusticiable. The court again
determined that the Speech or Debate Clause barred suit against
the Correspondents' Committee regarding its accreditation
decisions "so long as the Committee was acting within the scope of
its authority and in good faith., 85 Finding that Schreibman never
pled that the Committee acted in bad faith, the court dismissed the
suit.
C. Access Granted
Decided two years after Consumers Union and twenty
years before Schreibman, the Sherrill court was the first court to
venture into the constitutional issue underlying special access
cases. 86 Because Sherrill is still good law, it provides considerable
weight to the argument that courts should not lightly abdicate their
judicial responsibilities when it comes to reviewing Gallery access
cases on the merits. Luckily, the D.C. District Court is slowly
showing its willingness to address the issue.
The most recent case speaking to the issue of access is
87Getty Images News Services, Corp. v. Department of Defense. In
this case, Getty Images alleged a violation of its First Amendment
rights, due process rights, and equal protection rights when the
DOD rejected the photo service from travel with certain press
82 See Schreibman, 1997 WL 527341, at *2.
83 Id.
84 id.
851d. at *4 (emphasis added).
86 Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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pools related to Operation Enduring Freedom of the Iraq War.
88
Getty Images asserted that the DOD's method of selecting which
media organizations could travel to Guantanamo Bay was arbitrary
and capricious, and permitted the DOD to reject an application
without any reasonable explanation, and without review.
Dismissing all but one of Getty's claims, the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia ultimately held that Getty was likely
to succeed on the argument that inadequate and unpublished
criteria relating to the selection of journalists for a press pool with
finite space was a violation of their due process and First
Amendment rights.
89
In 2002, the DOD began permitting journalists to travel to
Guantanamo Bay on a military transport plane to cover the
detention facility. 90 Because there was only one way to Cuba, and
one way home, the space allotted to journalists was limited, and
the exclusion of some was necessary and inevitable. 91 In order to
aid in the selection process, the DOD crafted a set of six internal
guidelines that would inform their decision. These guidelines were
not published, and selection decisions were made by a DOD Public
Affairs Officer based on his or her "general knowledge and
expertise." 92 On occasion, the Public Affairs Officer would elicit
information from other members of the press pool to guide his or
her decision.93 In support of its decision to exclude Getty Images,
the DOD argued that not only is Guantanamo Bay not a public
forum, but that "review of military regulations challenged on First
Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional
review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian
society.
' 94
The district court agreed with the DOD that heightened
deference was due to the military. 95 In addition, the court found
that Guantanamo Bay is a closed military base located on an island
with no commercial air travel, dedicated to the housing of terrorist
suspects in a military operation. 96 But despite these important
88Id. at 114.





94 Id. at 119 (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986)).
95 See id. ("The Court agrees both that the Guantanamo Bay Navel Base is not a
public forum and that consideration of Getty's First and Fifth Amendment
claims must be undertaken through the prism of the heightened deference due to
military regulations and decision-making. Nonetheless, equal access claims by
the press warrant careful judicial scrutiny.").
96 Id at 120.
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policy concerns, the court found that components of the DOD
selection process were unreasonable. For one, the court reasoned
that the standard for due process is not met where "criteria ... are
either vague or completely unknown [so that] the party affected
has no way of knowing how to achieve compliance.., nor even of
challenging them as being improper." 97 The court also noted-as
in the situation of the Gallery-that competing journalists were
permitted to inform the DOD's decision on who is granted access.
The court concluded that the "DOD must not only have some
criteria to guide its determinations [about journalists], but must
have a reasonable way of assessing whether the criteria are met."
98




The Sherrill and Getty line of cases provides a proper
standard for reviewing Gallery problems, as well as the appropriate
measure of deference when reviewing access decisions on the
merits. In addition, Getty is instructive when evaluating the
reasonableness of the selection criteria for journalists.
First, both lines of cases involve the issue of deference.
Whereas the courts in Consumers Union and Schreibman made the
decision to give the ultimate deference to the Periodical
Correspondents' Association-rendering their decisions
unreviewable-Getty and Sherrill carved out a more appropriate
path for handling these types of cases.
Like in the Gallery cases such as Consumers Union and
Schreibman, Sherrill involved the issue of deference to a coequal
branch of government. The reasoning used to deny judicial review
in Consumers Union was that the Constitution entrusted Congress
with the authority to pass rules regulating access to the chamber,
and that power was in turn delegated to the Correspondents'
Association. However, access to the White House and the
President of the United States is within the scope of powers
reserved to the Executive Branch. In turn, the Secret Service is the
agency entrusted with deciding who may access the White
House. 00 But despite deference to a coequal branch of government
and to the administering agency, the court still found that the
constitutional concerns in Sherrill were within the purview of the
97Id at 121.
98 Getty Images News Servs., Corp. v. Dep't of Def., 193 F. Supp. 2d 112, 121
(D.D.C. 2002).
99Id at 119.
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court. The court rejected the government's argument that the case
was "nonjusticiable . . .because protection of the President is
vested within the sole discretion of the Executive."' 0 ' The court
found the argument "wholly without force," and noted that this
discretion "cannot be said to authorize procedures or actions
violative of the Constitution."'10 2 The court found that once the
White House made its press facilities available as a source of
information for newsmen, "the protection afforded news-gathering
under the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press
require[ed] that this access not be denied arbitrarily or for less than
compelling reasons." 10 3 The court gave some weight to the
government's compelling reasons, but still found that decisions to
exclude newsmen must be reasonable and guided by appropriate
standards. Sherrill shows that courts can grant the appropriate
measure of discretion to a coequal branch, while still safeguarding
the rights of citizens.
If there were ever a case where public policy would counsel
the courts to grant broad discretion to exclude journalists, it would
be Getty. Unlike the Capitol in Washington, D.C., which houses
the elected representatives of the people, Guantanamo Bay houses
terrorist suspects and is accessible only by military transport.
Unlike the Galleries, with over five hundred seats, space on the
military base is much more restricted. Despite granting broad
discretion to military decisions, the court in Getty still ruled that
the decisions of the Department of Defense must be reasonable; a
decision which is ultimately subject to judicial review.
There is no legitimate policy justification for holding the
Department of Defense to a higher standard in excluding
journalists than the Executive Committee of the Correspondents'
Association. Just as Getty demonstrates a new willingness to tread
into access cases, courts should reconsider the district court
opinion in Consumers Union and find the decisions made by the
Executive Committee outside of the scope of immunity of the
Speech and Debate Clause.
E. Distinguishing Consumers Unionfrom Sherrill
Arguably, the similarities between Getty and Sherrill may
have led to their similar treatment, in contrast with the treatment of
Consumers Union and Schreibman. In particular, the courts have
227
101 Id. at 128 n.14.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 129-30 (citations omitted).
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only stepped in when the selection criteria for journalists were
unpublished or when no appeal procedure had been established.
First, Getty and Sherrill involved selection criteria which
were not published by the Secret Service or the Department of
Defense. By contrast, the Periodical Press Gallery Rules have
always been made public and available to any journalist prior to
filing his application with the Committee. While this major
difference is instructive on the matter of due process, the
Periodical Press Gallery Rules are not so clear as to avoid
constitutional scrutiny. As described above, although the
Periodical Press Gallery Rules are long, much of the text deals
with what Gallery journalists are prohibited from doing once they
are admitted into the Gallery. The selection criteria themselves are
subject to amorphous and arbitrary application. For instance, could
a failing newspaper be denied admission because it is no longer
turning a profit? 10 4 As advertising dollars dry up and newspapers
look toward alternative money-making schemes, can the
newspaper be said to be "supported chiefly by advertising or
subscription?"'10 5 Is an online journalist categorically excluded
from being a "bona fide resident correspondent[] of reputable
standing, giving [his] chief attention to the gathering and reporting
of news"? 10 6 No matter how clear the rules are, judicial
unwillingness to review decisions of the Executive Committee
leaves the strong possibility of impermissible discrimination. All
of these cases, including Consumers Union, provide that the
Executive Committee is only entitled to immunity when its
decisions are made in good faith. As Part III of this essay points
out, the opportunity to make decisions in bad faith is too great to
go unchecked.
Also important in Sherrill is that rejections were made
without factual findings. The same is true in Schreibman and
Consumers Union, where the Committee refused to give any
factual basis for rejecting accreditation until after litigation
commenced. This is most problematic when it comes to the appeal
procedure. Although the Periodical Press Gallery Rules provide for
"a right to a public hearing before the committee," 1 7 the right is
meaningless when the factual basis for denial is not released until
after the hearing. In addition, due process typically requires an
impartial decisionmaker; in this case, the same committee that
104 See House Press Gallery Rules, supra note 30, R. 2 ("Applicants must also be
employed by a periodical that is published for profit and is supported chiefly by
advertising or by subscription.").
105 Id.
106 Id. R. 1.
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made the decision is given the power to review it. Although the
applicant can then appeal directly to the Speaker of the House, this
method has been wholly unsuccessful in the past.10 8 The court in
Sherrill made clear that the basis for rejection must be sufficient to
allow for meaningful judicial review. In the absence of judicial
willingness to review, the rationale for rejection may never be
released.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM
A. Problems with the Rules Themselves
As seats in the Gallery begin to open up, the question of
who occupies the empty chairs will become a source of contention.
Because Consumers Union and its progeny are on shaky ground
jurisprudentially, the political question doctrine and the Speech or
Debate Clause should be set aside, and cases involving
discriminatory access to the Gallery should be decided on the
merits. Even if the courts refuse to budge, there are still substantial
policy reasons for Congress to redraft the rules or provide
additional oversight to the accreditation process.
First, even if the existing rules are faithfully applied and are
sufficiently distinguishable from those in Sherrill and Getty, the
existing requirements infringe the First Amendment rights of the
entire class of online journalists.
One piece of evidence of the discriminatory nature of the
rules is the subsequent denial of Gallery accreditation to a reporter
who was already accredited with a different organization. In
Schreibman, the aggrieved plaintiff was accredited as a Gallery
correspondent when he worked for the Electronic Public
Information Newsletter. 109 It was not until he struck out on his own
and created the Federal Information News Syndicate that his
accreditation was denied. This focus on the parent publication and
the journalist's income as a deciding factor stifles journalistic and
entrepreneurial freedom and undermines competitive journalism.
For instance, if an experienced Washington Post reporter
decided to start his own news site, the Executive Committee could
no doubt deny his application on several grounds. First, under Rule
2, the Committee could find that the journalist was not "employed"
because he had yet to earn a salary. The proprietor of a new
company might operate at a loss for some time, and if the owner is
108 In both Consumers Union and Schreibman the applicants appealed but cert
was not granted.
109 Brief for Vigdor Schriebman, supra note 20, at 53.
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also the sole employee, he might also forego a salary, choosing
instead to reinvest his earnings back into the company until the
business is financially secure. Rule 2 conditions accreditation on
commercial viability, and allows only the instantly successful
publishers-or the independently wealthy-to have access to the
Gallery.
Not only is it improper to condition access to information
on wealth, it ignores the underlying motivations of journalists.
Journalism has norms that often defy conventional
wisdom about rational economic behavior ....
Historically it has not been a high-paying
occupation and.., it still is not. As a consequence
journalism is staffed largely by people who have
rejected economic reward as their principal
motivation. The rewards they seek come from their
peers and their superiors, not the audience or the
market."l
0
By excluding journalists who have deeper motivations than
economic concerns, the Executive Committee may be denying
access to the most dedicated and altruistic reporters. While it is
obviously necessary to set standards for access, money should not
be the concern of the guardians of the Gallery. I do not suggest that
every blogger with a website should have access, but hinging
accreditation on readership rather than income might be more
appropriate. In addition, the second part of Rule 2 operates as a
catch-22 to prohibit newcomers from the Gallery. How does one
demonstrate a necessity for "Washington coverage on a continuing
basis" for an upstart publication? In the absence of a track record
of congressional reporting, a new publication would likely be
denied. Simply declaring its purpose would probably not be
enough. While a history of congressional reporting with another
publication could be instructive on this point, Schreibman
demonstrates that the Committee might not take this fact into
account. This rule favoring established media outlets further
entrenches traditional media's control of the Gallery.
Next, the administrative process to change the rules is
undemocratic. Rule 6 of the Senate's Rules Governing the Press
Gallery states that "[t]he Standing Committee shall propose no
changes in the [sic] these rules except upon petition in writing
signed by not less than 100 accredited members.""' However, the
"0 Anderson, supra note 16, at 475.
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dearth of accredited Internet-only journalists, and the strong
economic motivation of traditional newsmen to maintain the status
quo, ensures that the requisite number of online-only journalists to
change the rules will not soon be reached. Thus, online journalists
will not meet the accreditation standards until the rules change, and
the rules will not change until the Executive Committee accredits a
larger number of online journalists.
B. Problems with the Administration of the Rules
This is not the first time that the Correspondents'
Association has felt threatened by outsiders. When the rules were
originally drafted at the New York Times Company headquarters
in 1879, women and minorities were excluded from the Gallery.
112
Only radio reporters who also reported for daily newspapers would
be granted accreditation during the 1920s and 1930s.13 Nonprofit
organizations, the "backbone of a civic society," were excluded
until 1979.114 Accreditation standards recognizing only print media
also stood as an obstacle to the development of broadcast
journalism.115 This history of discrimination demonstrates the need
to address the problems faced by online-only journalists as quickly
as possible.
1 6
First, the lack of genuine independence in the private press
demands higher scrutiny of how the Correspondents' Committee
self-regulates the Galleries. Between advertisers, parent
companies, and stockholders, the traditional press is constrained by
market concerns that are less relevant to the independent online
journalist. American newspapers, magazines, and broadcasters
generate about $145 billion in revenue each year, more than double
the revenue from oil and gas production or agriculture. 117 Many
conventional media outlets now have online operations and many
more are betting their future on a switch to the Internet. With these
bet-the-company strategies, it is easy to see how self-interested
business can guide the supposedly impartial decision of who





116 Although one might point to the eventual incorporation of each of the
excluded populations as a testament to the Executive Committee scheme, the
case of Internet journalism is quite different. Unlike the admission of minorities
or women, which posed no threat to the institution of the press, Internet
journalism could deal a significant blow to the institution itself. In addition,
newspapers were not attempting to break into the television or radio market.
Nowadays, they are attempting to enter the world of Internet news.117 See Anderson, supra note 16, at 484.
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should be accredited to the Gallery. In 1880, John Swinton, the
managing editor of the New York Sun and former chief editorialist
of the New York Times, made clear the effects that economics
played on the newspaper and its employees:
There is no such thing in America as an
independent press, unless it is in the small towns.
You know it and I know it .... [W]hat folly is this
to be toasting an 'Independent Press.' We are the
tools and vassals of rich men behind the scenes. We
are the jumping-jacks; they pull the strings and we
dance. Out talents, our possibilities and our lives are
all the property of other men. We are intellectual
prostitutes.
More recently, the "rich men" have become publically held
conglomerates which must serve the expectations of investors,
analysts, and fund managers. NBC is owned by General Electric,
ABC by Walt Disney Co., and CBS by Viacom, and only a
fraction of each parent company is dedicated to news gathering and
news dissemination. 19 News Corp., which owns the New York
Post and 175 other newspapers, also owns television stations,
sports teams, a book publisher, and a movie studio. Under the
existing rules, it is debatable whether these companies actually
engage in lobbying activities or whether their chief attention is the
gathering and dissemination of news. For instance, should Walt
Disney's activities lobbying for an extension of the copyright
protection period,120 prohibit ABC from joining the Gallery? Like
Consumer Reports, the parent companies here may be engaged in
activities which should prohibit membership into the Gallery, but,
unfortunately, the rulemakers tend to avoid these issues when it
comes to determining the accreditation of their own. These
companies seem to have a fiduciary duty to their stockholders to
stifle competition, and the current process for drafting the
Periodical Press Gallery Rules and the unreviewable manner in
which they are administered provides a perfect cover to do just
that.
It is clear that the Executive Committee has the right to
promulgate and enforce the rules relating to the Gallery as
delegated by Congress. It must, however, draft clear rules and
118 RiCHARD 0. BOYER & HERBERT M. MORAS, LABOR'S UNTOLD STORY 81
(1955).
119 Anderson, supra note 16, at 455.
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administer these rules fairly. 121 Because of Consumers Union and
its progeny, the Executive Committee has no incentive to even-
handedly administer the rules of accreditation. Well aware that the
courts are unwilling to disturb its decision, the Committee is in a
position to discriminate against online journalists at will. While
proof of discrimination in any single case might be difficult to
prove, the system as a whole should be evaluated for constitutional
infirmities. As even the Schreibman court noted, decisions of the
committee could not be predicated on bad faith. The confluence of
problems in the rules themselves, the selfish interests of the current
Gallery members in excluding Internet journalists, and the
unreviewable administration of the rules provides a strong basis for
inferring bad faith.
Ever since its inception in the late 1800s, the
Correspondents' Committee has been dominated by representatives
of traditional print media. Of the seven members of the current
Executive Committee, not a single individual represents an online-
only publication. 122 Given the competitive nature of journalism,
this poses a significant problem.
The press has been, and is now more than ever, a
fluid and dynamic institution, with newcomers
always contending for membership .... [There is a]
troublesome risk in today's environment [that]
politically powerful media will capture the process
to serve their own ends at the expense of the weaker
or less politically engaged segments of the media.
123
The Committee is also well aware of the growing
preference for individualized news tailored to readers' specific
interests and the advantage that smaller publications have in
delivering the news to a niche market. In the area of television
news, the past decade has proven that broadcast and cable
networks which cater to specific interests, such as sports, finance,
food, or entertainment, have outpaced the broadcast giants in terms
of viewership. 124 The same is true for print media, where
metropolitan daily newspapers have lost readers to alternative
newspapers, business publications, and national newspapers.
125
Considering the low barriers to entry and low overhead for online
journalists and publishers, the Committee's impermissible desire to
121 See Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 130-31 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
122 Supra note 31.
123 Anderson, supra note 16, at 520-21.
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hold on to a competitive advantage in congressional access can
surely be inferred.
While the argument can be made that the Committee is
discriminating based on the economic status of the Internet
publications-a traditional rational basis category-it is the nature
of the right that is most important. The court in Sherrill held
arbitrary discrimination violated the First Amendment; the
decision to discriminate based on market power is at best arbitrary.
At worst, it is an example of bad faith because without access,
market power is impossible to achieve.
In addition, the current accreditation scheme runs counter
to the free marketplace of ideas theory of the First Amendment, in
which a multiplicity of viewpoints is viewed as necessary to serve
the best interests of the public. The First Amendment "rests on the
assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of
the public, that a free press is a condition of a free society."' 126 The
value of the First Amendment provision for a free press lies in its
protection of debate on public issues that should be "uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open."' 7
The current scheme used by the Correspondents'
Association allows members of traditional print media to decide
what the public needs to know, by selecting which journalists
cover the news, instead of letting market forces determine which
news outlets are ultimately successful. The existence of such a
"self-appointed elite" is one source of popular dissatisfaction with
the press. 1
28
Evidence of the failure of the free marketplace of ideas can
also be seen in the rising dissatisfaction with the media, as well as
the shrinking press coverage of the federal government. 129 "On the
whole, mainstream journalism seems to be edging away from the
public-interest ideal. Coverage of foreign affairs, government,
science, and business has been cut back in favor of coverage of
126 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); see also Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas
in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization
of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee.").
127 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).128 See Anderson, supra note 16, at 478-79.
129 See Thomas Kunkel & Gene Roberts, Leaving Readers Behind, AM.
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lifestyle, consumption, sports, entertainment, and celebrities.'
130
Investigative reporting is suffering in the same way, with fewer
than one in ten covering issues concerning education, economics,
foreign affairs, the military, national security, politics, or social
welfare, and over half focusing on lifestyle, behavior,
consumerism, health, or entertainment celebrities.' 3 ' Given the
media's traditional role as a watchdog for the people, the lack of
attention to matters of significance threatens that role. By allowing
an injection of new blood into the Gallery, the public will have
more options for finding their news; the addition of these new
journalists should increase competition and lead to better coverage.
Furthermore, congressional news which is important to only
certain communities would benefit greatly from the increased
variety of journalists in the Gallery. For example, an online
publication dedicated to reporting on agricultural issues may be
better suited to recognize and report on legislation like farm bills
than some traditional print publications.
Currently, newspapers like the New York Times have
dozens of seats in the Galleries. However, the marketplace of ideas
theory of the First Amendment is best served by a diversified press
pool. As Judge Learned Hand noted in United States v. Associated
Press:
[The press] serves one of the most vital of all
general interests: the dissemination of news from as
many different sources, and with as many different
facets and colors as is possible .... [That interest]
presupposes that right conclusions are more likely
to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authoritative selection. To
many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have
staked upon it our all.
132
While some may argue that the shift in reporting to soft
news is simply a product of consumer demand, evidence suggests
that the public seems less inclined to trust the press than ever.
133
130 See Anderson, supra note 16, at 477 (noting that only 513 reporters covered
all of the state capitals in 1998, while 3000 reporters were accredited for one
Super Bowl).
131 Id. (citing Bill Kovach & Tom Rosenstiel, Are Watchdogs an Endangered
Species?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., May-June 2001, at 50, 53).
132 United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943),
aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
133 Anderson, supra note 16, at 480 ("From 1985 to 1999, the number of people
who thought the news media usually get the facts straight dropped from fifty-
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Perhaps, with such a wide array of independent journalists
covering the same story, readers get one step closer to "the truth,"
or at least "the truth" that they want to read. The ability of
individual journalists to cover the Congress in their own way will
help insure that institutional bias remains at a minimum.
134
Without the crushing overhead of the institutional press, the future
of independent online journalism is at a critical impasse. Provided
with appropriate access, these journalists have the potential to
change the way people receive their news. If the current system is
allowed to discriminate against online-only journalism, the
problems in coverage will persist and consumer confidence will
continue to suffer.
IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES
Of course, every denial of a journalist's application should
not turn into a federal case, but in order to ensure that the decisions
of the Executive Committee are made in good faith, the existing
Periodical Press Gallery Rules should be amendment. It is
important to remember that once a journalist is admitted to the
Gallery, his or her behavior still comes under the purview of the
Executive Committee. If a journalist is ever found to no longer
need access, there is nothing in the Rules which would prohibit the
revocation of his or her credentials with appropriate notice and due
process. The most important thing at this point, however, is to
provide for the opportunity to be admitted in the first place. The
proposed amendments are noted in italics.
First, Rule 1 should be amended to alter the selection
criteria to permit more online-only journalists admission. The Rule
should state that
Persons eligible for admission to the Periodical
Press Galleries must be bona fide resident
correspondents or independent journalists of
reputable standing, giving their chief attention to the
gathering and reporting of news. They shall state in
writing the names of their employers and their
additional sources of earned income. Independent
journalists who are self-employed may be permitted
five percent to thirty-seven percent, the number who saw the press as 'immoral'
rose from thirteen percent to forty percent, and the number who saw the press as
lacking in professionalism tripled.").
134 See Wendy S. Zeligson, Pool Coverage, Press Access, and Presidential
Debates: What's Wrong with This Picture?, 9 CARDOzO L. REv. 1371 (1988)
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access to the Press Gallery as a correspondent
upon a showing that his or her publication is of the
type that would benefit from ongoing Press Gallery
access. Additional sources of income derived from
sources not explicitly prohibited below should be
irrelevant to determining Press Gallery admission.
By altering the Rule in this manner, the Executive
Committee will have a textually demonstrable commitment to
consider independent journalists. In addition, by allowing
alternative sources of income, provided they are not from
prohibited sources like lobbying activities, the proposed
amendment ensures that access is never predicated on financial
success.
Next, Rule 2 should be amended to provide more leniency
to online journalists when evaluating their publication's success.
For instance, the Rule could read
Applicants must be employed by, or independently
operate, periodicals that regularly publish a
substantial volume of news material of either
general, economic, industrial, technical, cultural, or
trade character. The periodical may be published in
print, on the Internet, or a combination of both. The
nature of the periodical must be such that
Washington coverage on a continuing basis would
demonstrably improve the content of the
publication. The publication must be owned and
operated independently of any government,
industry, institution, association, or lobbying
organization.
Applicants must also be employed by, or
independently own and operate, a periodical that is
published for profit and is supported chiefly by
advertising or by subscription . . . . Online only
publications which are distributed free of charge
and without advertising revenue shall be permitted
access so long as an alternative source of income is
not prohibited below .... 1
35
135 Pro-Publica is a good example of an online news organization which
distributes its content free to other publications and relies on philanthropic
contributions and foundation support to survive. See Pro-Publica, About Us,
http://www.propublica.org/about (last visited May 28, 2010).
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In addition, a few qualifications could guide the Executive
Committee in its decisions. For instance, a section could be added
that directs the Committee to consider certain factors when
deciding whether to grant or deny the application of an online-only
publication. Those factors should include:
(a) The number of subscribers to the publication, or
the number of "hits" that the publication's Web site
receives on a daily basis;
(b) Whether the type of news material published by the
applicant is substantially similar to that of a print
publication which would be granted access to the Press
Gallery;
(c) Whether the applicant has already been accredited by a
different publication;
(d) Whether the applicant's previous stories have
contained independent research; and
(e) The number of publications which maintain multiple
accredited journalists in the Press Gallery.
For the last factor, the Committee should consider the costs
and benefits of allowing different publications to report the
dealings of Congress rather than dozens of journalists accredited
from the same institution. The Rules should also be amended to
require the Committee to detail the factual findings associated with
the decision to deny an applicant's admission. These findings shall
be reviewable and subject to appeal according to the current
regulations. Lastly, the Rules should make clear that federal courts
have jurisdiction to review decisions denying admission to a
journalist after all of the administrative remedies authorized in the
statute are exhausted.
By making these changes, the Executive Committee will be
forced to give due respect to the emerging medium of online news.
In addition, by making the decisions of the Committee subject to
judicial review, there is a much smaller likelihood that the
applications will be denied based on improper motives or bad faith.
CONCLUSION
While the Rules of the Gallery will probably eventually
change to incorporate more online-only journalists, the change
should not be so slow as to deny business opportunities to the very
reporters that foresaw the shift from print media to the Internet.
Cases like Consumers Union ensure that the Executive Committee
has no incentive to administer the Periodical Press Gallery Rules
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First Amendment rights of online reporters will be subjugated
without judicial or congressional action. If access to the home of
the President and to suspected terrorist suspects in a militarily
controlled foreign land is within judicial oversight, so too should
the Gallery be reviewable. In the absence of a judicial willingness
to oversee this important matter, Congress should take steps to
cabin control of the Executive Committee and ensure that online
journalism can succeed or fail on its own merits, rather than its
lack of access to primary news.
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of patent policy is to balance the incentive to
invent against the ability of the economy to utilize and incorporate
new inventions and innovations. Substandard patents that upset
this balance impose deadweight losses and other costs on the
economy. In this paper, we examine some of the deadweight losses
that result from granting substandard patents in the United States.
Under plausible assumptions, we find that the economic losses
resulting from the grant of substandard patents can reach $21
billion per year by deterring valid research with an additional
deadweight loss from litigation and administrative costs of $4.5
billion annually. This brings the total deadweight loss created by
our "dented" patent system to be at least $25.5 billion annually.
These estimates may be viewed as conservative because they do
not take into account other economic costs from our existing patent
system, such as the consumer welfare losses from granting
monopoly rents to patent holders that have not, in the end,
invented a novel product, or the full social value of the innovations
lost.
* Senior Fellow, Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy
Studies; Professor of Economics, Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama.
** Chief Economist, Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public
Policy Studies.
*** Resident Scholar, Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public
Policy Studies.
**** President, Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy
Studies. The views expressed in this paper are the authors' alone and do not
represent the views of the Phoenix Center, its Adjunct Fellows, or any of its
individual Editorial Advisory Board members.
33
Witte: IT'S MY NEWS Too!
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2010
QUANTIFYING THE COST OF SUBSTANDARD PATENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 241
I. SOURCES AND COSTS OF A "LOOSE" PATENT SYSTEM ............ 243
II. THE EQUILIBRIUM LEVEL OF VALID AND SUBSTANDARD
PA TEN TS ........................................................................... 250
III. QUANTIFYING THE COSTS OF SUBSTANDARD PATENTS .......... 255
A . L ost P atents ..................................................................... 25 7
B. Other Deadweight Losses ............................................... 264
C. Review of the Evidence ................................................... 268
C ON CLU SION ........................................................................... 268
INTRODUCTION
Patent policy necessarily involves a balance between
encouraging inventors to create new products while simultaneously
ensuring that innovations become diffused throughout the
economy. Protecting intellectual property is a lynchpin of a
vibrant, modem economy, and while the benefits of the patent
system are undeniable, the system also imposes significant cost on
the economy-even in the best of circumstances. Several high-
profile patent disputes, such as the Blackberry' and Microsoft
MP32 cases, have sparked a debate as to whether the U.S. patent
law system adequately promotes the interests of inventors or
whether the system is a legal quagmire that stalls new innovation
in excessive litigation.3 When a patent system grants substandard
patents or provides overly permissive legal remedies for patent
holders, the protection of intellectual property can create
substantial net loss of economic welfare. We envision a
"substandard patent" as one that is not privately profitable to
pursue in the absence of litigation opportunities afforded through
inevitable imperfections in the legal system. Although such a
patent does not protect an invention worth protecting from the
social point of view, they may be privately profitable because the
sometimes afford the opportunity to obtain payments from holders
1 The dispute between patent holder NTP Inc. and BlackBerry smartphone
manufacturer Research in Motion Ltd. resulted in a settlement of $612.5 million.
See Important Dates in BlackBerry Patent Case, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
11409695 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (providing a detailed timeline of the case).
2 Saul Hansell, MP3 Patents in Upheaval After Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/23/technology/23patent.html.
3 For a summary of the ills of the modern patent system and critiques against it,
see ADAM JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How
OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS,
AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT (2004). As the National Research Council of the
National Academies noted, "patents on trivial innovations may confer market
power or allow firms to use legal resources aggressively as a competitive
weapon without consumer benefit." NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L
ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY 95 (2004).
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of sufficiently similar or related "real" patents which are practiced.
So, while a well-functioning patent system will necessarily balance
the benefits of innovation with the costs of monopoly, a defective
system adds to the social costs of patent monopolies the additional
deadweight losses arising from reduced innovation and from the
wasted resources directed at securing and protecting substandard
patents, without providing any offsetting benefit. In economic
terms, such substandard patents represent options permitting
transfers of wealth from the holders of legitimate patent rights to
those holding related, substandard patent claims. Their social value
is low (or zero), yet their private option value rises with defects in
the patent system.
The economic costs of substandard patents are highlighted
by (but by no means limited to) "patent troll" litigation, to which a
substandard patent regime can give rise. "Patent troll" litigation is
one form of litigation arbitrage-it will exist in areas in which
patents are relatively easy to obtain and the consequences to a
defendant accused of infringement of losing a patent suit can be
enormous and irreversible, such as an injunction against any future
sales of a successful yet potentially infringing product. The
presence of this arbitrage indicates that the current patent licensing
and enforcement system are in need of reform and a thoughtful
rebalancing of incentives.
In this Article, we attempt to quantify in a preliminary
manner a portion of the cost to the United States' economy of
substandard patents granted by the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO). In particular, we focus upon
deadweight losses that result from the impact that a "loose" patent
system that unduly grants "substandard" patents has upon
innovation and the development of important, valid patents. These
costs are deadweight losses and not merely transfers, so they
reduce overall economic welfare. In the United States, we estimate
that the deadweight loss of a "loose" patent system from lost
innovation is approximately $21 billion each year in private costs
alone, or nearly $200 per household per year. This sizeable
deadweight loss constitutes approximately 7% of annual Research
and Development ("R&D") spending. Deadweight losses from
litigation and administrative costs from substandard patents
constitute an additional $4.5 billion annually, or 1.5% of the
country's annual R&D spending.
Our findings are described as preliminary, since there is
very limited data upon which to base our estimates. However, we
believe that our methods render conservative estimates because we
do not take into account a number of other costs created by
substandard patents. Most notably, in cases where a substandard
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innovating, there is a welfare loss without commensurate benefit
that our model does not attempt to quantify. We also ignore the
fact that innovation has a greater social benefit than private benefit,
so the social costs of lost innovation stand to be much larger than
the $21 billion in annual private costs from lost innovation that we
estimate.
4
In Part I, we provide a brief description of the general
problem of substandard patents and their causes and consequences.
Our discussion is succinct, since there are many studies on this
issue that are readily available to interested parties. In Part II, we
explain an important component of our model, which focuses on
the important interactions between the equilibrium level of "valid"
and "substandard" patents. We show that substandard patents
impose deadweight losses on the economy as a whole because they
deter innovation and the development of important, valid patents.
This idea serves as the basis for the estimation that we perform in
Part III. Part III also contains a sensitivity analysis to allow the
inputs to vary over the range of plausible values. Our findings are
summarized in the Conclusion.
I. SOURCES AND COSTS OF A "LOOSE" PATENT SYSTEM
A well-functioning patent system engages in a delicate
balance. In order to "promote the progress of Science and useful
Arts,"5 a patent holder is granted a legal exclusive monopoly to an
invention for a limited period of time. It is thought that granting
monopoly profits to patent holders would direct societal resources
towards scientific and useful innovations. Thomas Jefferson once
wrote that patent law is about "drawing a line between the things
which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive
patent and those which are not."
6
What Jefferson calls the "embarrassment" of a legal patent
monopoly, economists would call a social cost. By definition, the
granting of a monopoly reduces output and causes a net loss in
consumer welfare. The traditional justification for patent rights is
predicated upon the assumption that without such monopoly rights,
society will not achieve the optimal rate of innovation because
innovations and scientific discoveries are, absent patent rights,
often public goods that provide limited or no opportunity for the
4 See, e.g., Charles Jones & John Williams, Measuring the Social Return to R &
D, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1119 (1998); Adam Jaffe, Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Economic Analysis of Research Spillovers Implications for the Advanced
Technology Program (Dec. 1996), http://www.atp.nist.gov/eao/gcr708.htm.
5 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
6 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989)
(citing 13 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 335 (Memorial ed. 1904)).
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inventor to recover the costs of discovery. If every invention could
be immediately copied, then few firms would invest the resources
necessary to invent new products. Absent patent rights, an inventor
also would have an incentive to prevent others from learning about
any new discovery.7 A patent attempts to remedy these problems
by giving the inventor the legal right to collect some portion of the
social value attributable to the invention while inducing disclosure
of the details of the invention to the public.8 This disclosure, in
turn, likely increases innovative activity in that area due to
increased information.
9
At the same time, granting too much protection to inventors
(or granting it too easily) can hamper the creation and diffusion of
technology throughout the economy. Achieving an adequate
balance of rights to compensate true innovators and fostering the
use of patented technology is the goal of a well-functioning patent
system. A patent regime that makes it too easy to obtain and
enforce a patent could create too many of these monopoly
"embarrassments" that would reduce economic welfare by virtue
of their monopoly status yet not promote economic welfare
because they do not reward true innovations.i° As the Supreme
Court stated in 1950, the granting of patents for obvious and
known methods "withdraws what is already known into the field of
its monopoly and diminishes the resources available to skillful
men."
11
There are several ways in which substandard patents can
impose economic and welfare costs on the economy. As we
describe in Part II below, a "loose" patent system-that is, a patent
system that permits large numbers of substandard patents-causes
deadweight economic losses because the presence of substandard
patents diminish the overall level of innovation and development
of valid patents. A valid patent, like a substandard patent, confers a
7 See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 247, 247-48 (1994).
8 Kitch adds that patents also promote efficiency by deterring others from
engaging in wastefully duplicative efforts of re-inventing the same technology.
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265 (1977); see also Dam, supra note 7, at 266-67.
9 There is some dispute regarding the value of disclosure. See, e.g., Yossi
Spiegel & Reiko Aoki, Public Disclosure of Patent Applications, R&D, and
Welfare (Berglas Sch. of Econ. Working Paper No. 30-98, 1998).
10 See Nancy T. Gallini, The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S.
Patent Reform, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 131 (2002); Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie
Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting
in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-95, 32 RAND 101 (2001) (patenting
may be socially wasteful and accumulation of patents may redirect resources
away from productive research).
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monopoly right to the holder, but a valid patent does so only in the
case of genuine innovation. Valid patents then have a positive
social value in addition to a private value, while substandard
patents have only the private value. The deadweight losses
occasioned by substandard patents will cause resources to be
allocated inefficiently and therefore affect the entire economy. In
addition, a "loose" patent system that grants large numbers of
substandard patents also causes other inefficiencies and
misallocations of resources, as such a system would:
" Cause consumers to absorb monopoly prices over
"inventions" that were already effectively common
knowledge;
12
" Direct resources away from productive research and instead
towards strategic accumulation of patents already filed over
innovations already deployed;
13
" Divert resources to "defensive patenting" or securing
offensive "blocking patents;"'
14
" Direct research away from areas of existing patents that
should not have been granted;
15
" Direct resources toward acquiring and enforcing
substandard patents and collecting royalties rather than
productive fields of economic activity.
Given this potential for misallocating resources and the
other costs, a well-functioning patent law regime should tailor the
scope of the legal patent monopolies so that the harms described
above are outweighed by the benefit to society from the economic
innovation which results from those patent monopolies. As stated
by Ldvaque and Mdni~re, the "simple criterion" of economic
welfare "helps define the elements of an optimal patent."'
16
Whether the United States patent system is "too loose"
today is the subject of substantial debate. The claimed
shortcomings of the USPTO and the United States court system are
numerous and appear to stem primarily from a poor legal
12 "This deadweight loss reduces the total surplus created by the innovation at
least during the lifetime of the patent." FRANCOIS LIVtQUE & YANN M NIERE,
THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT 21 (2004).
13 Jaffe & Lerner describe a number of such activities including the sealed
crustless sandwich and the perpetual option pricing formula of Vergil
Daughtery. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 3, at 32, 145-47.
14 See Gallini, supra note 10 (describing strategic practice of "defensive
patenting"); Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining
Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REv. 75 (1994)
(describing the similar strategic use of "blocking patents").
15 See Gallini, supra note 10.
16 LIVQUE & M1WNIItRE, supra note 12, at 43.
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framework and an understaffed and overworked agency. The
debate often centers around the patenting of "inventions" such as a
method for swinging on a swing, the sealed crustless sandwich, a
financial technique developed four decades prior to patenting by
academics unaffiliated with the patentee, and anti-gravity flying
machines. 17 As observed by Magliocca, the United States court
system, in many ways, exacerbates the problem, brought to light
by the explosion of "patent troll" litigation. Patent trolls engage in
a very specific arbitrage opportunity and thrive in certain
conditions in which patents are easy to obtain and keep, the costs
of defending a patent suit are great, and the risk to a defendant of
losing a patent suit are enormous because the defendant "cannot
easily substitute away from the disputed technology."' 18 Trolls
thrive in situations in which patents are easy to get and damages
uncertain. 19 As Justice Kennedy observed in the eBay decision, a
patent remedy such as a permanent injunction against an infringer
"can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to
companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent."
20
As a result, almost unique among industrialized nations,
United States companies face a plethora of patent suits brought by
plaintiffs with arguably substandard patents. 2 1 There are some
17 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 3, at 145-47; U.S. Patent No. 6,960,975 (filed
Mar. 14, 2005) (granting patent for a "space vehicle propelled by the pressure of
inflationary vacuum").
18 Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the
Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv 1809, 1812 (2007).
19 On the other hand, some commentators argue that "patent trolls" serve a
useful purpose, most notably by providing liquidity to inventors as well as
expertise in policing infringement. See, e.g., Steven Rubin, Hooray for the
Patent Troll, IEEE SPECTRUM, Mar. 2007, http://spectrum.ieee.org/consumer-
electronics/gaming/hooray-for-the-patent-troll ("[P]atent-holding companies
provide another way, and sometimes the only way, for an inventor to monetize
his patent. They foster innovation by making it possible for small companies and
individual inventors to spend their time in research and development, knowing
that if a patent does issue, they will not necessarily have to commercialize or
litigate it. They can spend time doing what they are good at-inventing."). But
see Zachary Roth, Patent Troll Menace, WASH. MONTHLY, June 1, 2005,
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2005/0506.rothsidebar2.html
("The reason this business is attractive to people such as Lockwood is simple:
Trolling makes money.... [E]ven though his patent was overturned, Lockwood
still got to keep the licensing fees he had extracted from other targets that chose
not to fight.").
20 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
21 Patent trolls are largely a U.S. phenomenon. See, e.g., Joe Brennan et al.,
Patent Trolls in the U.S., Japan, Taiwan and Europe, 13 CASRIP NEWSLETTER,
Spring/Summer 2006, http://www.law.washington.edu/Casrip/Newsletter/
default.aspx?year=2006&article=newsvl3i2BrennanEtAl. We do not claim that
most litigation by patent trolls is brought through substandard patents, only that
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signs that reform is brewing. Several recent Supreme Court
decisions have addressed the standards for granting and
challenging a patent22 and trimmed back lower court rulings that
had increased the business risk and harm from losing a patent
lawsuit.23 The Patent Reform Act of 2007, directed at improving
patent quality and changing patent remedies, has been approved by
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. Analyzing and
understanding the economic welfare costs of the current United
States patent system is clearly of importance to policymakers as
they consider these reform proposals.
The welfare costs of the current United States patent
regime can be estimated empirically by comparing the valid patent
output of our regime to the patent system in Europe. In contrast to
the United States, the European patent system, while certainly not
perfect, has a relatively "tighter" standard for granting patents and
the process is administered and enforced differently as well. By
this discussion we do not mean to imply that the European patent
system is better than the United States system or that it should be
adopted here, but only to assert that the two legal regimes are
different in a way that allows us to perform an empirical analysis
of the current United States patent regime.
To obtain a patent in the United States, the invention must
be new, useful and non-obvious. 24 In the United States, unlike
some other countries, the process for granting a patent is usually
confidential and solely between the applicant and the USPTO, and
other parties are not permitted to intervene or oppose a patent
application. 25 Moreover, the USPTO cannot simply reject a patent
22 In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), the Court
tightened the Federal Circuit's test for patentability, in particular the "obvious"
standard. In Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007), the
Court overturned a Federal Circuit ruling that limited the ability of patent
licensees to subsequently challenge the validity of a patent.
23 In Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007), the Court overturned
a Federal Circuit ruling that held Microsoft liable for computers manufactured
and programmed abroad with software that infringed a United States patent. In
eBay, the Court ruled that traditional equitable principles should apply in patent
disputes with regard to the granting of injunctions against infringing products;
prior to that decision, lower courts had followed a "general rule" of always
issuing such an injunction without considering the public interest.
24 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (new and useful); id. § 103 (non-obvious). For a
recent Supreme Court discussion of the obviousness test, see KSR, 550 U.S. 398.
25 Patent applications in the United States are not necessarily made public until
after a patent is issued. 35 U.S.C. § 122(a). Applications are not made public
until 18 months after filed. Id. § 122(b)(1)(A). Within two months after
publication, third parties may submit prior art related to patentability. Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure 1134.01. Upon issuances of a patent, the protection
has a term of twenty years from the date on which the application was filed, but
only upon issuance of a patent does the information disclosed in the application
becomes a matter of public record. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a). Until 1995, the term of a
247
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application; it also bears the burden of making a prima facie case
that explains the reasons for rejection. Third parties do not have the
right to participate in the patent application process and patents can
only be challenged after a grant in limited instances, consisting of
challenges based on prior art found in patents or printed
publications. 26 Moreover, in some instances, challenging a patent
creates potential for the challenger to be estopped from asserting
certain defenses in an infringement suit.27 Finally, in a suit for
patent infringement, a plaintiff may obtain injunctive relief and
damages, which may include lost profits due to the infringement or
a reasonable royalty.
28
Pursuant to the European Patent Convention, which
harmonizes the patent laws of its signatories, twenty-year patents
are available for "any inventions .. .provided that they are new
and which involve an inventive step and are susceptible of
industrial application." 29 The standard for patentability in Europe,
while similar to the United States in some respects, 30 is different in
other respects, particularly with regard to the European
requirement that an invention be of a "technical" nature. 31 In
addition, patent applications in Europe are made public even if
they have not been issued and the method for challenging a patent
differs. As a result, a patent application in Europe is three times
more likely to be opposed than a patent is to be reexamined in the
United States.32 Of all the potential remedies to the United States
patent system, remedying post-grant review process to adopt an
patent was seventeen years from the date of issuance. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1988)
(amended 1994).
26 35 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302, 311 (2006).
27Id § 315(c).
28 D.S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS 20.01, 20.03 (1997).
29 European Patent Convention art. 52(1), Nov. 29, 2000, available at
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/2000/e/contents.html.
30 Robert Stevenson, Software Patent Law: United States and Europe
Compared, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0006 (comparing U.S. "novelty" step to
European "new" step).
31 European Patent Convention, supra note 29, §§ 29(1), 52(2). This "technical
nature" requirement has led to different approaches in the United States and
Europe over the patentability of software and "business method" patents. The
European standard does permit the patenting of software directed at a technical
process or that contains non-technical features. See, e.g., In re Sohei, 1995
O.J.E.P.O. 525 (Tech. Bd. App. 1994), available at http://legal.european-patent-
office.org/dg3/biblio/t920769ep1 .htm.
32 LtVtQUE & MtNItRE, supra note 12; see also Dietmar Harhoff & Stuart J.H.
Graham et al., Patent Quality Control: A Comparison of US Patent Re-
examinations and European Patent Oppositions (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res.,
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approach more consistent with the European Patent Office (EPO)
is by far the most commonly mentioned.33
Remedies for patent infringement are also different
between the United States and Europe, and these differences
appear to encourage more litigation in the United States. In
particular, European law tends to favor payment of license fees and
damages instead of injunctions over the future sale of infringing
products, which have been more common in the United States. For
example, in the United States, patent holders do not have a duty to
license and their licensing actions are limited only by antitrust
law, 34 but in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany,
compulsory license statutes require patent holders to license their
products. 35 While the Supreme Court in 2006 took action to limit
the scope of permanent injunctions in patent disputes, 36 injunctive
relief is still available to patent holders in the United States.37 Jury
trials to enforce patent rights and establish damages are not
guaranteed in Europe as they are in the United States. In the United
States, patent litigators often get a second bite of the apple as well,
33 See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1455, 110th Cong. § 6. There are a
number of papers offering options to improve the current patent system,
primarily to protect against opportunism using substandard patents. See, e.g.,
David Barker, Troll or No Troll? Policing Patent Usage with an Open Post-
Grant Review, 2005 DuKE L. & TECH. REV. 0009 (proposing that all patents be
reviewed openly "whenever patents are renewed or sold"); James Bessen &
Michael Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research on Patent
Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1, 1-27 (2005); J. Farrell & Robert
Merges, Incentives To Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won't
Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might
Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 1-28 (2004); Michael Meurer, Controlling
Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L.
REv. 509, 509-44 (2003); Stuart Graham & Dietmar Harhoff, Can Post-Grant
Reviews Improve Patent System Design? A Twin Study of US and European
Patents (CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5680, 2006); Stuart Graham & Dietmar
Harhoff, Would the U.S. Benefit from Patent Post-grant Reviews? Evidence
from a 'Twining' Study (June 2005), ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-
docs/veranstaltungen/graham harhoff paper.pdf.
34 See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172,
179 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
35 Stevenson, supra note 30, at 10.
36 In the eBay decision, the Court reversed the court of appeals' "general rule"
unique to patent disputes "that a permanent injunction will issue once
infringement and validity have been adjudged." eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,
547 U.S. 388, 393-94 (2006). According to Chief Justice Roberts, "[f]rom at
least the early 19th century, courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding
of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases." Id. at 394 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
37 TiVo Inc. v. Echostar Comm. Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
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because the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
reviews all patent claim determinations under a de novo standard.38
Patent suits in the United States are also generally more
expensive than in Europe. Estimates indicate that the costs of a
patent lawsuit through discovery are about $2 million for each
side.39 These costs are substantially higher than that in several
European countries. In Germany, for example, the cost of a suit
ranges from approximately $30,000 to $80,000. o
We outline these differences between the European and
United States patent regimes not to imply that the European regime
is somehow preferable to the United States system, but simply to
demonstrate how the United States system maintains a relatively
"looser" patent system than Europe, thereby permitting more
substandard patents. (The looseness of the patent system is
logically separate from the costs of litigating patent claims, yet the
high costs evident in the United States may strengthen the hand of
patent trolls in pretrial negotiations.) That distinction is important
as it serves as the basis for our estimation of deadweight losses and
other costs described in Part III below. As described below, a
"loose" patent system discourages the development and filing of
valid patents and creates a deadweight loss for the economy. We
base this estimate on the fact that even with a tighter legal standard
for patentability, Europe produces a higher share of "valid"
patents, relative to substandard patents, than the United States.
Therefore, while the European system has been criticized as being
too "tight," its relatively more stringent granting practices allow it
to serve as a basis for our estimation approach.
II. THE EQUILIBRIUM LEVEL OF VALID AND
SUBSTANDARD PATENTS
The basis of our argument is that substandard patents
arising from a "loose" patent system reduce the number of valid
patents by discouraging innovation. While this idea is generally
accepted, we formalize it here by describing the "correct" level of
patenting in the sense of the equilibrium values of valid and
substandard patents. To begin, we divide total patents into two
38 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc). District Court Judge James F. Holderman stated that because of this de
novo standard of review in patent cases, "we United States District Court Judges
feel like the late comedian Rodney Dangerfield, because our opinions 'get no
respect."' James F. Holderman, The Patent Litigation Predicament in the United
States, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 1, 6.
39 See, e.g., John Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 441 (2003)
(estimating this figure for patents worth $1 to $25 million).
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types: (1) valid patents (v) and (2) substandard patents (b). Total
patents are just v + b. Valid patents represent patents that are true
inventions or discoveries in which the cost to society of granting a
twenty-year monopoly to the patent holder are outweighed by the
aggregate social benefit of the invention or discovery itself.
Substandard patents are those which are granted that are of low
quality (that is, for ideas that are not in fact new or non-obvious)
and which create risks for valid patents through litigation and
licensing. From the standpoint of our model, it is not necessary to
assume that each and every patent of this sort is literally bogus, is
created for a nefarious purpose, or is of no independent private
value to the patentee. Our analysis simply assumes that such
patents fall below an operative or ideal standard for approval and
that they impose, on average, a harm to the economy as a whole
and, specifically, a harm to so-called valid patents. More directly,
the addition of a substandard patent reduces the private marginal
benefit of a valid patent, and discourages the production of both
valid and substandard patents (or inventions in general, whether
patented or not).
The relationships between the flows of valid and
substandard patents, and the assumed forms of the marginal
benefits of these activities among agents in the economy, lie at the
heart of our analysis, and therefore merit a brief discussion. First,
valid patents, although they are differentiated by definition, are
assumed here to be, broadly speaking, "competing" with one
another. In other words, a valid invention will, on average, make
money for its owner, but the product or service supported by the
invention in question competes for the consumers' attention with
all other products offered in the market. In a market populated by
many innovative products, any individual product is, on average,
less likely to make a high return. Thus we assume, as is common in
economic analysis, that the marginal benefit of an additional valid
patent decreases as more valid patents are awarded. This feature of
the return to innovative activity is also consistent with the
observation that high value projects are pursued "first", i.e., in
almost all cases, while lower valued projects are funded only under
more favorable conditions. The same logic applies to the
diminishing marginal values of substandard patents.
The notion that increased numbers of valid patents will
increase the marginal value of a substandard patent arises from the
conceptualization of a substandard patent. Such a patent has value
primarily (or solely) from its potential to support a patent claim
against a valid, profitable patent. The more valid patents there are,
the greater the probability such a claim can be constructed given an
arbitrary substandard patent. Thus, the holder of a substandard
patent would welcome increased numbers of valid patents, as this
44
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would raise her opportunity for privately profitable litigation. In a
similar way, an increase in the number of substandard patents will
adversely affect the expected profitability of a valid patent, since
the risk of costly patent claims will increase.
To describe the equilibrium, we assume that patents (or
patentable inventions) are ordered from highest to lowest, with
resources devoted first to those patents with the greatest value.
With diminishing marginal benefits to patents, the equilibrium
number of valid patents, v*, will solve:
A(x) -a v-c b =0 (1)
where the expression is the net private marginal benefit of an
additional valid patent.4 1 The total benefit of valid patents is
maximized where the marginal benefit of a valid patent is zero.
The net marginal benefit includes a value A(x), which is a function
of exogenous factors x such as the legal system for granting or
challenging patents and the cost of enforcing patents. The
parameter a measures the reduction in the net marginal benefit of
valid patents given the addition of one more valid patent, and the
negative sign indicates diminishing marginal benefits.42 The
relationship between the number and creation of substandard
patents and the marginal value of a valid patent is measured by the
parameter c. Substandard patents, on the other hand, reduce the net
marginal benefit of valid patents. This consequence arises
primarily from opportunistic litigation or licensing. Although they
both represent a reduction in the value of a valid patent, both a and
c are expressed as positive values.
The equilibrium number of substandard patents, b*, will
solve:
B(y) - d b + e v =0 (2)
where B(y) is a scale factor for the net private marginal benefit of
substandard patents, and its value is driven by a set of factors y.
The factors y will generally not be the same as x, but some overlap
is to be expected. Intuitively, y will encompass factors that
measure the strength of the jurisdictional patent review process, the
efficiency of the legal system, the generosity of patent
41 In both Equation (1) and Equation (2), we have linear marginal benefits, but
this assumption is not required and is for convenience only.
42 This reduction in marginal benefit presumably occurs because patent
opportunities are exploited in order of decreasing expected net value, although
the formulation is not inconsistent with the existence of an additional effect that
reflects an actual reduction in the economic value due to competition between
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infringement awards, legal costs, and so on. The parameter d is the
effect on net private marginal benefits from the addition of one
more substandard patent. And while d is positive, the negative sign
implies diminishing net marginal benefits. In contrast to Equation
(1), an increase in the number of valid patents increases the net
private marginal benefit of a substandard patent (because this
increase creates more opportunities for litigation). The equilibrium
number of both types of patents is determined by the condition that
the marginal benefits of each are simultaneously equal to zero in
the relevant jurisdiction.
Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the equilibrium.
The figure has the number of substandard patents (b) on the
vertical and valid patents (v) on the horizontal axis. The curves in
the figures represent the loci of points where the marginal benefits
of valid and substandard patents equal zero across the range of
values of both b and v (i.e., iso-marginal benefit curves). The
intersection of the two defines the equilibrium. In the figure, the





Figure 1. Patent Equilibrium
To demonstrate the comparative statics of the model,
consider a court decision that makes the granting of substandard
patents more difficult, such as the recent Supreme Court decision
in KSR that overturned lower court's permissive interpretation of
the "non-obvious" test for patentability. In the model, this legal
change is represented by a change in y that reduces B(y).
Consequently, the number of substandard patents should diminish.
In Figure 2, we illustrate this as a change in y to y', causing a shift
in the upward sloping iso-marginal benefit curve for substandard
patents down and to the right. The new equilibrium is b** and v**,
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where substandard patents fall and valid patents rise. Given our
observation above that substandard patents diminish the value of
valid patents and, therefore, reduce the incentive for firms to obtain
such valid patents, upon the legal change that decreases the
number of substandard patents, the number of valid patents will be
expected to rise.
The comparative statics of the other parameters are
similarly intuitive. Put simply, anything that increases the value of
valid patents increases both b and v. Any change that increases the
value of substandard patents reduces v and increases b. For
example, a change in x that makes valid patents more difficult to
enforce will shift the iso-marginal benefit curve (MBV = 0) down





b* . . . . /
I MB =O0
V* V ** V
Figure 2. Patent Equilibrium
The most important point about this analysis is that it
illustrates an aspect of the problem of the United States patent
system that has received insufficient attention. In particular, since
the numbers of both types of patents affect the marginal values of
each, any policy change that affects either relationship will, in
equilibrium, affect the numbers of both types. Of special potential
concern is the size of the effect of substandard patents on the
values of valid patents. To the degree that valid patents, as
described here, have much larger net social values, a patent system
that allows too many substandard patents is likely to reduce the
extent of innovation valid patents support, reducing economic
welfare. This dampening effect may be far more important than the
direct costs of litigation and licensing, much of which will
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de minimis, the discouragement of innovation, in the long run, will
almost certainly swamp these more easily counted "direct" costs.
We also note that the underpinnings to our approach are
conceptual. For example, we note that there is no need to assume
that the socially optimal number of substandard patents need be
zero, especially because there are costs associated with reducing
substandard patents. For instance, adopting a patent regime that
sets the bar high for granting any patent would certainly reduce or
even eliminate the level of substandard patents, but that decision
also could reduce the number of valid patents as well and therefore
impose welfare losses on the economy. The administrative costs
(and risk of mistakes) of sorting through valid and substandard
patents may also be extraordinarily high. Like most things in
economics and public policy, such a complete foreclosure of
substandard patents would probably be too costly to be optimal in
the real world. As a result, the efficient balance should be sought,
and that appropriate balance is what a good patent policy must
continually strive to achieve.
In addition, we are not assuming, and do not suggest, that
substandard patents are intentionally created to use in
opportunistic, socially destructive litigation or royalty seeking. It
seems probable that very few patents are created with that primary
end in mind. Rather, when the patent system is sufficiently "loose"
in granting patents, and patents are had cheaply enough, firms and
others will patent devices and procedures that are of limited
commercial potential. In such cases, the possibility of obtaining an
infringement award, or of licensing to others seeking legal defense,
becomes a non-negligible consideration that encourages the
patentee to proceed. Such expectations, of course, need to be
accurate in equilibrium, so it must be the case that some
opportunistic exploitation occurs. Since a patent is often an
alternative to other means of protecting intellectual property, such
as trade secret activity, one would expect that an increase in the
number of potentially threatening patents would reduce the
marginal benefit of a "valid" patent effort.
III. QUANTIFYING THE COSTS OF SUBSTANDARD PATENTS
As discussed above, the presence of substandard patents
leads to a reduction in the number of valid patents. In this Part, we
attempt to quantify the loss of valid patents in the United States
due to substandard patents, and then put a monetary value on that
loss. As a first step, we estimate the number of valid patents lost to
substandard patents. To do so, we assume, as have others, that
triadic patents-i.e., those in which the inventor seeks patent
protection in the United States, Europe, and Japan-are "relatively
255
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important" patents and are, to a large extent, generally regarded as
"valid" patents.43 The validity of such patents is based on the fact
that the patent must be granted by three patent offices: the USPTO,
the EPO, and the Japanese Patent Office (JPO). By most accounts,
the EPO is the most stringent in its requirements and evaluations,
and we use that presumption below to specify some parameters of
our estimation approach. We do not intend, however, to imply that
the European patent system is the "correct" system. Rather, we
assume, given the differences in the legal regime, that patents
issued by the EPO are less likely to be substandard patents. This
assumption, however, does not imply that the EPO system is in
some sense ideal or perfect.
It is of course arguable that U.S. patents are, in some sense,
qualitatively different from those in the European Union or Japan.
This could be the case, for example, if the U.S. market were more
important because of its size or profitability. Then, one might
imagine valid inventions being patented only in the U.S. However,
we find this conjecture unconvincing for several reasons. First, it
seems unlikely one would have a patent for an invention that was
profitable in the United States, but not in the European Union, for
example. It is easier to imagine a profitable invention patented
only in Japan, where cultural practices and relative prices are quite
different (for example, it seems likely that a golf driving range
device meant to be used atop tall buildings would be of more value
in Japan). One might refer to this possibility as the "enculturation"
of inventive activity.
More importantly, however, it seems undeniable that triadic
patents are highly likely to be important, valid patents, even if
there are valid patents that are not registered in all three
jurisdictions. In this case, variations in the rates of triadic patents
between jurisdictions will still provide a relative measure of lesser
quality patents, although perhaps not universally substandard ones.
Then, looking at the high rate of patents granted in the United
States relatively to U.S. investment in R&D, one is forced to
conclude either that: (1) the United States is highly efficient in
R&D given its investments, or (2) the U.S. system generates a
large number of dubious patents relative to the other jurisdictions.
We base our calculations on the second of these interpretations.
Substandard patents are harmful in (at least) three
respects. 44 First, substandard patents may reduce future innovation
43 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 3, at 143.
4 4 See, e.g., U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 146-151, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/report/gc vl.pdf (2003); Richard Levin et al.,
Appropriating the Returns from Industrial R&D, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
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by discouraging research and development in a particular area for
fear of infringing, or directing research away from valid to
substandard opportunities. 45 This reluctance to enter could affect
market structure and prices. Second, substandard patents may
induce unnecessary licensing royalties, distorting the incentives the
patent system was designed to provide. Third, legal challenges to
substandard patents can result in socially wasteful litigation costs.
Our focus here is on the first harm, and we attempt to estimate the
welfare losses from high numbers of substandard patents. We
believe these costs will be the largest of the three, and our rough
estimates of the other costs indicate that this is true.
A. Lost Patents
The presence of substandard patents clearly reduces the
incentives for firms to innovate. 46 Yet, there is no direct evidence
of which we are aware on the precise extent of research deterrence.
In an effort to approximate the number of lost "valid" or
"relatively important" patents lost due to the presence of
substandard patents, we assume the production of relatively
important patents is a linear function of R&D expenditures.47 Thus,
45 See, e.g., Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is
It the Best Incentive System?, 2 INNOVATION POL'Y & ECON. 51 (2002); Robert
Merges & Richard Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of
Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991).
46 Jean Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary
Injunctions, 44 J.L. & ECON. 573 (2001); Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow
of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463 (1995). Hunt claims that the weakening of
the non-obviousness requirement by domestic courts lead to more but weaker
patents, and discouraged R&D activity. Robert Hunt, Nonobviousness and the
Incentive To Innovate: An Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Reform
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. Working Paper No. 99-3, 1999); see also T.S.
Ellis, Judge, Distortion of Patent Economics by Litigation Costs, Address at the
1999 CASRIP Summit Conference, in 5 CASRIP PUBLICATION SERIES:
STREAMLINING INT'L INTELL. PROP. 22 (1999), available at http://www.law.
washington.edu/casrip/Symposium/Number5/pub5atcl3.pdf. ("My thesis today
is neither revolutionary nor abstruse. On the contrary, it is no more than a
modest, straightforward, common-sensical observation that has likely already
occurred to many veteran viewers of the patent scene. It is, simply put, that the
escalating, indeed skyrocketing litigation costs of the 1970's and 1980's have
distorted patent markets and patent economics. Put another way, it is my
observation that the escalating costs associated with litigating patent
infringement and validity issues discourage challenges to patents, thereby
essentially equating the entry barriers for presumptively valid, but weaker
patents with those entry barriers associated with strong or judicially tested
patents.").
47 We are also evaluating log transformations of the variables using comparable
R 2 values, but the linear specification is superior to these alternatives.
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the number of triadic patents filed by country i in period t is
described by
T
Fi,t = RNDi,t + O DUS + ;_ ajDj + i,t (3)
where F is the number of triadic family patents for country i in
period t, RND is the real research and development expenditures
for country i in period t, DUS is a dummy variable with a value of
1 for the United States (0 otherwise), the Dj are T (= Xt) period
specific dummy variables, the cy are estimated coefficients, and Ejj
is the econometric disturbance term.48 The coefficient 0 measures
the extent to which the United States either under- or over-
produces valid patents relative to other countries. Triadic patents
are measured by the OECD using applications at the EPO and JPO
and grants at the USPTO.49
All of the data required to estimate Equation (3) is from the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's
(OECD) Main Science and Technology Indicators. The variables
are expressed in annual terms and cover the period 1995 through
2003. The variable RND is measured in two ways: civil R&D and
total R&D (both civil and defense), and both are measured in real
dollars (in millions).50 There is some evidence suggesting that
defense spending on R&D generates few patents, and the United
States spends far more on defense R&D than any other country in
the sample.51 Thus, using only Civil R&D (i.e., total R&D less
defense-related R&D) provides a more conservative estimate of the
number of lost valid patents. To demonstrate the conservative
nature of using only Civil R&D expenditures, we also present the
results with the variable R&D measured using total R&D
expenditures for comparison purposes. Given the large number of
missing observations on the share of Civil R&D spending, the
48 Data required to estimate this equation is from the OECD's Main Science and
Technology Indicators (Subscription Service). The variables are expressed in
annual terms and cover the period 1995 through 2003, and with missing
variables the sample size is 299 observations. The model is estimated using least
squares with period dummy variables to account for the time series nature of the
data. The coefficients are highly statistically significant and are 13o = -396.6, 131
= 0.10, and the year 2003 constant is -105.2. Overall, the model performs well,
with an R2 of 0.80. The linear specification fits the data quite well, much better
than either the log-lin or log-log specifications.
49 Application data at the USPTO was not available prior to 2003, leading to this
definition of triadic patents by the OECD. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION &
DEV. [OECD], PATENT STATISTICS MANUAL 71 (2009).
50 The GDP deflator is provided in the OECD data for those countries included
in the sample.
51 Aok Chakrabarti & C. Leonard Anyanwu, Defense R&D, Technology, and
Economic Performance: A Longitudinal Analysis of the U.S. Experience, 40
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share variable is assumed to be constant over the sample period
(based on the average of available data). We do not suspect this
will bias the results significantly, since the available data suggests
the civil share across all countries is very stable over time.
The OECD data provides data on thirty-eight countries,
although there are some missing observations. We present the
results of the estimation using three sets of countries. Sample A
includes thirty countries with 227 total observations. 53 This sample
includes all countries for which the necessary data is available. For
Sample B, we include only countries in the European Union and
the United States, since the patent and legal regimes in these
countries are more likely consistent with that of the United
States. 54 Finally, in Sample C, we include all thirty-eight countries
available.55 In this sample, however, we are limited to total R&D
expenditures in nominal terms due to a lack of data. The results
from this sample are provided for illustrative purposes only, and
we do not discuss them in detail.
The model is estimated using least squares with period
dummy variables to account for the time series nature of the data.
56
Table 1 summarizes the results. Alternative procedures for
computing the standard errors render no significant changes, so the
t-statistics are based on the ordinary standard errors. All the
variables are statistically significant. The model fits the data very
well, with R2 values of about 0.97 across all specifications (except
for Sample C, with an R2 of 0.92). The good fit is not surprising
given the time series component of the data.
Turning to the number of lost patents (measured by 0 in
Equation (3)), across Samples A and B we observe similar
estimates when using Civil R&D expenditures. The more
conservative number, and probably the more sensible one given the
comparison is across the United States and EU countries only, is
52 For every year the data is available, we compute the ratio of Civil to Total
R&D (as a percentage of GDP), and then average these for each country.
53 We have 30 countries and 9 years of data for a total of 270 potential
observations, but there are missing values. The countries in Sample A include
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United
Kingdom, and United States.
54 The countries in Sample B include Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway,
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Slovenia, United
Kingdom, and United States.
55 Thus, Sample C includes all countries listed supra note 53, plus Canada,
China, Hungary, Israel, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, and Turkey.
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7266 triadic patents, with 90% confidence interval boundaries of
6205 and 8327 [se(O) = 642.7]. In the larger Sample A, lost patents
rises to 8447, with a 90% confidence interval bound by 7715 to
9181.
For both samples, the estimate of lost triadic patents is
larger when using total R&D expenditures (12,004 and 9406,
respectively). This difference and its direction were expected,
given the higher percentage of defense related expenditures in the
U.S. and the low patent productivity of such expenditures. To be
conservative, we assume there are 7000 lost triadic patents due to
the presence of substandard patents in the United States, a round
number that is at the lower end of our approximation technique
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Table 1. Estimation of Lost Patents, Regression Results
Sample A Sample B Sample C
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(t- stat) (t- stat) (t- stat) (t- stat) (t- stat)
Constant -404.35 -417.79 -249.60 -211.30 -332.20
(-8.23) (-7.14) (-4.63) (-3.51) (-4.89)
RND 0.123 ... 0.115
(Civil R&D) (60.19) (36.44)
RND ... 0.117 ... 0.105
(Total R&D) (50.19) (32.00)
RND ... ... ... ... 0.103
(Nominal Total) (35.50)
DUS -8447.96 -12003.74 -7266.10 -9405.96 -8445.48
(-19.01) (-20.18) (-11.30) (-11.82) (-11.29)
Period Constants
1995 -73.18 -65.06 18.02 30.49 154.68
1996 -24.38 -13.81 50.41 63.51 151.71
1997 50.93 53.62 63.11 67.97 135.30
1998 4.39 5.69 -5.49 -1.89 67.73
1999 101.16 102.23 24.40 19.89 82.75
2000 51.45 45.43 -1.93 -10.63 -10.12
2001 -9.92 -16.89 -55.26 -64.45 -109.85
2002 -67.83 -71.36 -50.51 -52.54 -213.70
2003 -37.68 -43.37 -43.92 -52.56 -234.70
R2  0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.92
Cross Sections 30 30 19 19 38
Observations 227 227 148 148 299
Of course, a patent can be valid without being triadic (but
we are assuming triadic patents are valid), since not all valid
patents are worth filing triadically. As an approximation to the
number of valid to triadic patents, we assume that more rigorous
standards of the EPO render only valid patents (we relax this
assumption later in our estimation procedure). The (average) ratio
of valid patents to triadic patents can be approximated by
T
Pit = ;k. "Fi + ai- xDi + 6i't  (4)
where Pit is the number of patent applications by country i in
period t. Equation (4) is estimated in the same way as Equation (3)
with period dummies Dj. Sample B is used since it includes only
EU countries (18 countries, 162 observations). The k coefficient is
estimated to be 3.0 (t-stat = 120.3). 57 So, the ratio of total valid
patents to triadic patents in a jurisdiction is approximately 3.0.
Triadics are measured in terms of grants by the USPTO rather than
57 The R2 of the model is 0.99.
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applications as in the case of the EPO and JPO. Given X = 3 and a
loss of 7,000 triadic patents due to the presence of substandard
patents in the United States, both estimated above, the total loss of
valid patents in the United States per year is estimated to be 21,000
patent grants (about 10% of patents granted annually by the
USPTO).58 Over the period 1999 through 2003, applications in the
US exceeded grants by about two-fold, so there is approximately a
loss of about 40,000 applications for valid patents.
59
Assuming, for illustrative purposes, a 20% leakage in the
EPO of substandard patents, reducing X to 2.4, we have 16,800 lost
valid patents in the United States annually due to the research
deterrence effects of substandard patents. If the EPO is too
stringent, say leading to the rejection of 20% of valid patents filed,
then X is 3.6 and lost U.S. valid patents is approximated by 25,200.
We can also vary the assumed loss of triadic patents, perhaps
according to the estimated confidence interval, for even more
approximations of the total loss of valid patents in the United
States. Given the imprecise nature of all of these calculations, we
believe it is prudent to consider a range of options when estimating
the welfare loss from substandard patents.
Having set forth a method for determining the number of
lost patents, the next step requires an estimate of how much each
patent is worth. There exists a substantial literature on the
economic value of patents. For our purposes, the most useful
estimate is by Cockburn and Griliches, who estimate the average
economic value of a patent as US$1 million (in current dollars) or
$2.4 million adjusting for both inflation and economic growth.6'
Certainly, the distribution of value is highly skewed, but for our
calculations the average is suitable. To be conservative, for the
benchmark case we assume an average value per valid patent of $1
million, and we will also consider a range of potential values.
The calculation of the deadweight welfare loss from
substandard patents is
DWL = X " PsT " VvAUD (5)
58 Estimated according to OECD's Main Science and Technology Indicators.
59 USPTO, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963-2008,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/usstat.htm.
60 lain Cockburn & Zvi Griliches, Industry Effects and Appropriability Measures
in the Stock Market's Valuation of R&D and Patents, 78 AM. ECON. REV.:
PAPER & PROC. 419 (1988) (providing a per-patent estimate of value).
61 Id. We use the consumer price index to convert the year 1980 estimate of
$500,000 to current dollars (258 in 1980 to 604 in 2006), and for economic
growth we include the growth in GDP over the same period. These data are
available at U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Economy Analysis,
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where PLOST is lost valid patents and VVALID is the average value of
a valid patent. In our benchmark case, we have
D WL = 3" 7,000" 1,000,000 = 21,000,000,000 (6)
so our "point" estimate of the deadweight loss from substandard
patents is $21 billion annually. Given annual R&D expenditures in
this US of about $300 billion, these losses represent about 7% of
total R&D spending per year.
We do not wish to exaggerate the precision of our
estimation approach. A rudimentary sensitivity analysis seems
unnecessary given the simple form of the damage calculations (in
Equation (5)). For example, if we assume any of the inputs to the
calculation is understated by 10%, then the estimated cost
increases by 10%.
We do think a simulation approach that estimates a
distribution of plausible values may be useful. In this simulation,
we take our "point" estimates of the three inputs to Equation (5) as
mean values, and allow each to vary according to a specified
distribution. From the econometric estimate of PLOST, we observed
a coefficient of variation of about 0.10 (i.e., standard error of the
coefficient divided by the mean). For our simulation, then, we
assume that PLOST is distributed normally with mean 7000 and
standard deviation 700. We also assume that VVALID is distributed
normally also with a coefficient of variation of 0.10 (so the 95%
confidence interval is 0.8 million to 1.2 million). For k, we also
assign a coefficient of variation of 0.1, and this choice renders a
95% confidence interval bound by 2.4 and 3.6. Our simulation
includes 10,000 draws of random numbers from these
distributions, and these numbers are inserted into Equation (5) to
compute the cost of substandard patents. The resulting distribution
is illustrated in Figure 3.
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Figure 3 is the histogram of welfare costs of substandard
patents from the simulation. The simulated mean of costs ($20.989
billion) is essentially equal to the $21 billion from Equation (6), as
expected. The standard deviation is about $3.6 billion (about 17%
of the mean). The distribution has a slight positive skew, so it is
not symmetrical. Repeating the simulation 100 times indicates the
upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval are $14.4
billion and $28.7 billion.62 For this particular simulation, the
minimum value is about $10 billion and the maximum about $38
billion.63 We stress, however, that these calculations are illustrative
since the nature of the random process is somewhat arbitrary. But,
even with wide variation in the benchmark assumptions, the
estimate of cost remains very high even at its smallest value ($10
billion annually).
B. Other Deadweight Losses
As mentioned above, we suspected that the research
deterrence costs would be the largest of the deadweight losses from
a loose patent system. There are, however, other costs. One direct
cost of substandard patents relates to the typical administrative
costs of pursuing substandard patents including legal fees,
application fees, and the cost of the USPTO. These costs are
62 This confidence interval is not symmetric around the mean (-6.6 billion and
+7.7 billion).
63 Given the very large number of simulations, the minimum, maximum, and
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Figure 3. Simulated Distribution of Deadweight Loss
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deadweight losses. In the United States, the legal and filing fees
are estimated to be a few thousand dollars for even a simple patent
to upwards of $25,000 for more complex technologies. Offered
estimates of costs from a variety of sources typically fall in the
$3000 to $25,000 range per application.64 For our computations,
we assume that the patent application costs $7500, on average, in
legal and administrative fees.
65
These costs must be applied to some estimate of the
number of substandard patents filed each year. According to
OECD data, over the five-year period 1999 through 2003, there
were 90,445 triadic patents filed from the United States (recall that
66triadic patents are counted by grants for the USPTO). From
above, we estimated the ratio of valid patents to triadic patents to
be 3.0.67 Applying our k to the United States, we would expect that
there would be approximately 271,335 valid patent grants in the
United States over this period. However, there were 594,827
patents granted the USPTO in this period, which suggests that
approximately half of all U.S. patents granted are substandard.68
While this percentage of substandard patents is high, it is
consistent with other evidence. For example, Graham and Harhoff
calculate that about 40% of U.S.-granted patents are rejected by the
EPO, though the number is found to be much lower (about 4%) in
Jensen et al.69 Not all United States patents are also filed at the
64 Gene Quinn, Cost of Obtaining a Patent, IPWatchdog.com, Dec. 31, 2007,
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/patent/patent-cost. On average, the USPTO's
average cost per patent reviewed is about $4000. See also Techtransfer, Univ. of
Mich., Patents and Other Legal Protection, http://www.techtransfer.umich.edu/
resources/inventors/patents.php (last visited Apr. 9, 2010); What Does It Cost
To Obtain a Patent, http://www.basicpatents.com/patcost.htm (last visited Apr.
9, 2010); You Want To Be an Inventor, http://www.inventored.org/novice (last
visited Apr. 9, 2010); Cost of a Patent, http://www.costhelper.com/cost/small
-business/patent.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2010). In some cases, patent
prosecution costs must be incurred which could increase the cost by another
$5000 to $15,000. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FY 2006 PERFORMANCE &
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT app. A, at 316 (2006), http://www.osec.doc.gov/bmi/
Budget/06APPR/PAR06.pdf.
65 Over the period 2003 through 2005, the USPTO earned about $3.3 billion in
revenue from 1.14 million applications, for an average application cost of about
$3000. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FY 2006 PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS (2006).
66 Estimated according to OECD's Main Science and Technology Indicators.
67 For that same period, European countries (EU25) filed 79,295 triadic patents
and 250,275 applications at the EPO. Thus, dividing the two, we compute a X of
3.16, which is very close to our estimated k of 3.0.
68 Estimated according to OECD's Main Science and Technology Indicators.
69 Paul H. Jensen et al., Disharmony in International Patent Office Decisions, 15
FED. CTR. BAR J. 679, 690 (2006); Stuart J.H. Graham & Dietmar Harhoff,
Separating Patent Wheat from Chaff: Would the U.S. Benefit from Adopting a
Patent Post-Grant Review? (Oct. 14, 2009), http://ssm.com/abstract=1489579.
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EPO (U.S. entities file about 15% as many applications annually at
the EPO as they do the USPTO), but one would initially think that
those filed at the EPO by American entities would be of relatively
high quality.70 Allison and Lemley, in a study of patents litigated
over the period 1989 through 1996, reveal that about half of
litigated patents are invalidated at trial y.7  Further, Trajtenberg
argues that cited patents, and not simple patent counts, are
correlated with patent value. In his data, about half of patents are
not cited, again suggesting that about half of patents may be
classified as substandard. 2 Finally, Jaffe and Lerner summarize
evidence from the OECD indicating that the growth rate of USPTO
granted patents is twice that of "economically significant" (or
triadic) patents.7 3
Assuming 50% of filings are substandard and there are
400,000 filings per year, there are about 200,000 substandard
patent filing at the USPTO annually.7 4 At an average cost of $7500
per application, the annual deadweight loss from administrative
costs related to the acquisition of substandard patents is $1.5
billion. While this is certainly a large number and a significant cost
of substandard patents, it is far below the costs of research
deterrence caused by substandard patents.
Substandard patents also lead to litigation. While
judgments are properly viewed as transfers, the costs of obtaining
judgments (or royalties) are deadweight losses. In order to
determine the expected cost of litigation from substandard patents,
we need an estimate of the probability a patent is litigated and the
cost of litigation. As for litigation rates, Lanjouw and Shankerman
find a domestic litigation rate of about 1.6% during the early
Grant rates are highly contested figures. See, e.g., Cecil Quillen & Ogden
Webster, Continuing Patent Applications and Performance of the U.S. Patent
Office, 11 FED. CTR. BAR J. 1 (2001) ("The Grant Rate (allowances divided by
total disposals, i.e., the sum of allowances and abandonments) for the USPTO
for its fiscal years 1993-1998, corrected for continuing applications, ranges from
87% to 97%, depending on the extent to which prosecution of abandoned
applications was continued in re-filed applications. Reported Grant Rates for
1995-1999 for the European and Japanese Patent Offices (averaged) are 67%
and 64%, respectively.").
70 FOUR OFFICE STATISTICS REPORT fig. 4.2, at 41 (2008), http://www.trilateral.
net/statistics/tsr/statisticsreport/fullreport.pdf.
71 John Allison & Mark Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 185, 205 (1998).
72 Manuel Trajtenberg, A Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the Value
of Innovations, 21 RAND J. ECON. 172, 181 (1990).
73 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 3, at 143.
74 Our statistical analysis is based, by necessity, on grants for the USPTO.
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1980s. 75 Allison et al. report a 3.2% litigation rate.76 The litigation
rate from these studies depend on a number of things including the
stock of patents and time period evaluated.
For our purposes, we are constructing annual estimates of
the cost of substandard patents. Federal statistics indicate that there
are approximately 3000 patent cases filed annually. Allison et al.
show that most litigated patents are younger, typically being three
years or less.77 Thus, we construct a patent stock of relatively
recent patents. Over the most recent five years for which there is
data (2004-2008), the USPTO has granted nearly one million
patents, so we assume the stock of patents is 1 million and
construct an annual litigation rate using that stock.78 So, a
reasonable proxy for the annual litigation rate is 0.3% (or 3 cases
per 1000 patents) on the stock of patents (both valid and
substandard).
The cost of litigation varies substantially across patents, but
the average is typically claimed to be in the $1 million to $4
million range for the discovery phase (about half the cost of a full
trial). 79 Allison et al., citing the American Intellectual Property
Law Association, state that a patent case can cost $1.5 million per
side.80 Only about 5% of cases actually go to trial, with 95% being
settled at some point in the process. 81 In a recent economic
simulation of patent litigation, Graham and Harhoff use a cost of
litigation of $5 million based on estimates from the American
Intellectual Property Law Association.
In light of the evidence, as a benchmark we assume a
litigation rate of 0.3% and a litigation cost of $2 million per case.
The stock of patents is assumed to be one million (which
approximates patents granted in the past five years) and we assume
that half the patent stock is substandard.83 Thus, the approximate
75 Jean Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A
Window on Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON 129, 135 tbl.1 (2001) (counting 16.4
cases per 1000 patents).
76 Allison et al., supra note 39 at 477 fig. 1.
77 Id
78 U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963-2008, http://www.uspto.
gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/usstat.htm (last visited May 30, 2010).
79 AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS'N, 2009 REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY 29
(2009); COALITION FOR PATENT FAIRNESS, THE CASE FOR REFORM,
http://www.patentfairness.org/pdf/whitepapers/Patents by the numbers.pdf.
80 Allison & Lemley, supra note 71.
81 Fabrizio Cesaroni & Paula Guiri, Intellectual Property Rights and Market
Dynamics (LEM Working Paper Series No. 10, 2005).
82 Graham & Harhoff, supra note 69.
83 On average, a patent is five years old when litigated. Benjamin Hershkowitz,
What Are My Chances? From Idea Through Litigation, FindLaw.com,
http://library.findlaw.com/2003/Oct/16/133092.html (last visited May 30, 2010);
see also Allison et al., supra note 39. Summing over a longer period would
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deadweight loss from the litigation of substandard patents is $3
billion annually.84 While this is also a very large number, it again
remains much smaller than the $21 billion annual cost of research
deterrence.
C. Review of the Evidence
Our analysis shows that the cost of a "loose" patent system
that is prone to grant substandard patents is very high. Much of the
cost is attributable to the reduced innovation, but the administrative
and litigation costs are non-trivial. We estimate that annually, the
deadweight loss from reduced innovation is $21 billion,
administrative costs $1.5 billion, and litigation costs $3 billion.
The total of these deadweight losses that we calculate is $25.5
billion annually. We stress that these estimates are preliminary. As
such, we have provided a range of probable values to demonstrate
the change in estimates given alternative assumptions. Certainly
more research is needed on this very important topic.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of patent policy is to balance the incentive to
invent with the ability of the economy to utilize and incorporate
new inventions and innovations. Because patent law grants de jure
monopolies to patent holders and provides those holders with
substantial rights to prevent infringement or sue for substantial
damages, it is crucial that such patents be awarded only for truly
original innovations. As Justice Kennedy recently wrote,
We build and create by bringing to the tangible and
palpable reality around us new works based on
instinct, simple logic, ordinary inferences,
extraordinary ideas, and sometimes even genius.
These advances, once part of our shared knowledge,
define a new threshold from which innovation starts
once more. And as progress beginning from higher
levels of achievement is expected in the normal
course, the results of ordinary innovation are not the
subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws.
Were it otherwise patents might stifle, rather than
promote, the progress of useful arts.
85
increase the estimated litigation costs, so the estimates here might be considered
conservative.
84 The calculation is 0. 50*1000000*0. 003*2000000 = $3 billion.
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LEAVING ROOM FOR RESEARCH:
THE HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF THE COMMON LAW
RESEARCH EXEMPTION IN CONGRESS AND THE COURTS, AND ITS
RELATIONSHIP TO BIOTECH LAW AND POLICY
Maureen E. Boyle*
12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 269 (2010)
ABSTRACT
The recent suit over the validity of gene patents between the
American Civil Liberties Union and Myriad Genetics has
highlighted the troubling ways in which patents may be interfering
with the willingness of scientists and companies to engage in basic
biotechnology research on matters of vital importance to human
health and disease. Many scholars have argued for a legislative
research exemption to protect this sort of research. Theoretically,
the common law already contains an exemption to protect certain
uses of a patented product from being deemed patent infringement.
This Article evaluates the history of the common law research
exemption alongside the history of biotechnology policymaking
since the 1970s, identifying how confusion over the scope of the
judicial research exemption may have led to legislative stagnation
on the issue of protecting research. Even during the infancy of
biotechnology, members of Congress believed in the existence of a
robust research exemption when making policy decisions about
whether to create a legislative exemption. Now that the scope of
the research exemption has been narrowed significantly by recent
Federal Circuit decisions, at a time when the intellectual property
regime permits patents on human building blocks as basic as
genes, this Article highlights the need for a clear exemption. It also
overviews and comments on existing policy solutions scholars have
offered to counteract the chilling effect that the lack of a clear
exemption might be having on basic research, including research
in the biotechnology sector.
* J.D. candidate, Yale Law School (2011). Many thanks to Daniel J. Kevles for
his helpful assistance and comments on this manuscript.
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INTRODUCTION
In March, 2010, the American Civil Liberties Union made
news when its lawsuit against a prominent genetics company-
Myriad Genetics-won its case on summary judgment in a New
York district court,' after surviving an earlier summary judgment
2battle over its standing to bring the suit in November, 2009.
Myriad holds a patent on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, the
presence of which indicate a woman's predisposition to certain
types of cancer. 3 With its patent, Myriad has a monopoly over the
gene, including all diagnostic testing related to it. Women cannot
seek a second opinion and there is no cheaper alternative test;
scientists cannot look at the gene, let alone perform research on it
without Myriad's permission.4 The heart of the ACLU complaint
alleges that Myriad's monopoly over the BRCA genes interferes
with women's health and doctors' practices. But the complaint also
alleges that Myriad's patent prohibits independent, non-
commercial research on the genes from taking place in university
and nonprofit labs.5 Indeed, the other plaintiffs in the ACLU suit
are researchers who received cease and desist letters from Myriad
after engaging in unsanctioned work, work which could have
provided valuable information about the gene itself and
technologies directed to it.6 In preparation for trial, the ACLU
argued that:
[G]ene patents interfere with the ability of
physicians and researchers to investigate complex
diseases. For example, BRCA1/2 may be associated
with cancers other than breast and ovarian cancer,
but so long as the patents on these genes remain, no
one will be able to include these genes in tests for
other disease predispositions.
7
Although the district court ruled for the ACLU summarily
on other grounds relating to the invalidity of Myriad's patents, the
1 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, No. 09
Civ. 4515, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *108 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010).
2 Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Court Upholds Right of
Scientists and Patients To Challenge Gene Patents (Nov. 2, 2009),
http://www.aclu.org/free-speech womens-rights/court-upholds-right-scientists-
and-patients-challenge-gene-patents.
3 Complaint at 18, Ass 'n for Molecular Pathology, No. 09 Civ. 4515, available
at http://www.aclu.org/files/images/asset upload file939_39568.pdf.
4 id. at 18-19.
5 Id. at 6, 28.
6 [d. at 6.
7 'nfor Molecular Pathology, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *76-77.
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court did not rule out the possibility that were a full trial to occur,
it could be proven that Myriad's patents were indeed functioning to
prevent basic, beneficial research from continuing.
8
The clause of the Constitution dealing with patents-
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8--optimistically describes the patent
monopoly as meant to "promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts" by promoting disclosure of novel and useful methods and
inventions. 9 Although patents do encourage the disclosure of
beneficial ideas, patent holders use their patents for a number of
other reasons in modem society: to encourage investor confidence
in a new product or market; to gain bargaining chips for cross-
licenses, sales, mergers, and acquisitions; or defensively, to secure
freedom to work on a new technology or product without fear of
infringement. 10 More detrimentally, a patent holder may engage in
behavior like Myriad's-rarely licensing the patented technology,
but instead enforcing the patent strategically to stifle basic
research, the development of competitive alternatives, and other
non-sanctioned uses. This type of guarded behavior preserves the
patentee's dominance, but may ultimately harm the public by
impeding beneficial research on or with the patented technology.
Long before the advent of biotechnology, the fundamental
importance of experimentation was recognized by the judiciary,
and some research activities were granted qualified immunity from
patent infringement suits. This immunity is known as the "research
exemption" or "experimental use exemption."" Although the
scope of the exemption is and always has been murky, 12 since the
nineteenth century, judges around the country have recognized that
common sense seems to dictate that certain not-for-profit
experimentation should not constitute patent infringement under
the patent statutes.' 3 In recent years, however, the Federal
Circuit-the federal court with exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over patent suits-has narrowed the common law exemption
substantially, leaving it difficult to discern whether there is any
room for non-commercial research using patented technologies in
8 Id. at *81 ("[T]here exists a sharp dispute concerning the impact of patents
directed to isolated DNA on genetic research and consequently the health of
society.... [T]he resolution of these disputes of fact and policy are not possible
within the context of these motions.").
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
10 Benjamin K. Sovacool, Placing a Glove on the Invisible Hand: How
Intellectual Property Rights May Impede Innovation in Energy Research and
Development (R&D), 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 381, 437 (2008).
11 The exemption is also called the "research exception" in other literature. I use
it to mean the judicially-created immunity for users of patented technology who
engage in non-commercial research. See infra Part I.
12 See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.




Witte: IT'S MY NEWS Too!
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2010
THE HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF THE COMMON LAW RESEARCH
EXEMPTION AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO BIOTECH LAW AND POLICY
universities and nonprofits after the court's recent holdings.
Although the specter of a possible research exemption may have at
least discouraged patent holders from suing non-commercial
experimenters, the Federal Circuit's erosion of the exemption
makes it likely that any non-commercial experimenter, whether
individual or institutional, could risk being sued if her work
involves patented technology.
This Article examines how, historically, the research
exemption has been discussed and relied upon in patent
policymaking, and how the demise of the common law research
exemption relates to practices in the biotechnology industry. Did
the common law research exemption ever really exist? Were
fundamental policy choices made in reliance on it? What results
from the evisceration of the common law exemption, given the
state of current policy toward biotechnology? What should
legislators do about it?
Biotechnology is a particularly vulnerable technology
because of its deep relationship to our understanding of health and
disease. Continued research is vital to confirm the accuracy of
genetic tests, to discover potential flaws and fixes, and to allow
researchers to find suitable alternatives or substitutes if possible. In
an industry so intertwined with life and death, the threat of an
anticommons is particularly worthy of concern. 14 Without the
space and freedom to research, patients, doctors, and society at
large are at the patentee's mercy. A person's health may depend on
the patentee granting licenses, choosing a reasonable price for
products incorporating the monopolized technology, and doing
further research that may improve or cheapen the technology. As
Myriad's behavior has demonstrated, a bad actor has little
incentive to do any of these things. The pro-competitive goal of
patent law is undermined by the anti-competitive effect of patents
on genetic material: with a gene, there is no way to invent around
the patented technology, so the patentee need not fear competition
for the term of the patent. In a competitive environment, the
patentee would be incentivized to do more research, to charge
reasonable prices, and potentially to cross-license the technology.
In an environment free of competition, profit-maximizing behavior
and progress-maximizing behavior may be at odds. 15 A research
14 See generally Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 6918
(1998) (discussing the seriousness of the patent thicket impeding continued
research in the biomedical field).
15 See id. There is some specific evidence that biotechnology patents are being
used to slow progress or impede competition. Lori Andrews has identified a case
in which GlaxoSmithKline pursued a patent on a test which would examine the
effectiveness of one of their drugs, not because they intended to develop the test,
but rather so that no one could do further work on it. Lori B. Andrews, Genes
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exemption might help alleviate at least some of these problems,
and legislators and policymakers should consider ways in which
the research exemption might be reinstated and clarified now that
the common law exemption has been eviscerated.
Part I of this Article tells the story of the common law
research exemption as it evolved prior to the advent of
biotechnology. Part II discusses the beginnings of biotechnology
and the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, which essentially gave
researchers (including academic and nonprofit researchers) a duty
to commercialize and license their work, a subtle yet dangerous
threat to the underpinnings of the research exemption. Part III
examines the ways in which biotechnology policymakers, aware of
the threats to public health posed by biotechnology patents,
discussed and relied upon the research exemption in their decisions
during the 1980s and 1990s. Part IV overviews the recent
narrowing of the common law exemption and its ramifications,
specifically for the most recent advancement in the modem
biotechnology industry-genetic analysis and testing. Part V sets
forth the solutions that have been advanced by academics
and policymakers to address the current system's chilling
effect on basic, beneficial research, and concludes with some
recommendations for future action.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW RESEARCH
EXEMPTION
Although many authors have discussed the origins of the
research exemption, 16 their interpretations of the exemption vary as
widely as the interpretations advanced by various courts over the
years. This section attempts to briefly overview the history of the
experimental use or research exemption prior to the advent of
biotechnology, highlighting its inconsistent application and
meaning. While perhaps offering no clear answers to questions
about the traditional meaning or scope of the exemption, the
and Patent Policy: Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights, 3 NATURE REVIEWS
GENETICS 803, 804 (2002). Progress and profit may not always be in
competition, though; a company that obtains a patent might work to cheapen the
production of the patented biotechnology, or to develop technologies that
enhance the value of the patented product, in cases where the ability to charge
monopoly prices would allow the patent holder to reap additional profits. I thank
Bret Hembd, Executive Editor of the Yale Journal of Law and Technology, for
these suggestions.
16 See Richard Bee, Experimental Use as an Act of Patent Infringement, 39 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 357 (1957); Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of
Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959 (1986); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary
Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177
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history does demonstrate that there would be at least some basis to
believe that certain applications of patented technology-
particularly uses for the purposes of testing the accuracy of an
invention or testing its proper enablement by the specification-are
protected from infringement because of the absence of harm to the
patentee.
A. Origins of the Exemption
The common law research exemption originated in an 1813
case from Massachusetts, Whittemore v. Cutter. 7 The defendant,
who was charged with infringement for constructing the plaintiffs
patented machine, challenged a jury instruction which stated that
making a machine with "a design to use it for profit" constituted
infringement. 18 Justice Story, sitting in his appellate capacity on
the Massachusetts federal circuit court, affirmed the instruction,
noting that making a patented technology for profit was within the
purview of the Patent Act of 1793; it was not-for-profit use of the
patented technology that might not be covered. Justice Story stated
that "it could never have been the intention of the legislature to
punish a man, who constructed such a machine merely for
philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the
sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects."'
19
Justice Story thus believed that Congress intended to punish
persons deriving profit from their use of the invention, but not
those who used the patent for certain other purposes.
Justice Story again discussed the issue of profit as a
component of infringement just five months later in Sawin v.
Guild, another Massachusetts circuit court case.2 0 The defendant, a
deputy sheriff, seized and sold the plaintiffs patented nail cutting
machine as part of an execution of the plaintiffs debts. In holding
that this was not infringement, Justice Story referenced Whittemore
in dicta while remarking that the Act of 1793 had already been
construed. He stated that
[For] the making of a patented machine to be an
offence within the purview of [the statute], [it] must
17 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600). The history of the research
exemption has been given full treatment by many scholars. Particularly detailed
histories can be found in Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use
Exemption from United States Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for
University and Nonprofit Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917
(2004); and Jordan P. Karp, Note, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement:
The Impropriety of a Broad Exception, 100 YALE L.J. 2169 (1991).
18 Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121.
19 Id
2021 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391).
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be the making with an intent to use for profit, and
not for the mere purpose of philosophical
experiment, or to ascertain the verity and exactness
of the specification. In other words, that the making
must be with an intent to infringe the patent-right,
and deprive the owner of the lawful rewards of his
discovery.",
2 1
One commentator has interpreted these two 1813 cases to mean
that Justice Story believed that the experimental use exemption
consisted of two separate requirements: "(1) the activity must not
be performed with the intent to gain profit and (2) the activity must
be either (a) for philosophical experiments or (b) for ascertaining
the verity and exactness of the specification."
22
While it may be easy enough to look at the question of
intent, and it is a matter of fact whether the use was for
ascertaining "verity" or "exactness," the problem lies in
interpreting what Justice Story meant by "philosophical
experiments." One interpretation would be that Justice Story
contemplated only a man "tinkering around" in his basement with
another's invention; however, it seems unlikely that Justice Story
would have limited philosophical experiments to such an invisible,
individual use.23  Another view states that "philosophical
experiments" would include use of the invention in the course of
developing new technologies, although this would seem to extend
directly to future for-profit uses that Justice Story would likely
consider infringement.
24
Rebecca Eisenberg has advocated an interpretation
somewhere in the middle of these two extremes: "[t]he first prong
of Justice Story's experimental use privilege, permitting
'philosophical experiments' . . . seems to permit subsequent
researchers to use the patented invention at least in traditional basic
research with no commercial implications." 25 Eisenberg defines
21 Id. at 555 (internal citation omitted).
22 Karp, supra note 17, at 2171.
23 Bee, supra note 16, at 367.
24 Chisum, supra note 16, at 1019 n.203. This view is probably the weakest. The
nineteenth century case Poppenhusen v. Falke held that use of patents to
develop future technology is not protected, and similar fact patterns were also
held not to be experimental uses by other courts. 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279) ("[The defendants] are rivals of the
complainant in the very business to which his patents relate .... The answer
alleges that all the defendants have thus far done since the organization of said
company, has been done by way of experiment, for the purpose of hereafter
working under certain patents, grants, and licenses of their own ... it can hardly
be necessary for the respondents to experiment with the complainant's
inventions in order to perfect their own .. .
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"basic research" as "'pure' research directed solely toward
expanding human knowledge, as opposed to 'applied' research
directed toward solving practical problems." 6 Eisenberg's
definition encompasses the basement inventor, but leaves out
researchers who use the invention for eventually for-profit
purposes. More importantly for this inquiry, Eisenberg's
interpretation exempts researchers who aim to test an invention or
use it to add to human knowledge and understanding, a more
liberal construction of "philosophical experiments" than one which
would protect only the casual, curious experimenter in his
basement. Eisenberg's definition is also consistent with the more
recent research done by Janice Mueller, who evaluated other
nineteenth century uses of the word "philosophical" and suggested
that "philosophy referred to natural philosophy, which in turn
meant science generally." 27 Under this definition, "philosophical
experiments" might thus cover scientific research on a patented
invention to ascertain its workings and to either evaluate them or
attempt to design around them.
In any case, by the close of the nineteenth century, it was
almost unanimously agreed that a narrow exemption for
experimental use existed at common law.28 One nineteenth century
treatise on patents stated that "where [the invention] is made or
used as an experiment, whether for the gratification of scientific
tastes, or for curiosity, or for amusement, the interests of the
patentee are not antagonized., 29 The experimental use exemption
was narrow from the outset-even prior to 1900, courts typically
found that various uses of patented inventions by commercial
infringers were not experimental-but even in the cases where the
courts found no experimental use, the courts acknowledged that
some exemption did exist for not-for-profit uses. As early as
26Id at 178 n.1.
27 Mueller, supra note 17, at 929.
28 But see Clerk v. Tannage Patent Co., 84 F. 643 (3d Cir. 1898) (holding that
contracts were required even to conduct experimental testing); Albright v.
Celluloid Harness-Trimming Co., 1 F. Cas. 320 (C.C.N.J. 1877) (No. 147);
Palmer v. United States, 20 Ct. Cl. 432 (1885), aff'd on other grounds, 128 U.S.
262 (1888). These latter two cases held that clearly experimental uses-one,
testing the performance of patented molds in the process of manufacturing
trimming, and the other, testing a knapsack for its wartime practicality-were
indeed infringements. However, the majority of cases both before and after
followed Story's logic rather than these aberrant holdings.
29 3 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS
§ 898 (1890).
30 See U.S. Mitis Co. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 89 F. 343, 351 (C.C.W.D. Penn.)
(holding that "use in the course of business and for profit" is not experimental),
aff'd without opinion, 90 F. 829 (3d Cir. 1898); Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v.
Derboklow, 87 F. 997, 999 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1898) (acknowledging a "legitimate
use for experimental purposes only"); Bonsack Mach. Co. v. Underwood, 73 F.
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1861, one court even called it "well settled" that an experimental
use exemption existed at common law,31 but the conflicting
interpretations later given in courts around the country demonstrate
that the scope of that exemption and the nature of the activities that
would fall under it were hardly clear.
B. Subsequent Interpretations of the Exemption Prior to
Biotech
As is evident from the limited history thus far, the scope of
the exemption was murky from its outset. Although most courts
recognized that, according to common sense, some experimental
use could not have been intended to be infringement by the
legislature, they frequently conflicted in their interpretations of
what exactly permissible experimentation was or would be. This
pattern of inconsistent interpretation continued for the majority of
the early twentieth century, 32 and overwhelmingly, plaintiffs
prevailed against a defendant's claim of experimental use.
33
However, one interesting pattern during this period is of note:
although strictly commercial enterprises were almost never
exempted on the grounds of experimental use, in those cases in
which experimental use was found, the defendant was the U.S.
government, a frequent government contractor, or a nonprofit
educational institution.
The educational institution absolved from infringement was
the Colorado School of Mines. The school and its faculty and
students were released from liability in a 1935 decision, Ruth v.
Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Co. 34 The disputed technology was a
certain type of patented flotation machine. Although the named
defendant, a commercial enterprise, was found guilty of
206, 211 (C.C.E.D.N.C. 1896) ("It is true that, if an infringing machine is made
or used as an experiment merely, it does not infringe former patents.");.
31 Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No.
11,279) ("It has been held, and no doubt is now well settled, that an experiment
with a patented article for the sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or
curiosity, or for mere amusement, is not an infringement of the rights of the
patentee.").
32 See 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03(1)(b) (2010); see also
Steven P. Caltrider & Paula Davis, The Experimental Use Defense: Post-Madey
v. Duke and Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 86 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 1011 (2004) (providing an overview of the parameters
of the exemption in individual cases throughout this period). In his 1957 article,
Richard Bee also has a very detailed (although overwhelmingly critical) case-
by-case description of these continuously inconsistent interpretations of
experimental use. Bee, supra note 16, at 370-75.
33 See Bee, supra note 16, at 377; Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 222.
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infringement, the school (which bought parts from the company)
was immune from liability because the school used the technology
in "laboratory machines used for experimental purposes, and
consequently did not contribute to an infringing use."35 Although it
is not completely clear what the type of experimentation was, the
court seems to have overlooked the fact that even educational
institutions are in a sense commercial, in that they are in the
business of attracting students and endowment investors. The court
seems only to have considered that the use of the technology was
in the lab and was for the purpose of satisfying scientific inquiry,
an educational and experimental activity which it held to be
exempt.
In addition to covering educational use of patented
technology, the exemption seems also to have covered some work
for government research.36 Although not explicitly for government
use, one wartime case, Dugan v. Lear Avia, involved a type of
technology for a direction-finding and position-indicating system
in airplanes, and since Lear was an essential government contractor
during World War II, one might imagine that the suit had
implications for national defense.37 Although the case was decided
on other grounds-the invalidation of the plaintiffs patents-the
court stated that "defendant built [one of the allegedly infringing]
device[s] only experimentally and that it has neither manufactured
it for sale nor sold any." 38 The device was only constructed to
understand how it worked-a form of reverse engineering and
industrial research that the court stated would be free from liability
under the experimental use exemption. The exemption covered
more obvious, explicit government research in a later case which
found the United States not guilty of infringement: Chesterfield v.
United States.39 In dicta, the court referenced the experimental use
exception, stating that the government's use of an alloy as part of
government experiments was not infringement; unfortunately, it is
completely unclear how or for what purpose the technology was
used.40 The court stated only that "a portion of the 422-19 alloy
procured by the defendant was used only for testing and for
35 Id. at 703.
36 I contrast this to work for government use-for example, use of the
technology in warfare or as part of national defense. This type of use is clearly
not experimental or research-based, and the "experimental use" defense has
failed for the government in these situations. See Pitcairn v. United States, 547
F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Palmer v. United States, 20 Ct. Cl. 432 (1885).
37 55 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
38 Id. at 229.
39 159 F. Supp. 371 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
40 Id. The patent was invalidated in this case, so the experimental use discussion
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experimental purposes, and there is no evidence that the remainder
was used other than experimentally. Experimental use does not
infringe." 41 The issue in both Dugan and Chesterfield seems to be
whether the invention was being used by the government or a
contractor in a strictly non-commercial sense: testing the
sufficiency of an item for its own sake, or reverse engineering an
item to see how it works without the intention of producing a copy.
Although these decisions indicate that courts were perhaps
more likely to find a nonprofit or governmental entity engaged in
basic research to be protected by the experimental use exemption,
the application and construction of the exemption remained far
from clear prior to the 1970s. There appears to have been some
recognition that functionally non-commercial enterprises-
university research, and perhaps certain research by the
government-should not give rise to liability for the use of
patented technology in non-commercial ways. However, in ways
unforeseen, the lines between commercial and non-commercial
were about to be blurred. With an action as small in scale as the
introduction of DNA into a host bacterium, the business of
biotechnology was on its way.
II. 1970s AND 1980s: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE BAYH-
DOLE ACT
Biotechnology is generally defined as "any technique that
uses living organisms (or parts of organisms) to make or modify
products, to improve plants or animals, or to develop
microorganisms for specific uses."42 Beginning in the mid-1970s,
with advances in genetic technology, the contemporary
biotechnology industry was born. Molecular biologists researching
recombinant DNA-a method of splicing, cloning, and isolating
genetic material-quickly realized its implications and possibilities
for the future of scientific research, given that they now possessed
the ability to single out DNA segments and analyze their structure
and function. 43 However, as recombinant DNA technology became
widespread, many others, including patent attorneys for
universities, speculative venture capitalists, and even enterprising
scientists themselves, recognized the commercial possibilities of
recombinant DNA technology.44 The rise of biotechnology and the
41Id at 845-46.
42 Frank E. Young, Harvesting the Fruits of Biotechnology, FDA CONSUMER,
Sept. 1, 1987, at 2.
43 Sally Smith Hughes, Making Dollars Out of DNA: The First Major Patent in
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battles the fledgling industry faced have been extensively
chronicled and analyzed.45 Although biotechnology faced a
number of detractors who feared its capabilities and hazards, many
viewed biotechnology as an industry with the ability to stimulate
much-needed domestic economic growth.46 In 1980, when news
broke that one of the earliest biotechnology companies, Genentech
(a combination of the first syllables of "genetic engineering
technology"), had produced synthetic insulin with recombinant
DNA technology, its stock price more than doubled on the day it
went public.47 Start-up companies sold promises of medical
miracles to their investors, and established pharmaceutical and
chemical companies began investing millions in biotechnology
research and development. 48 The fruits of the biotechnology
industry include the creation of many synthetic hormones with
profound implications for human health, and in the following
decades, genetic testing used to indicate biological predisposition
for certain diseases.
The term "industry" brings to mind the private sector and
private development, but from its very beginnings, the public and
nonprofit sectors were at the heart of the biotech industry. It was
an academic lab at Stanford University that spawned recombinant
DNA technology, not a private-sector team of inventors.
49
Academic molecular biologists were increasingly courted by
biotechnology corporations with promises of funding and profits.
50
In addition, and perhaps most troubling, academic scientific
research was largely being funded by the government. The
National Institutes of Health, Department of Defense, Department
of Agriculture, Department of Energy, National Science
Foundation, and other federal groups spent billions of dollars on
university research and development over the course of the 1970s
and 1980s.51 Alerted to the conflicts of interest inherent in public
money funding private enterprise, members of the media began to
cover biotechnology with no shortage of skepticism and
cynicism.52 The concerns largely fell into two categories: first,
45 See SHELDON KRIMSKY, BIOTECHNICS AND SOCIETY: THE RISE OF
INDUSTRIAL GENETICS (1991); Hughes, supra note 43; Daniel J. Kevles, The
Battle over Biotechnology, in DAYS OF DESTINY 453 (Alan Brinkley & James M.
McPherson eds., 2001).
46 KRIMSKY, supra note 45, at 25.
47 Daniel J. Kevles, Principles, Property Rights, and Profits: Historical
Reflections on University/Industry Tensions, 8 ACCOUNTABILITY IN RES. 293,
298 (2001).
48 KRIMSKY, supra note 45, at 30-37.
49 Hughes, supra note 43, at 541-42.
50 KRIMSKY, supra note 45, at 60.
51Id. at 66-68.
52 Id. at 70-71.
74
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concerns over the "commingling of funds" and whether scientists
were using publicly funded labs and materials for commercial
work, and second, the concern that private companies were
appropriating the profits and the fruits of publicly funded academic
research, making the public "pay twice for its investment."
53
Congress took notice of the controversies and the
excitement surrounding biotechnology. Initially, Congress's focus
was on regulation and driven by safety concerns; 54 however, as
private firms found success with commercial applications of
recombinant DNA technology, Congress recognized that biotech
could provide a serious boost to the American economy, and thus
began to focus on ways the government could support the industry
and ensure American dominance.55 Long before the 1970s, both
universities 56 and the government 57 had encouraged the patenting
of publicly funded research results. However, in the 1970s, two
factors were different: first, the amount of federal money in R&D
had increased dramatically, 58 and second, the profits to be gleaned
from the exploitation of biotechnology research were absolutely
enormous compared to the paltry amount universities received
from controlling and licensing their pre-biotechnology patents.
59
As the biotechnology frenzy swept the U.S. economy, the
government was not equipped to quickly commercialize the results
of the research it funded; besides, the commercial infrastructure
was set up already by private biotech companies and start-ups. The
nexus between government and the private sector was nonprofit
and university research, but with the amount of funding and profits
at stake, clear guidelines for ownership and transfer of technology
from the universities to the private sector were needed.
Hence, Congress took action, first, to enable universities to
retain ownership in the results of their federally funded research,
and second, to facilitate (and all but mandate) the transfer of that
technology to the commercial private sector. In 1980, Congresspassed two pieces of legislation-the Stevenson-Wydler
13Id. at71.
54 Hughes, supra note 43, at 566-68.
55 H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, at 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460,
6460.
56 See Kevles, supra note 47.
57 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents
and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV.
1663, 1677-84 (1996) (discussing initiatives from the 1960s and earlier to
encourage the patenting of inventions created with government funding).
58 Kevles, supra note 47, at 298.
59 Id at 298-99.
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Technology Innovation Act6 and the Bayh-Dole Act62 in order
to encourage the commercial development of university and
government discoveries, promote the creation of new jobs, and
thereby stimulate the U.S. economy.6 3 The Bayh-Dole Act, also
known as the University and Small Business Patent Procedures
Act, has had a lasting effect on the university's role in the patent
system; it grants universities-as opposed to government
agencies-title in inventions made with government funding,
provided that these universities satisfy a number of requirements,
including obtaining patents in the technology and actively pursuing
"practical application," or the commercial development of the
invention, through licensing if necessary. The Bayh-Dole Act was
Congress's response to what U.S. universities perceived as a lack
of clarity about their rights in federally funded technology,64 and
moreover, to a fear that beneficial research would languish in
university labs that lacked the tools to commercialize it.65 In
addition to giving universities clearer rights and duties, the Act
also provided the government with "march-in rights" to grant
licenses to other contractors regardless of the patentee university's
willingness to license, if deemed necessary to hasten
commercialization, "meet requirements for public use," or
"alleviate health and safety needs." 66 By requiring universities to
find commercial outlets for their patented research (or else face
government intrusion), the provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act have
been interpreted by universities as creating an "implied duty to
commercialize" any inventions or technologies created with public
money.
67
Although the congressional hearings contained discussions
about whether patent rights would be allocated to the government
or the universities, Congress does not seem to have discussed the
dedication of the developed technologies to the public domain.
From the outset, patent protection was viewed as the best means
for facilitating technology transfer, as opposed to open sharing of
61 Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 3701-3714 (2006)).
62 Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 200-212).
63 Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 1663-65.
64 H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, at 1-2 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460,
6461-62.
65 Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 1663-64.
66 35 U.S.C. § 203. The march-in rights may be exercised against the university
and against licensees, despite the provisions of any existing contracts.
67 For an extended discussion of the implied duty to commercialize, see Jennifer
A. Henderson & John J. Smith, Academia, Industry, and the Bayh-Dole Act: An
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university- or nonprofit-developed inventions and methods. There
is only a hint that some senators may have been considering public
dedication in the remarks of Representative Jack Brooks (D-TX),
contained in the house report on the Bayh-Dole bill:
My concern is simply the role of the government
and the rights of the people in the patent process.
When a private company risks its own money to
develop new products and procedures it deserves
and receives the profits that may result. There
should not be a different standard applied when it is
the government that risks the taxpayers' money. The
rewards of successful research and development
conducted at government expense should go to all
the people.68
The final form of the bill ensured the opposite: universities were to
hold patents that would be licensed to private firms and
developers. By the early 1980s, many universities had already
established deep ties to the commercial sector.69 In 1980, the
Supreme Court decision Diamond v. Chakrabarty encouraged
further ties and investment in university biotech research, by
clarifying that living material was not per se unpatentable subject
matter.7 0 Chakrabarty paved the way for universities to work
toward patents on DNA material, microorganisms, and farther
down the road, even higher life forms.
7 1
With the advantage of hindsight, it is now apparent that the
creation of a "duty to commercialize" stands in direct conflict not
only with certain academic norms,7 2 but also with the university's
function as a center of basic research.73 Before the 1970s and
1980s, the experimental use exception may have protected
universities from being liable for their research work using
patented technologies-at the very least, the exception was murky
enough that patent holders might not have been willing to gamble
time and money to sue universities and nonprofits. But the passage
68 H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, at 29 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460,
6488 (emphasis added).
69 Kevles, supra note 47, at 303.
70 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
71 For a history of the patenting of animals, see Daniel J. Kevles, The Advent of
Animal Patents: Innovation and Controversy in the Engineering and Ownership
of Life, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN ANIMAL BREEDING AND
GENETICS 17, 17-30 (Max Rothschild & Scott Newman eds., 2002).
72 For example, norms encouraging the sharing of research, or the independence
and integrity of chosen research projects. See Eisenberg, supra note 16; Kevles,
supra note 47.
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of the Bayh-Dole Act blurred the line between basic research and
applied research in this setting, leaving it difficult to determine
whether certain types of research on patented technologies in
university or nonprofit labs would constitute infringing uses. In
biotechnology, the stakes were financially high, but additionally, in
fields touching public health and disease, the progress of certain
kinds of research are critical: verifying and testing health-related
technologies and methods, or encouraging and developing new
ideas to design around preexisting inventions. After Bayh-Dole,
with universities becoming heavily invested in commercialization,
the ability of the experimental use defense to cover basic nonprofit
and university research was jeopardized. But policymakers
believed that an exemption existed, and that it would protect
valued types of research. Indeed, in considering regulation and
guidance for the development of the biotechnology industry in the
1980s and 1990s, legislators seem to have relied on the existence
of the common law research exemption to ensure that critical and
beneficial basic research would continue.
III. 1980s AND 1990S: CONGRESSIONAL UNDERSTANDING
OF THE RESEARCH EXEMPTION
In the legislative history of the Bayh-Dole Act, there is a
notable absence of concern about the protection of university and
nonprofit research activities. However, Congress was confronted
again with biotechnology policy questions (including questions
about the "experimental use" protection for basic research) in the
subsequent decade, most notably during the debates on the
patenting of transgenic animals and attempts to pass policies which
would clarify U.S. patent law and bring it into line with global
practices. This Part will examine the legislative history
surrounding two bills in particular-the Transgenic Animal Patent
Reform Act of 198874 and the Patent Competitiveness and
Technological Innovation Act of 199075-neither of which was
ever enacted. Although they never became law, the legislative
history of the bills preserves the ways in which members of
Congress discussed the value of university and nonprofit research,
perceived the research exemption, and made choices about the
codification of the common law exemption in proposed legislation.
A. The Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act of 1988
It was not too long before the advancement of
biotechnology rendered scientists able to genetically modify higher
285
74 H.R. 4970, 100th Cong. (1988).
75 H.R. 5598, 101st Cong. (1990).
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life forms which satisfied the criteria of patentability-cancer-
susceptible mice, for example, or genetically modified pigs capable
of producing more meat.76 The technology involved in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty was a kind of bacteria,77 perhaps more easily viewed
as a patentable man-made composition of matter than as a living,
breathing animal. Moral and environmental opposition to the
patenting of these higher life forms again drew the attention of
Congress to the biotech industry. Congress thus began to consider
whether a moratorium on the granting of animal patents would be
appropriate, and moreover, whether and what guidelines were
necessary to govern patentability and infringement questions with
regard to animal patents specifically. 78 Representative Robert
Kastenmeier (D-WI), Chairman of the House Judiciary
Subcommittee that handled patents, held hearings on the issue and
began formulating a bill to cover the patenting of transgenic
animals, called the Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act.
79
Prior to the drafting of the bill, in the hearings held by the
Committee on the Judiciary, a statutory "research exemption"
came up in the testimony of three individuals: Robert Merges, a
professor of law at Columbia, Reid Adler, a patent attorney at
Finnegan Henderson in Washington, D.C., and Leo Walsh, dean of
the College of Agriculture at the University of Wisconsin.
80
Ostensibly, the research exemption was suggested because such an
exemption would mirror the exemption Congress inserted in the
Plant Variety Protection Act of 197081 (PVPA).
Unfortunately, there is very little legislative history
clarifying why the research exemption appeared in the PVPA. It
seems likely that legislators included the research exemption
because it was mandatory if the United States wished to become a
member of the International Union for the Protection of New
76 Kevles, supra note 71, at 19-2 1.
77 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
78 Kevles, supra note 71, at 23-26.
79Id at24, 28.
80 H.R. REP. No. 100-888, at 12-14 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1,
12-14.
81 Id. at 12 ("Both [a farmer's exemption and a research exemption] are
paralleled in legislation Congress passed under the Plant Variety Protection
Act.").
82 See H.R. REP. No. 91-1605 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5082.
Section 114 of the bill-covering the "research exemption"-is explained in the
report only by the statement that "[u]se and production for research is not to
constitute infringement." Id. at 5093. Section 111 of the bill-covering the
"infringement of plant variety protection" clarifies that "[u]se of the protected
variety as one source of germ plasm to breed a novel variety is permissible"
under the research exemption, id, seeming to indicate that Congress wished to
protect the ability of experimenters to design around the patented variety to
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Varieties of Plants" (UPOV). UPOV is an intergovernmental
organization which encourages intellectual property protection for
plant breeders' creations internationally.8 4 The organization sets
forth uniform legal standards that member nations must comply
with-one of which is a robust research exemption.8 5 The reason
for the exemption may be as simple as this: in order for the United
States to join UPOV, and gain the attendant benefits of
membership, Congress passed the PVPA with the required
research exemption. But post-hoc rationalization of the inclusion
of the research exemption is also instructive for interpreting how
later legislators understood the importance of the exemption. After
the passage of the PVPA, legislators have stated that the exemption
exists because (1) there was concern about granting private entities
exclusive control over federally funded technology, and a research
exemption alleviated this concern,86 and (2) they were trying to
protect valuable germplasm from being locked up in patents,
preventing experimenters from using patented germplasm as a
source to develop novel and diverse varieties of plants.
8 7
The latter reason is strikingly evocative of the fair use
doctrine in trademark law, which prevents the holder of a
trademark from removing particular language from public
discourse (or controlling use of the language) on First Amendment
grounds.8 8 Similarly, experimental use in the PVPA seems to try to
prevent a patent holder from removing important germplasm from
the collection of germplasm available to plant breeders.
83 See Anne E. Crocker, Will Plants Finally Grow into Full Patent Protection on
an International Level? A Look at the History of U.S. and International Patent
Law Regarding Patent Protection for Plants and the Likely Changes After the
U.S. Supreme Court's Decision in J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 8
DRAKE J. AGRiC. L. 251, 256-80 (2003).
84 Int'l Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, What It Is, What It
Does (Oct. 22, 2009), http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/en/about/pdf/pub
437.pdf.
85 Crocker, supra note 83, at 81-83.
86 H.R. REP. No. 101-960, at 32 (1990) ("This amendment [creating a research
exemption in the PVPA] was made, in part, because of the involvement of
publicly funded research on plants.").
87 This is supported by congressional debate surrounding the Plant Variety
Protection Act Amendments of 1993: "The research exemption [in the 1970 bill]
was included to promote the free flow of germplasm-essential to the
maintenance of genetic diversity." 139 CoNG. REC. S10841-02, S10868 (daily
ed. Aug. 7, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kerrey). It is also supported by the "design
around" provisions. See supra note 82.
88 See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002)
(discussing the fair use doctrine in relationship to the First Amendment). For a
more thorough discussion of the relationship between trademark fair use and the
research exemption in PVPA, see Mark D. Janis & Stephen Smith,
Technological Change and the Design of Plant Variety Protection Regimes, 82
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1557, 1563-65 (2007).
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Germplasm and genetically modified animals share basic
similarities, in that they are composed of identifiable genetic
material and thus tied to life and the environment; it seems
deleterious to permit patents to remove basic building blocks of
life from the research scientist's tool kit, whether those building
blocks are germplasm or genetic sequences. While this theory is
completely speculative, perhaps this connection between plants
and animals motivated Merges, Adler, and Walsh to suggest that a
research exemption comparable to the one in PVPA be included in
any legislation covering transgenic animal patenting.
Adler and Walsh went into deeper detail than Merges on
the scope of the proposed statutory research exemption. Walsh
expressed fears that animal patents would concentrate valuable
resources in the hands of a few patentees and licensees, and thus
recommended the legislation include "a university research
exemption, compulsory licensing of the patent, public research
focusing efforts on helping the smaller firms stay competitive in
the market place, [and] public institutions cooperating in
establishing and maintaining a gene bank," among other
suggestions which would protect university and nonprofit
research.89 Adler seems to have argued that although a common
law exemption existed, a statutory exemption was necessary
because "the boundary between permissible research uses and
impermissible infringement [was] not totally clear" from the case
law. 90 He further expressed concerns that because of the
ambiguous precedents, courts might not recognize basic research
on transgenic animals as exempt, even when "no direct commercial
benefit" was at stake for the research scientists. 91 The record thus
demonstrates that Congress was warned by a few prominent
advocates that a research exemption would be necessary in order to
keep valuable genetic information in the public domain for basic
research purposes.
Yet prior to the bill's passage by the House of
Representatives, the House Committee on the Judiciary deleted a
proposed statutory research exemption. The reason: "a statutory
exception was unnecessary in light of the existing judicially
fashioned doctrine."92 It was not oversight or lack of consideration
that kept the Act from including a research exemption: it was
reliance on the existence of a common law "experimental use"
exemption that would protect basic research activities from
constituting infringement.
89 H.R. REP. No. 100-888, at 14 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1, 14.
90Id. at 13
91 d.a
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The Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act died in the
Senate after being passed in the House. 93 However, the debate
about the Act is instructive for viewing how contemporary
legislators viewed the function and strength of the experimental
use doctrine. Two years later, in the debates surrounding another
bill advanced by Kastenmeier, it would become even clearer that
legislators believed that a robust common law research exemption
existed.
B. Patent Competitiveness and Technological Innovation
Act of 1990
The Patent Competitiveness and Technological Innovation
Act of 1990 was broadly intended to "improv[e the] country's
patent law." 94 Like the Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act, the
bill was introduced by Kastenmeier, and it contains sections
regulating everything from inventions made in space to genetically
engineered animals. 95 For our purposes, the critical component of
the bill is Title IV, which would have created a statutory research
exemption for basic scientific research activities. Title IV of the
Patent Competitiveness Act would have amended 35 U.S.C. § 271,
a section of the patent law, by adding a subsection which would
state that "[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to make or use a
patented invention solely for research or experimentation
purposes."
96
To contextualize the drafting of Title IV, it is essential to
realize that the legislators viewed the bill as "an attempt to codify
and clarify current case law in the United States which currently
excludes experimental use or research as an act of infringement,"
and stated that it was a "central tenet of American patent law that
there is a right to use scientific information to create new and
better inventions in competition with the patented invention."
97
Legislators thus did not see the bill codifying the research
exemption as a departure from current case law, but rather as the
legislation of an already existing common law exemption.
The report by the House Committee of the Judiciary on the
bill contains some clarification of which activities would constitute
protected research and which would not.
[T]he making or using of a patented invention
solely for research or experimentation shall not be
93 Kevles, supra note 71, at 28.
94 H.R. REP. No. 10 1-960, at 1 (1990).
95 H.R. 5598, 101st Cong. (1990).
96 H.R. 5598, 101st Cong. § 402 (1990).
97 H.R. REP. No. 101-960, at 32.
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an act of patent infringement unless the patented
invention has a primary purpose of research or
experimentation. If the patented invention has a
primary purpose of research or experimentation
(such as a transgenic mouse used for cancer
research or a laboratory implement such as a
microscope), it shall not be an act of infringement to
manufacture or use one of these inventions to study,
evaluate, or characterize it or to create a product
outside the scope of the patent covering the
particular invention.98
The House Report identified six additional examples of
"experimental use":
(1) testing an invention to determine its sufficiency
or to compare it to prior art;
(2) tests to determine how the patented invention
works;
(3) experimentation on a patented invention for the
purpose of improving on it or developing a further
patentable invention;
(4) experimentation for the purpose of "designing
around" a patented invention;
(5) testing to determine whether the invention meets
the tester's purposes in anticipation of requesting a
license; and
(6) academic instructional experimentation with the
invention.
99
These permissible uses fall broadly into two groups: (1) research
on the technology, or in other words, evaluations and studies of the
technology itself; and (2) use of the patented technology in an
effort to design around the technology. Both seem to fit within at
least some interpretations of Justice Story's original formulation,
100
and moreover, both are important parts of biotechnology research.
Indeed, the clarification of biotechnology policy was
expressly mentioned as reason to support the statutory
exemption. 10  Citing the progress of university-industry
partnerships following the Bayh-Dole Act, the House Report stated
that allowing scientists and researchers to remain confused over
98 d
99 Id at 35-36.
100 See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
101 H.R. REP. No. 101-960 at 34-35 ("The field of biotechnology would
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which research activities were permissible and exempt would be
"contrary to sound public policy."'1 2 In addition to alleviating
confusion, legislators cited two other main reasons to support a
statutory research exemption for biotechnology: first, the
prevalence of public funding in the biotechnology industry, and
second, the fear that basic testing activities would be sent to
countries with robust research exemptions, such as Japan and the
countries in Western Europe. 103 To indicate the widespread support
for a statutory research exemption in biotechnology, the House
Report quotes professors, economists, and scientists, all in support
of the proposition that without a clear exemption, "[u]nnecessary
litigation occurs, excessive threats are levelled, transaction costs
are raised, and experimentation and research are chilled.'
0 4
Though legislators emphasized that legislating an
exemption would merely be codification of the case law, the House
Report also identified a strong tradition within Congress of
supporting statutory research exemptions, evidenced by the PVPA
and the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
of 1984 (commonly called the Hatch-Waxman Act). The House
Report states that the PVPA research exemption "was made, in
part, because of the involvement of publicly funded research on
plants," and suggests that Title IV was thus appropriate because, as
of 1990, "more than 50 per cent of all scientific research and
experimentation is Federally funded."'1 5 The argument in the
House Report about the statutory exemption in the Hatch-Waxman
Act is particularly interesting because in that legislation, Congress
was responding to a Federal Circuit case from 1984 which
confronted the experimental use exception: Roche Products v.
Bolar Pharmaceutical.10 6 In Roche, the Federal Circuit rejected
Bolar's argument that its use of patented drugs in order to ensure
FDA approval of generic drugs (meant to hit market immediately
after the patent expired) was experimental use, because of its
commercial purpose. 10 7 Congress overturned this decision by
including a narrow statutory research exemption in the Hatch-
Waxman Act, which established that "the use of a patented
invention in preparation for the submission of data to the Food and
Drug Administration in connection with approval for marketing a
drug was not an act of patent infringement," thus shielding some
102 Id. ("It only stands to reason in this public-private partnership that
government and university scientists should not be confused about the
permissible parameters of their research and experimentation. Clarity about
research will promote competitiveness and creativity.").
103 Id.
104 Id. at 35.
105 Id. at 33.
106 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
107 Id.
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biomedical and pharmaceutical research from being considered
infringement. 10 8 Using the PVPA and Hatch-Waxman Act as
examples, the House Report argued that both common law and
congressional tradition supported a strong research exemption to
protect basic research.
The report accompanying the Patent Competitiveness Act
therefore provides clear guidance as to how legislators perceived
the common law research exemption: the parameters of the
exemption were murky, yes, but legislators considered the
exemption itself to be well-established and completely necessary.
Because the bill contains a research exemption fashioned after the
common law exemption, the provisions contained in the bill
provide some indication as to what legislators believed the
parameters of the common law exemption were and should be.
They certainly believed an exemption existed, and that it should
cover experiments to "research on" and "design around" patented
technology.
Indeed, even the main critic of the bill, Representative
Carlos Moorhead (R-CA), recognized the existence of the common
law exemption in his dissenting remarks (in fact, as a reason not to
legislate an exemption):
I am aware that since 1813, the doctrine of
"experimental purpose" has been recognized as an
exemption to patent infringement. Throughout the
years, U.S. courts have recognized that making or
using a patented invention for the purpose of
studying or analyzing how the invention works has
not given rise to patent infringement liability, so
long as this is done in a way which does not directly
interfere with the commercial interests of the
patentee. This long standing legal principle is sound
and is a recognized feature of the patent system. I
am not aware of any reason to believe that there is
a need for Congress to codify this doctrine. 1
09
To Moorhead, Title IV was unnecessary not only because of the
existing common law exemption, but also because it sought to
protect university research which he could not perceive as
endangered:
The stated purpose of this title is to protect
university research activity. I fail to understand
what universities are being protected from. There
292
108 H.R. REP. No. 101-960, at 34.
109 Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
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has never been a case, to my knowledge, where a
university has been sued for patent infringement for
carrying on research on a patented invention. If the
existing patent law is harming universities or
interfering with their research, I believe they should
come forward and explain the nature of the
problem.
110
At the time, it may have seemed unthinkable that a
university would be sued for its basic research activities involving
patented technology. And in any case, the bill evidently was not at
the forefront of Congress's agenda: the Patent Competitiveness
Act, like its predecessor the Transgenic Animal Patent Reform
Act, languished in Congress for several years without being
passed,"' probably due in part to the defeat of its main proponent,
Kastenmeier, in the 1990 primary election. 112 In the coming years,
as the biotechnology sector failed to live up to both positive and
negative expectations, biotechnology policy fell off of the public
agenda, and a statutory research exemption fell away with it.
113
However, there were hints-particularly in Roche v. Bolar-that if
confronted with an experimental use defense, the Federal Circuit
would construe the research exemption strictly and narrowly.
These hints foreshadowed future judicial decisions that would
dramatically alter researchers' understanding of the common law
exception, spurred on by something that may have been
unimaginable to Moorhead and his contemporaries: a university
was sued for its research work.
IV. 2000s: JUDICIAL EVISCERATION OF THE COMMON
LAW EXEMPTION
While the controversies surrounding biotechnology played
out in the 1980s, changes in the federal court system were taking
place-specifically, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
was created in 1982.114 The Federal Circuit has subject matter
jurisdiction over patent appeals from U.S. district courts. Its
decisions in patent cases are crucial, because they are binding
11° Id. at 57.
... See H.R. REP. No. 102-18, at 334 (1991) ("In the Second Session of the 101st
Congress, the Subcommittee developed and the full Committee reported
legislation (Title IV of H.R. 5598) to provide a research exemption to the patent
laws of the United States. The bill was not considered in the House, and activity
may resume on this matter in this Session.").
112 Kevles, supra note 71, at 28.
113 Id. at 28-29.
114 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 165, 96 Stat.
25, 50 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (2006)).
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precedent in district courts throughout the United States. Indeed,
shortly after coming into existence, the Federal Circuit had the
opportunity to create binding precedent on the scope of the
research exemption in Roche v. Bolar,115 although its decision to
interpret the common law research exemption extremely narrowly
was overturned quickly by Congress. In the early 2000s, the
Federal Circuit had new opportunities to rule on the scope of the
common law research exemption-and the court has clarified just
how narrow it perceives the exemption to be.
After Roche v. Bolar, the next experimental use case to
come up in the Federal Circuit was Embrex, Inc. v. Service
Engineering Corp.116 Embrex had a patent on a method of
inoculating chicks against diseases before they hatched; Service
Engineering evaluated the patented method in an effort to design
around it.117 Because Service Engineering planned to compete with
Embrex, the Federal Circuit held that its use of the patented
technology was impermissible commercial use that could not be
protected by the research exemption.
118
This case could have come out either way: on the one hand,
because Service Engineering intended to eventually profit from
designing around Embrex's technology, its experiments with the
technology may not have been experimental use under Justice
Story's original formulation. 1 9 But on the other hand, the patent
bargain requires patentees to disclose their inventions so that
others might invent new and better methods around the technology,
not so that patentees can stifle attempts to design around it. The
facts of Embrex might actually be a "paradigm case of exempted
experimental use": the researchers at Service Engineering were
using the technology only to understand how to avoid
infringement, and the intent to profit was only remotely related to
the use.120 In any case, Embrex reaffirmed that the Federal Circuit
would not permit an experimental use defense if the alleged
infringer would receive commercial gain and eventual profit from
experimenting with patented technology. But what about
functionally non-commercial research by nonprofit entities? The
Federal Circuit illustrated just how remote the commercial
connection that barred the experimental use defense could be in
115 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
116 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000). It is not completely clear why the exemption
is brought up so infrequently as a defense, but speculation suggests that the
exemption's track record of failure in federal courts may explain why
defendants do not raise it as an affirmative defense as frequently as, say, patent
invalidity.
1 1 7 
Id. at 1346-47.
118 Id. at 1349.
119 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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two subsequent cases: Madey v. Duke University12 1 and Integra
LifeSciences v. Merck.
122
A. Madey v. Duke
The facts and posture of Madey are worth discussing in
some detail. John Madey had formerly worked for (and directed)
Duke University's Free Electron Laser lab, and invented and
owned certain equipment used in the lab. 123 Prior to the lawsuit,
Madey and Duke had a particularly vicious falling out, Madey left
the lab, and Duke University scientists continued using his
patented equipment in non-commercial research. 124 In addition to
suing Duke on employment-related claims, Madey sued Duke for
patent infringement stemming from the continued use of his
equipment. The North Carolina district court dismissed the patent
infringement claim on summary judgment, based in part on the
experimental use defense presented by Duke and its lawyers:
Duke's use of the technology was exempt because it was in the
course of non-commercial, not-for-profit research.
125
The Federal Circuit reviewed this judgment. Madey argued
for an extremely narrow interpretation of experimental use, which
would make any beneficial use of the patent infringing; 126 Duke
countered that the experimental use defense protected the
university's basic, non-commercial scientific research. 127 Both
Duke 128 and the district court 12 9 cited Ruth v. Stearns-Roger
Manufacturing Co.-a 1935 case in which the research exemption
protected the Colorado School of Mines regarding its experiments
with patented technology-as evidence that basic university
research was protected by longstanding precedent.
130
The Federal Circuit ultimately rejected Duke's arguments,
overturning Ruth in the process. Not only did the court reaffirm
121 307 F.3d 1351, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
122 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003). This Article will only generally cover the
holdings of Madey and Integra, in order to demonstrate how they conflict with
legislators' understanding of the common law exemption. There is already a
wealth of scholarship on the ramifications of these cases for the common law
exemption. See, e.g., Caltrider & Davis, supra note 32; Chester G. Moore,
Comment, Killing the Bayh-Dole Act's Golden Goose, 8 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 151, 163-68 (2006); Mueller, supra note 17, at 936-61.
123 See Madey v. Duke Univ., No. 1:97CV1170, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21379,
at *2-3 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 1, 1999).124 Id. at *6.
125 Madey, 307 F.3d at 1352.
126 Appellant's Reply Brief at 7-13, Madey, 307 F.3d 1351 (No. 01-1567).
127 Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 15-22, Madey, 307 F.3d 1351 (No. 01-1567).
12
1 Id. at 22.129 Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362.
130 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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prior holdings that no commercial use is protected by the
exemption, it also established that even an extremely remote
relationship between the use and the profit might prevent
utilization of the experimental use defense:
Our precedent clearly does not immunize use that is
in any way commercial in nature. Similarly, our
precedent does not immunize any conduct that is in
keeping with the alleged infringer's legitimate
business, regardless of commercial implications.
For example, major research universities, such as
Duke, often sanction and fund research projects
with arguably no commercial application
whatsoever. However, these projects unmistakably
further the institution's legitimate business
objectives, including educating and enlightening
students and faculty participating in these projects.
These projects also serve, for example, to increase
the status of the institution and lure lucrative
research grants, students and faculty.
In short, regardless of whether a particular
institution or entity is engaged in an endeavor for
commercial gain, so long as the act is in furtherance
of the alleged infringer's legitimate business and is
not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity,
or for strictly philosophical inquiry, the act does not
qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited
experimental use defense. Moreover, the profit or
nonprofit status of the user is not determinative.
In the present case, the district court attached too
great a weight to the nonprofit, educational status of
Duke, effectively suppressing the fact that Duke's
acts appear to be in accordance with any reasonable
interpretation of Duke's legitimate business
objectives. On remand, the district court will have
to significantly narrow and limit its conception of
the experimental use defense. The correct focus
should not be on the nonprofit status of Duke but on
the legitimate business Duke is involved in and
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satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical
inquiry.1
3 '
The Federal Circuit thus held that experimentation or research in
the university setting with "no commercial application
whatsoever" may not be protected by the research exemption
because of the university's business of attracting students, faculty,
and grants. At least when researchers could rely on the distinction
between commercial and non-commercial work, there was some
guidance as to which activities would be protected. After Madey,
only the old, vague guidelines protecting experiments for
"philosophical inquiry" and "idle curiosity" remained, creating
more confusion for nonprofit researchers than there may have been
before the holding. As one commentator has put it, under the strict
test in Madey, "it appears that any use of patented tools by
researchers and faculty engaged in the constant pursuit of funding,
whether in the form of research grants or licensing arrangements
for inventions developed at the institution, is unlikely to be
experimental use."
' 32
Duke immediately petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari, identifying a number of concerns: first, that all nonprofit
research institutions, because they are in the business of seeking
grants and attracting researchers, would no longer be eligible for
the research exemption. Second, Duke argued that the
unavailability of the defense would create high licensing demands
and transactions costs for nonprofits facing a thicket of corporate
patents in the way of their research. 133 The Supreme Court took
some interest in these arguments, and invited the Solicitor General
to submit a brief on the issue of whether certiorari should be
granted.
134
The Solicitor General's brief recommended that the petition
for certiorari be denied, which it ultimately was. 135 The brief
reasoned that the Federal Circuit ruling was not directly
antagonistic to prior experimental use precedent, nor was it an
inaccurate ruling given the facts of Madey's case. 136 The
arguments in the brief are also direct evidence that the model of
131 Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362-63.
132 Melissa J. Alcorn, Note, Biotechnology Law: A Tale of Peptides and Lasers:
Is Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA the End of the Experimental Use
Defense for Biomedical Innovation, or Does § 271(e) (1) of the Patent Act Save
the Day?, 57 OKLA. L. REv. 381, 387 (2004).
133 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, Duke Univ. v.
Madey, 538 U.S. 959 (2003) (No. 02-1007), available at http://www.justice.gov/
osg/briefs/2002/2pet/6invit/2002-1007.pet.ami.inv.pdf.
134 Duke Univ. v. Madey, 538 U.S. 959 (2003).
135 Duke Univ. v. Madey, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
136 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 133, at 6-13.
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university patenting promoted by the Bayh-Dole Act rendered the
research exemption untenable, at least in the view of the
Department of Justice. The brief states that after Bayh-Dole, the
university's role as a center of non-commercial research was no
longer "clear-cut" given the rise of deep university-industry
partnerships, and that universities and other research institutions
deserved no blanket exemption as a result.13 7 Not-for-profit
research institutions were no longer primarily considered centers
for advancement of human knowledge, but rather became
institutions with deep corporate ties and conflicts of interest. The
advent of biotechnology, the Bayh-Dole duty to commercialize,
and the lack of clearly defined exempt uses combined to create a
perfect storm, jeopardizing the continuation of basic research in
even the most independent settings.
Nevertheless, the Solicitor General stated that the
experimental use defense might be ripe for legislative (as opposed
to judicial) consideration. The brief identified the "weighty
concerns" raised by Duke about the scope of permissible research
and the feasibility of licensing, and identified Congress as the
authority most capable of evaluating those concerns and creating a
solution. 3 8  The brief identified the Hatch-Waxman Act
(Congress's response to Roche v. Bolar), the Transgenic Animal
Patent Reform Act, and the Patent Competitiveness Act as
evidence of Congress's willingness and ability to address the
experimental use exception if necessary. 139 After certiorari was
denied, universities were left questioning whether their activities
were protected research, and unfortunately, the legislature took no
immediate action to clarify.
B. Integra LifeSciences v. Merck
Integra is less instructive for this study because the
research exemption was ultimately determined to be a collateral
issue by the majority of the Federal Circuit panel. 14 Moreover, the
Supreme Court ultimately overturned the Federal Circuit decision
in favor of the defendants, but on grounds not involving the
1 3 7 
Id. at 12-13.
138 Id. at 15-16. The Solicitor General discussed the judiciary's ability to address
these concerns: "Indeed, it seems improbable that a 190-year-old, judge-made
defense with little rooting in any statutory text could anticipate the challenges of
the modern academic and research environment and adequately accommodate
the competing policy concerns raised by the parties in this case."
139 Id. at 16-17 (citing the Hatch-Waxman Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1); the
Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act, H.R. 4970, § 2, 100th Cong. (1988); and
the Patent Competitiveness Act, H.R. 5598, § 402, 101st Cong. (1990)).
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experimental use debate. 14 1 Nevertheless, in the Federal Circuit
case, the dissenting judge, Judge Newman, offered an interesting
view of the experimental use exemption that merits discussion,
particularly in view of some recent developments in biotechnology
and some of the recently proposed solutions for the research
exemption problem.
The facts of Integra are somewhat complex, but essentially
involve the experiments of a scientist, David Cheresh, at the
(nonprofit) Scripps Research Institute. Integra had a patent directed
toward recombinantly-roduced peptides (RGD peptides) and
certain uses for them,' 4 chiefly for healing wounds and adhering
prosthetics, although Integra was never successful in
commercializing its patents. 143 Cheresh discovered a new use for
certain forms of the RGD peptides: inhibiting blood vessel growth,
which could have profound implications for inhibiting cancerous
tumor growth. 144 Recognizing the possibilities of this technology,
Merck, a German pharmaceutical company, entered into an
agreement with Scripps to develop it. 
145
The majority did not discuss experimental use, 146 but in her
dissent, Judge Newman expressed the opinion that the
experimental use exception would have properly protected some of
Cheresh's early work.147 Judge Newman expressed her concern
that the "right to [use patented technology to] conduct research to
achieve [basic] knowledge need not, and should not, await
expiration of the patent," and her frustration at the majority's
decision to further "disapprove[] and essentially eliminate[] the
common law research exemption."'148 Judge Newman distinguished
"research" from "development," and stated that the exemption
should protect the former:
[T]here is a generally recognized distinction
between "research" and "development," as a matter
of scale, creativity, resource allocation, and often
the level of scientific/engineering skill needed for
141 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
142 Integra, 331 F.3d at 862-63.
143 Mueller, supra note 17, at 949-50.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Integra, 331 F.3d at 864 n.2 (stating that the experimental use exemption was
not before them in the case, but suggesting that even if it had been briefed or
argued, "the Patent Act does not include the word 'experimental,' let alone an
experimental use exemption from infringement").
147 Id. at 874. (Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that "either the common law
research exemption or the development associated with § 271(e)(1) immunity
embraces all of [the allegedly infringing] activities").148 Id. at 873.
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the project; this distinction may serve as a useful
divider, applicable in most situations. Like "fair
use" in copyright law, the great variety of possible
facts may occasionally raise dispute as to particular
cases. However, also like fair use, in most cases it
will be clear whether the exemption applies.
149
Despite leaving the parameters of the exemption open, Judge
Newman did give some guidance as to the types of research
activity that should be protected:
The subject matter of patents may be studied in
order to understand it, or to improve upon it, or to
find a new use for it, or to modify or "design
around" it. Were such research subject to
prohibition by the patentee the advancement of
technology would stop, for the first patentee in the
field could bar not only patent-protected
competition, but all research that might lead to such
competition, as well as barring improvement or
challenge or avoidance of patented technology.
Today's accelerated technological advance is based
in large part on knowledge of the details of patented
inventions and how they are made and used.
Prohibition of research into such knowledge cannot
be squared with the framework of the patent law.
150
Judge Newman's language is evocative of the "research
on"/"research with" dichotomy that has been advanced by many
scholars, including Rebecca S. Eisenberg and the National
Research Council, 151 and is also evocative of the protected uses
outlined in the statutory exemption contained in the Patent
Competitiveness Act.152 Under Judge Newman's formulation, pre-
commercial research on the technology as an end in itself-
intended to help researchers understand the invention or avoid
infringement-would be exempted, while research using the
technology as a tool or a means to another end would be
infringement.
149 Id. at 876 (footnote omitted).
150 Id. at 875.
151 See Mueller, supra note 17, at 957-59; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the
Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CRH. L. REV.
1017, 1074-75 (1989); Report of the National Institutes of Health Working
Group on Research Tools Appendix D (June 4, 1998), http://www.nih.gov/
news/researchtools/appendd.htm.
152 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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The majority opinion in Integra was ultimately vacated and
remanded by the Supreme Court on other grounds, and in any case,
Judge Newman's dissent would have had no precedential force.
153
However, the dissent reflects the desperate need for guidance in
delineating the bounds of the research exemption: even a basic,
vague line between "research" and "development" might aid
researchers and courts in their application and assessment of
permissible research activities. As the Federal Circuit was
narrowing the experimental use exception in the legal sphere, new
challenges for experimental use were arising in the scientific
world. The patenting of genes and genetic sequences was in full
swing. And as the 2000s continued, the tension between gene
patents and the progress of basic research would further illustrate
the need for clear guidelines to govern not-for-profit research on
patented technology.
V. THE FUTURE OF THE RESEARCH EXEMPTION IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY
The need for clarification of the research exemption has
been heightened by the rise of gene patenting, as new questions
arise about how researchers can use basic DNA strands to do
beneficial research on health and disease. The history of gene
patenting has been written elsewhere; 154 suffice it to say that since
around the year 2000, the Patent Office has granted patents on
small strands of complementary DNA-not on methods of using
them, but on the fragments themselves-allegedly because a
human's actions in isolating and purifying the fragments renders
them patentable. 155 Gene patenting has held great promise for the
biotechnology industry, but has also generated objections from
groups with moral and ethical concerns about patenting sequences
found naturally in human and animal bodies.
Deep controversies have arisen surrounding gene
patenting. 156 Some of the most troubling questions implicate the
153 For more in-depth discussion of the Integra case and the research exemption,
see Alcorn, supra note 132; Rebecca Lynn, Note, Merck KGaA v. Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd.: Judicial Expansion of 271(e) (1) Signals a Need for a Broad
Statutory Experimental Use Exemption in Patent Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
79 (2006).
154 See KEVIN DAVIES, CRACKING THE GENOME: INSIDE THE RACE To UNLOCK
HUMAN DNA (2001); Daniel J. Kevles & Ari Berkowitz, The Gene Patenting
Controversy: A Convergence of Law, Economic Interests, and Ethics, 67
BROOK. L. REV. 233 (2001).
155 See Andrews, supra note 15, at 803.
156 See supra note 154. For another thorough and recent overview of the gene
patenting controversies, see Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Note, Access to Bio-
Knowledge: From Gene Patents to Biomedical Materials, 2010 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. NI, http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/ouellette-access-to-bio-knowledge.pdf.
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fate of basic research on these genes and sequences, many of
which are correlated with predisposition to certain health problems
or diseases. Most obviously, there is no way to "invent around" a
particular genetic sequence. Researchers who wish to work on
genetic therapy or diagnostic testing related to a patented gene
fragment often cannot do so without infringing the patent. 157 A
patent on a gene sequence can hinder research on the technology
and attempts at the development of tests and therapy around it; any
progress that occurs must happen in the labs and by the employees
of the patentee and its licensees.
As with every new advancement in biotechnology,
members of Congress attempted to legislate a research exemption,
this time one that would allow non-commercial research on
patented genes. The Genomic Research and Diagnostic
Accessibility Act of 2002158 would have protected the use of
patented genetic information in the course of "systematic
investigation, including research development, testing, and
evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable
knowledge," as well as use of the patented sequence in the creation
of "any test, designed to detect disease, to predict the potential for
a medical disorder, or to predict the effectiveness of
therapeutics."' 159 But like nearly every other attempt to legislate a
statutory research exemption, the bill was never acted on after
being referred to committee, and it expired at the end of that
session of Congress. 160 Another bill, the Genomic Research and
Accessibility Act of 2007,161 sought to remedy the research
problems by prohibiting gene patenting altogether, 162 but it, too,
died after being referred to committee.
163
Confusion about the scope of permissible research may
deter researchers from doing work on patented genes: after a patent
was granted on a gene pertaining to hemochromatosis, thirty
percent of the U.S. laboratories surveyed ceased their work on it.
164
Many other researchers also report stopping their work after
learning that a patent has been granted, or after being contacted by
the patent holder with threats of suit or offers of exorbitant
157 Andrews, supra note 15, at 804.
158 H.R. 3967, 107th Cong. (2002).
159 Id. §§ 2(E), 3(F).
160 Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R. 3967,
107th Cong., available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl07-
3967.
161 H.R. 977, 110th Cong. (2007).
162 153 CONG. REC. E315-05 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2007) (statement of Rep.
Becerra).
163 Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, 110th Cong., available
at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h 110-977.
164 Andrews, supra note 15, at 805.
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licensing fees. 165 In any event, the effects of confusion deter
beneficial competition and development, perhaps not for the most
brazen researchers, but for enough researchers that it is a serious
problem. 166 Restrictions on basic research threaten to stunt
advances in technology that could have profound effects both for
public health and for economic growth. The confusion about the
permissibility of basic research on DNA fragments remains.
Gene patents are only one subset of biotechnology patents
which seem to be affected by the murky research exemption.
Although recent scholarship has indicated that patents and patent
infringement suits may not be the most serious obstacle that
scientific researchers face in their efforts to access and use
patented technology, 167 the extant confusion created by the unclear
exemption is terrible policy for a host of reasons. Researchers and
universities are somewhat less likely to engage in activity which
might be infringing; excessive licensing breeds high prices and
transactions costs that may be transferred to the government and
the public funding the research; 168 there is also the possibility that
basic research that would otherwise take place in U.S. labs is being
taken on by countries with robust and clear research exemptions. 169
Even if many researchers are not afraid of being sued for their
work with patented technology, the norms which might be keeping
researchers from being sued could one day be violated (envision
another Myriad, or worse, universities suing one another over their
patent portfolios).
Up to this point, this Article has attempted to point out the
tensions between congressional understanding of experimental use
and judicial understanding of experimental use. The two branches
seem to be talking past one another: in the past half-century, judges
have stated that a broader exemption could only be created by the
legislature, while various legislators have relied on the existence of
a common law exemption in deciding whether to support or amend
a statutory exemption. Adding to the mess, important advances in
biotechnology-most recently, the technology involved in gene
patents-have resulted in broad patents that may be having a
chilling effect on the continuation of basic research, particularly
165 Id.
166 Although Ouellette's research demonstrates that the patent problem may be
overstated, she also notes that some studies indicate that "DNA patents are
limiting both the availability of testing and the development of new genetic
tests." Ouellette, supra note 156, 56.
167 See id.
168 See Maurice Cassier, Private Property, Collective Property, and Public
Property in the Age of Genomics, 54 INT'L SOC. SCI. J. 83, 90-91 (2002).
169 See John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 717-19 (2002) (discussing the possibility of
outsourcing as a result of the lack of a research exemption in the United States).
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since Madey and Integra, which rendered the parameters of
exempted non-commercial research even more unclear. This Part
will provide a brief overview of a few of the solutions and
alternatives that scholars and policymakers have advanced for the
research exemption problem, suggestions which would protect the
continuation of basic research without damaging the value and the
incentives that the patent system provides. Although I discuss the
arguments made for different types of solutions generally-in
other words, the solutions recommended below could cover
research using all patented technologies-many of these solutions
could in theory be narrowed to specifically address the
biotechnology sector.
A. Liability Rules
One of the solutions that has been proposed by scholars
such as Rebecca S. Eisenberg and Janice M. Mueller would be to
change the rule protecting the patentee's intellectual property from
a property rule to a liability rule; 170 a property rule protects an
owner's rights against any non-consensual use of the property,
while a liability rule permits non-consensual use with the payment
of damages after-the-fact. 17' The liability rule would not permit a
broad research exemption, but it would allow courts to examine
uses of patented technology case-by-case, balancing the harm to
the patent owner against the scope, nature, and necessity of use by
the infringer, and adjusting damages accordingly. This approach
has been advocated by Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit.
7 2
In its recent decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C.,
the Supreme Court held that injunctions are not an automatic
remedy for patent infringement, and the Court suggested that a
balance-of-harms approach and adjusted damages may be more
appropriate in particular cases. 17 3 The public interest in the
progress of basic research and improvements in public health thus
might make a liability rule a good substitute for the experimental
use exception, by permitting non-commercial university and
nonprofit researchers to use technology in de minimis, non-
commercial ways that would likely not cause great damages.
However, there are two obvious problems: first, while assessing
170 Eisenberg, supra note 151, at 1078; Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante
Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for
Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REv. 1, 54-57 (2001).
171 See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L.
REv. 1089 (1972).
172 See Mueller, supra note 17, at 934-36 (discussing Judge Rader's arguments
for a similar rule in Embrex and Integra).
173 547 U.S. 388, 391, 394 (2006).
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damages on past research may be possible, valuing the damages
caused by prospective or ongoing experimentation may be very
difficult; 74 and second, the patent holder's uncertain ability to
wield exclusive control over use and licensing of the patent will
make the patent far less valuable and will also damage the overall
value of the incentives provided by the patent system. 1
75
B. A "Fair Use" Exemption
While Justice Story is famous for creating the experimental
use exception that is the topic of this Article, he is also responsible
for creating another intellectual property doctrine: copyright fair
use.176 Copyright fair use allows certain users to reproduce
copyrighted material without permission, under limited
circumstances. Though the doctrine originated at common law, it
was somewhat murky (as experimental use is today); hence, in the
Copyright Act of 1976, Congress enacted a fair use exemption
meant to codify the existing common law standard. 177 The
Copyright Act provides that a court considering whether a
defendant's use is "fair use" and thus not copyright infringement
should consider four factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.
178
Many scholars have suggested that patent law might benefit
from a "fair use" type exemption, in which courts could use a
multi-factor test to determine whether a defendant's use of
patented technology should be protected or not. 179 An exemption
174 See Mueller, supra note 17, at 979.
175 See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
Inventions, 85 MrNN. L. REV. 697, 703 (2001).
176 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
Copyright fair use is distinct from trademark fair use, discussed briefly in my
discussion of the PVPA above. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
177 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.05[1] (2009).
178 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
179 See, e.g., Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human
DNA Sequences in the United States and the European Union: An Argument for
Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623,
1687 (2001); Mueller, supra note 170, at 42; Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a
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could look very similar to the "four factors" test of copyright law:
for example, courts could consider the purpose of the use of the
patented technology, the amount of the use, and so on in
determining whether a defendant's activities would be permissible
research or impermissible infringement. 180 The test could be
created through either legislative guidance or common law
decisions. An unambiguous, "fair use" style research exemption in
patent law would help ensure that creation and sharing would still
be incentivized, and would also protect the valid interests of the
patentee in the fruits of his or her hard work.
However, the suggestion to create a "fair use" affirmative
defense is not without its problems. It is a broad solution requiring
significant legislative or judicial action that risks unintended
consequences and might result only in added complexity and
confusion. 18 1 It may also be expensive. Although some have
alleged that creating a clear exemption would reduce litigation and
the costs of case-by-case adjudication and modification of an
unclear research exemption, 182 one could envision another scenario
in which defendants would be more encouraged to present the
defense or bring declaratory judgment actions, and hence, litigation
might increase as courts build a body of "experimental use"
precedent. There are also problems with the complexity of the
evidence to be considered. Although factors like the "amount of
use" are comparatively easy to judge in copyrightable works, in the
patent scenario, courts might be confronted with particularly
detailed, scientific, and subjective documents and testimony on the
amount and purpose of use, further increasing the cost of
litigation. 183 Courts would also have to face "difficult pricing
decisions" to decide the scope, amount, and intent of the use, in
order to perform the balancing test. 184 Furthermore, the current
process, which provides courts with flexibility in computing
damages for infringement, may already provide a sort of multi-
Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLuM. L. REv. 1177, 1205 (2000)
("The preceding analysis identified five factors relevant to a fair use finding: (i)
the nature of the advance represented by the infringement; (ii) the purpose of the
infringing use; (iii) the nature and strength of the market failure that prevents a
license from being concluded; (iv) the impact of the use on the patentee's
incentives and overall social welfare; and (v) the nature of the patented work.
While this test resembles that of copyright fair use, it diverges to reflect the
different incentive scheme of patent."); see also Eisenberg, supra note 151, at
1018 n.6. ("The U.S. copyright laws also exempt some research uses of
copyrighted works from infringement liability under the 'fair use' doctrine.").180 See O'Rourke, supra note 179, at 1230-3 1.




184 Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time
for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REv. 457, 470 (2004).
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factor test which protects de minimis, nonprofit researchers from
having to pay large damages to patent holders, 8 5 rendering a "fair
use"-type defense redundant given the significant trouble creating
a new fair use doctrine might entail.
C. Compulsory Licensing, Non-exclusive Licensing, and
Patent Pools
Patent pools and compulsory licenses are traditional tools
of patent law that could be harnessed to ensure the continuation of
valued research, and this approach has been advocated by Lori
Andrews as well as the National Research Council Committee on
Science, Technology, and Law. 186 Similar consortia and collective
licensinf programs have been utilized with great success in
Europe. Patent pools are agreements in which two or more
patent holders agree to license their technology to one another (or
to third parties for a set fee). These agreements prevent parties
seeking to use the technologies from having to seek licenses from
each individual patentee. Because of the existing norms of sharing
and scholarship in academia, universities and nonprofits who
invent technology might be predisposed to make commitments to
join these voluntary associations.
As a similar alternative, the norms in the scientific
community could be utilized to promote non-exclusive licensing of
university- or nonprofit-developed technology. This approach
might require universities and nonprofits to sacrifice the high
payments that come with exclusive licenses, but non-exclusive
licensing could promote more widespread research and
development on and around patented work. Although it would be
more difficult, some scholars have advocated that the non-
exclusivity reforms go even further: using public domain projects
such as the Human Genome Project and some components of
pharmaceutical research as examples, they have suggested that
basic research in universities and nonprofits that is funded by the
public go directly into the public domain.18 8 This would require
revision of the Bayh-Dole Act, but one could imagine a revision
185 See Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(Rader, J., concurring).186 Andrews, supra note 15, at 807; cf NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L
ACADS., REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH 14-15
(2006) (recommending that "NIH ... undertake a study of potential university,
government, and industry arrangements for the pooling and cross-licensing of
genomic and proteomic patents, as well as research tools").
187 See Cassier, supra note 168, at 94-95.
188 Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Richard R. Nelson, Public v. Proprietary Science: A
Fruitful Tension?, 131 DAEDALUS 89, 100 (2002).
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permitting and requiring universities to pursue patent protection for
applications of basic research, but not for the results of basic
research and new knowledge itself. 1
89
Compulsory licensing, in contrast, requires no volunteerism
on the part of the patent holder; instead, the government can grant
a license on a patent to serve the public interest.190 The march-in
rights in the Bayh-Dole Act would clearly seem to give the
government this ability, but to date, these rights have not been
utilized. 191 The obvious problem with this and all of the
licensing/pooling approaches is that they require volunteer,
collective, or administrative actions, all of which are susceptible to
high transactions costs and inertia.
D. Legislation
With the common law research exemption in its current
state, the best choice would be congressional action to legislate a
research exemption. In the past, Congress has legislated
exemptions for certain types of possibly infringing activity
involving patented technology when matters of life and health are
at stake: Congress has protected research use of germplasm in the
PVPA, drug experimentation in the Hatch-Waxman Act, and most
recently, it has exempted doctors using patented surgical
procedures from being sued for infringement. 192 A legislative
research exemption has been advocated by nearly every single
scholar who has considered the problems inherent in the current
system. 193 The exception could be narrowly drawn-for example,
protecting only genetic testing or certain types of research on
certain biotechnologies-or it could guide all basic research in the
field of public health.
As this paper has shown, for the past century, nearly every
scholar, legislator, and judge to consider what kinds of
experimentation and research should be protected has agreed upon
two broad categories: (1) research on the patented technology and
(2) research to design around the technology. The National
189 See id.
190 Andrews, supra note 15, at 807.
191 See supra note 66 and accompanying text; see also NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 186, at 96.
192 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 616, 110
Stat. 3009, 3009-67 to -68 (1996) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2006)).
193 See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 186, at 14; Andrews, supra
note 15, at 806-07; Sherizaan Minwalla, A Modest Proposal To Amend the
Patent Code 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) To Allow Health Care Providers To Examine
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Research Council Committee has drafted four useful guidelines
that outline the work which it believes should be exempted:
[M]aking or using a patented invention should not
be considered infringement if done to discern or to
discover:
a) the validity of the patent and scope of
afforded protection;
b) the features, properties, or inherent
characteristics or advantages of the
invention;
c) novel methods of making or using the
patented invention; or
d) novel alternatives, improvements, or
substitutes.' 
94
Such an exemption would seem to protect both the patentee's
interests and the user's. Research with the patented technology for
commercial development would be infringing, but research
incidental to commercial business-for example, in the course of
developing an alternative, or ascertaining the veracity of the
patent's specifications-would not.1
95
While any proposed legislation would require extensive
hearings and the input of judges, scholars, researchers, and private
firms, 96 the suggestions already contained in past judicial opinions
and legislative history are a good start. A clear exemption would
ultimately benefit not only public health and non-commercial
biotechnology research, but would also help private, commercial
industry. Such an exemption would offer patent holders better
guidance as to when they should pursue costly and time-
consuming enforcement of their patents, and when enforcement
would be unsuccessful or inappropriate. Moreover, clearly defined
exempt uses would allow patent holders to cut through the thicket
of both commercial and non-commercial researchers that may be
using their technology, allowing them to focus on strategically
licensing their patents to those engaging in non-exempt work.
CONCLUSION
There is a complex web of law and policy surrounding
biotechnology and the university's role in basic biotech research:
at best, this Article has strived to identify some of the incongruities
194 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 186, at 14.
195 Id.
196 The difficulties in outlining the scope of such an exemption are briefly
discussed in Eisenberg & Nelson, supra note 188.
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between Congress's historical understanding of the common law
research exemption and the narrow judicial reality, and how these
misunderstandings have ultimately resulted in confusion that is
affecting researchers and universities alike. Legislation to protect
basic biotechnology research is necessary.
The ACLU's victory in its suit against Myriad at the district
court level leaves the future of gene patents uncertain. Although
the court decided the case on limited grounds at summary
judgment, namely, the unpatentability of products of nature, 197 it
did not rule out the possibility that gene patents may be impeding
beneficial, basic research, and that further findings of fact might
reveal that to be the case.198 If the ACLU suit survives an appeal
from Myriad, litigation might be enough to effect changes in gene
patenting, but as history has demonstrated, with each new advance
in biotechnology there have been new problems and challenges
implicating the research exemption, and clear legislative policy
going forward would help alleviate the problem. At the very least,
even if the ACLU suit is ultimately unsuccessful, it is possible that
it will draw public attention to the problems inherent in the
obstacles to basic research and will force some legislative action.
While the confusion may not yet have led to a crisis
implicating public health, it would be better to have Congress act
prematurely than to act too late. Since Madey and Integra, given
the importance of continued basic research in biotechnology fields
such as human genetics, a clear, legislated exemption to guide
researchers and the universities and nonprofits that employ them is
badly needed. A clear exemption would free Progress, that lofty
aim of the patent law, from the patents that currently may be
stifling it.
197 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, No. 09
Civ. 4515, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *108 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010).
198 Id. at *77.
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COURTING CHAOS:
CONFLICTING GUIDANCE FROM COURTS HIGHLIGHTS THE NEED
FOR CLEARER RULES TO GOVERN THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF
DIGITAL EVIDENCE
Lily R. Robinton*
12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 311 (2010)
ABSTRACT
Today's digital devices allow users to store an astounding
amount ofpersonal information and data of all types. People now
favor hard drives and e-mails over file cabinets and letters. When
conducting criminal investigations in today's high-tech world,
forensic analysts may compare digital fingerprints rather than
physical ones. Investigators must obtain search warrants before
examining any digital device for evidence of criminal activity, just
as they would before searching a suspect's car, home, or office. In
the digital context, however, the warrant requirement goes awry.
Traditional search and seizure rules fail to prevent general,
exploratory searches, which threaten individual privacy rights.
Courts recognizing this problem have adopted "special
approaches" for conducting digital media searches. Although
these approaches provide greater protection for privacy rights,
they often severely hamper legitimate law-enforcement interests.
In order to both preserve privacy rights and promote justice,
legislatures must enact laws directed at the search and seizure of
digital media. These laws should (1) require investigators to
follow narrow search protocols, but allow expanded searches
where necessary; (2) require investigators to obtain a second
warrant before seizing out-of-scope evidence, with a narrow
exception; and 3) require a taint team to review digital media
containing privileged or third party files.
* UCLA School of Law, J.D., Managing Editor, UCLA Law Review, Senior
Articles Editor, UCLA Journal of Law & Technology, 2008-2009, U.C. San
Diego, B.S., Biology. I would like to thank the attorneys at the U.S. Attorney's
Office for the Northern District of California, San Jose, for inspiring me to write
this article, with thanks in particular to Assistant U.S. Attorneys Hanley Chew,
Jeffrey Schenk, Daniel Kaleba, Susan Knight, and Jeff Nedrow for taking the
time to answer my questions and guide me to resources. I would also like to
thank Chris Beeson, Director of the Regional District Forensics Lab for the
Northern District of California, for setting aside time in his busy schedule to
give me an overview of how forensics analysts proceed with the complicated
task of searching for digital evidence. And of course, thanks to my friends and
family for edits and encouragement.
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INTRODUCTION
On August 26, 2009, searches and seizures of digital
property within the Ninth Circuit ground to a screeching halt.' The
culprit? A landmark opinion authored on that date by the Chief
Judge of the Ninth Circuit, Alex Kozinski, in a case already
fraught with controversy: United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing, Inc.2 (CDT). CDT stemmed from the federal government's
investigation into the illegal distribution and use of steroids in
Major League Baseball (MLB), which implicated well-known
players such as Barry Bonds, Alex Rodriguez, Sammy Sosa, and
Manny Ramirez.3 Several years of investigation gave the
government probable cause to believe that at least ten Major
League Baseball players had received illegal steroids from Bay
Area Labs Cooperative. Federal investigators obtained a warrant to
search the computer records of a private company retained by the
MLB Players' Association to oversee its drug testing program.
4
The warrant authorized seizure of drug test records pertaining to
those ten named players, but prosecutors discovered and reviewed
a directory containing hundreds of records relating to other sports'
drug testing programs. Prosecutors then sought additional warrants
to seize records and specimens pertaining to approximately one
hundred other players who had tested positive for steroids. This
move led to a heated debate in several lower courts over whether
the government acted properly in reviewing and seeking additional
warrants for data that fell outside the scope of the initial search.5
In CDT, a limited en banc panel comprised of eleven
judges overturned an earlier Ninth Circuit opinion written by a
three-judge panel in favor of the government. The CDT majority
1 See Brief for the United States in Support of Rehearing En Banc by the Full
Court at 1, 6, United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (CDTII), 579
F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Nos. 05-10067, 05-15006, 05-55354) ("The
government is accordingly laboring under the direct effects of this new legal
regime. Many United States Attorney's Offices have been chilled from seeking
any new warrants to search computers.").
2 CDTII, 579 F.3d.
3 See id at 993; Derek Regensburger, Bytes, BALCO, and Barry Bonds: An
Exploration of the Law Concerning the Search and Seizure of Computer Files
and an Analysis of the Ninth Circuit's Decision in United States v.
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1151, 1151
(2007); Paul Elias, Feds Seek Rehearing of Baseball Drug List Ruling,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 25, 2009.
4 See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing (CDT 1), 513 F.3d 1085,
1090-94 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'den banc and vacated, 579 F.3d 989.
'See CDT II, 579 F.3d at 993-94.
6 See CDT I, 513 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd en banc and vacated, 579
F.3d 989.
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held that the government had willfully disregarded the limitations
of the search warrant to obtain out-of-scope evidence illegally;
however, it was not the majority's disapproval of the government's
actions that catalyzed the ensuing squall. In his August 26, 2009,
opinion, Chief Judge Kozinski wrote, "This case is about a federal
investigation into steroid use by professional baseball players.
More generally, however, it's about the procedures and safeguards
that federal courts must observe in issuing and administering
search warrants and subpoenas for electronically stored
information." 7 After determining that the government had acted
improperly, the opinion set forth extremely restrictive guidelines to
govern the search and seizure of digital property. 8 The majority
took a significant step in shifting its focus from the facts of the
case to the general issue of how magistrates and federal agents
should issue and execute search warrants for electronically stored
information. Styled as "guidelines," but viewed by magistrate
judges as mandatory, the new rules set forth in CDT have wreaked
havoc on government investigations in the Ninth Circuit, and have
been criticized for departing from controlling precedent.9 The
opinion has caused such a stir that Solicitor General Elena Kagan,
along with every U.S. Attorney's Office in the Ninth Circuit, and
7 579 F.3d at 993.
8 Chief Judge Kozinski summarized his rules as follows:
1. Magistrates should insist that the government
waive reliance upon the plain view doctrine in digital evidence
cases.
2. Segregation and redaction must be either done by
specialized personnel or an independent third party. If the
segregation is to be done by government computer personnel,
it must agree in the warrant application that the computer
personnel will not disclose to the investigators any
information other than that which is the target of the warrant.
3. Warrants and subpoenas must disclose the actual
risks of destruction of information as well as prior efforts to
seize that information in other judicial fora.
4. The government's search protocol must be
designed to uncover only the information for which it has
probable cause, and only that information may be examined
by the case agents.
5. The government must destroy or, if the recipient
may lawfully possess it, return non-responsive data, keeping
the issuing magistrate informed about when it has done so and
what it has kept.
Id. at 1006 (internal citations omitted); see Hugh Kaplan & Christine
Mumford, Attorneys, Academics Sort Through Landmark Case on
Computer Searches, 85 CRiM. L. REP. 688 (2009).
9 See Brief for the United States in Support of Rehearing En Banc by the Full
Court, supra note 1, at 1, 5, 8-14.
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five top attorneys from Main Justice, have petitioned the full
twenty-seven member court to reconsider the decision.'
0
This is not the first controversy to arise over the search and
seizure of digital property. Crooks and innocents alike store
information relating to every facet of their lives on digital devices,
making them attractive targets for criminal investigators." Courts
across the nation have struggled to apply Fourth Amendment
principles to digital searches to ensure the searches do not expand
into exploratory hunts that threaten individual privacy. Their
attempts have produced a tangle of conflicting authority, and as
demonstrated by CDT, a digital search resolution remains elusive.
To add to the confusion, different government agencies may
disagree about how to approach and execute a search and seizure
of digital property.
12
Regardless of whether the Ninth Circuit accepts or declines
the federal government's petition to reconsider its decision in CDT,
or whether the Court overturns the decision, the storm of
controversy created by CDT has underscored the need for a
uniform set of rules that successfully balances individual privacy
concerns against legitimate law enforcement interests. As Chief
Judge Kozinski stated, "Everyone's interests are best served if
there are clear rules to follow that strike a fair balance between the
legitimate needs of law enforcement and the right of individuals
and enterprises to the privacy that is at the heart of the Fourth
Amendment."' 13 His rules, however, along with the rules of other
courts, have thus far fallen woefully short of achieving this
balance. This Article addresses these conflicting interests and
argues for a legislative solution that combines and harmonizes
existing rules.
Part I of this Article begins by introducing the history and
framework of the warrant requirement, which grew from the
Fourth Amendment. Part I also addresses the significance of the
threat to privacy posed by unlimited digital searches in response to
those who claim that law-abiding citizens need not worry about
privacy intrusions. Part II addresses the complications introduced
by digital media, and Part III explains the conflicting ways in
which courts have responded to these complications. Part IV
argues that legislatures should create statutory schemes to address
10 See Elias, supra note 3; Laura Ernde, Prosecutors: Steroid Ruling Hurting
Other Investigations: Obama Asks 9th Circuit To Reconsider Steroid Ruling,
DAILY J., Nov. 27, 2009. Due to the large size of the Ninth Circuit, a limited en
banc panel consisting of eleven judges usually convenes to hear appeals. See
Elias, supra note 3.
11 See infra Part II.
12 See Kaplan & Mumford, supra note 8.
1 CDTII, 579 F.3d 989, 1006 (9th Cir. 2009).
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the issue. Part IV goes on to propose rules governing search and
seizure of digital property, which would tackle the unique privacy
concerns raised by these searches without hampering government
investigations.
I. THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT, AND THE "I HAVE
NOTHING To HIDE" RETORT
A. The History and Framework of the Warrant
Requirement
In 1761, the citizens of Massachusetts lived without the
protections of the Fourth Amendment. 14 They lived in a world
where "writs of assistance," a type of general warrant, authorized
meticulous searches of their private homes and businesses, and
allowed searching officials to pry open locks, cast aside bars, and
seize offending articles on no more than bare suspicion. 15 In
February of 1761, a lawyer named James Otis gave a passionate,
five-hour speech against the perils of the "writ of assistance."
16
What Otis lacked in brevity, he made up for in emotion as he
effectively conveyed the fear incited by the specter of the general
warrant:
Every one with this writ may be a tyrant; if this
commission be legal, a tyrant in a legal manner,
also, may control, imprison, or murder any one
within the realm. In the next place, it is perpetual;
there is no return. A man is accountable to no
person for his doings. Every man may reign secure
in his petty tyranny, and spread terror and
desolation around him, until the trump of the
14 See JOHN CLARK RIDPATH, JAMES OTIS, THE PRE-REVOLUTIONIST: A BRIEF
INTERPRETATION OF THE LIFE AND WORK OF A PATRIOT 37-45 (1898); see also
Writs of Assistance: Colonial America, http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/
hl205.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
15 See RIDPATH, supra note 14; Samantha Trepel, Digital Searches, General
Warrants, and the Case for the Courts, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 120, 123 (2008);
James Otis, Against Writs of Assistance (Feb. 1761), available at
http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/writs.htm; James Otis, In Opposition to Writs of
Assistance (Feb. 1761) [hereinafter Otis, In Opposition to Writs of Assistance],
reprinted in 8 THE WORLD'S FAMOuS ORATIONS 27 (William Jennings Bryan
ed., 1906).
16 See RIDPATH, supra note 14, at 48; Otis, In Opposition to Writs of Assistance,
supra note 15; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and
the Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 53 (1996). James Otis
represented a group of Boston Merchants opposing the writs before the Superior
Court of Massachusetts. Id. at 76.
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Archangel shall excite different emotions in his
soul. 17
Otis' plea to banish the writ of assistance fell on deaf
ears, 18 but a few years later, in the cases of Wilkes v. Wood 19 and
Entick v. Carrington,20 the English court refused to allow the
government to rely on general warrants lacking probable cause to
justify the arrests of political activists and subsequent searches of
their homes and belongings. These two cases have been called "the
O.J. Simpson and Rodney King cases of their day," 21 and likely
influenced the Framers of the Constitution as they drafted an
amendment that would protect the American citizens against the
terrors preached by James Otis.
22
The Fourth Amendment, straight from the quills of the
Framers, ensures that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.23
A government-instigated search of anything a person deems
private must be reasonable to pass muster under the Fourth
Amendment. 24 The Supreme Court has developed two procedural
tools to ensure the protections of the Fourth Amendment. The first
17 See RIDPATH, supra note 14, at 53; Otis, In Opposition to Writs of Assistance,
supra note 15.
18 Writs of Assistance, supra note 14.
19 Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P.); Lofft 1.
20 Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P.); 2 Wils. K. B. 275.
21 Amar, supra note 16, at 65.
22 See id. at 64-65; Trepel, supra note 15, at 123-24.
23 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24 See id; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155 (1925) (setting forth a
reasonableness standard for probable cause); Investigations and Police
Practices, 38 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. ClUM. PROC. 3, 43-44 (2009) ("Under the
Fourth Amendment, every search or seizure by a government agent must be
reasonable."); Regensburger, supra note 3, at 1156. The Fourth Amendment
protects individuals from government intrusions that invade privacy.
Investigations and Police Practices, supra, at 5-8. A person must have a
legitimate expectation of privacy to merit protection under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. If a person has a subjective expectation of privacy, and society
accepts that expectation as objectively reasonable, the Supreme Court will deem
that expectation legitimate. Id.
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is the warrant requirement. With some exceptions, warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
25
Before investigators can obtain a search warrant, they must
have probable cause to believe they will discover evidence of the
alleged crime during the search. A neutral magistrate must
consider the facts and circumstances presented in a warrant
application, and may issue the warrant only after finding a
substantial basis that probable cause exists to search the named
area and seize any evidence. 26 The warrant must describe with
particularity the places investigators plan to search and items they
hope to seize. The particularity requirement defines the scope of
the warrant, and protects the privacy interests in a person's home
and possessions from broad, exploratory rummaging by ensuring
that each search is narrowly tailored to the justifications presented
to the magistrate.
27
A warrant contains sufficient particularity when it leaves
nothing to the discretion of the executing officers and officers "can
with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended. 28
However, an overbroad warrant, or a warrant containing mistaken
information may be "cured" if executing officers can rely on
personal knowledge to narrow and identify the place intended to be
searched.29 An affidavit incorporated by reference or attachment to
25 The warrant requirement applies to any place in which a person holds a
reasonable expectation of privacy. See Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures
of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 80 (1994).
26 See id; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) ("The task of the
issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,
including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place."); Investigations and Police Practices, supra
note 24, at 21-28 (2009).
27 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (requiring that warrants shall "particularly
describe[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized");
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976) ("[T]he problem [posed by the
general warrant] is 'not that of intrusion Per se, but of a general, exploratory
rummaging in a person's belongings.' ... [The Fourth Amendment addresses
the problem] by requiring a 'particular description' of the things to be seized."
(alterations in original) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467
(1971)); Investigations and Police Practices, supra note 24, at 27-28; Winick,
supra note 25, at 86.
28 Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925); see also Andresen, 427
U.S. 463; Investigations and Police Practices, supra note 24, at 28-31.
29 See, e.g., United States v. Judd, 889 F.2d 1410, 1413 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding
that a warrant that failed to describe a company's second office still sufficiently
particular because agents checked city business license records, bank records,
corporate filings, and the address on the company's letterhead to determine the
location to be searched; the offices were only 25-30 feet apart; and the company
had only leased the second office three weeks prior to the search). But see
United States v. Ellis, 971 F.2d 701, 704 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (holding that officers'
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the warrant that lists items not mentioned in the warrant itself may
also cure an overbroad warrant.
3 0
When a defendant challenges the particularity of a warrant
authorizing the search of his or her records, courts will deem the
warrant particular if it has been narrowed as much as the
information available to the agents will allow. For example, in
United States v. Gardiner,3 1 the Sixth Circuit found a warrant
listing a variety of personal and business records to be sufficiently
particular because it sought items pertaining to the time frame of
the crime, and all of the listed records would logically relate to the
alleged financial crimes.32 In United States v. Mathison,33 the
Eighth Circuit deemed particular a warrant seeking all records
pertaining to the suspect's seventeen distinct businesses, as well as
information with respect to eleven individuals. The Eighth Circuit
reasoned that the affidavit supporting the warrant contained
considerable evidence of the suspect's involvement in illegal
activities and demonstrated that the records sought would
substantiate the suspect's involvement. 34 In finding the warrant
sufficiently particular, the court in Mathison declined to employ
the exclusionary rule, which is the second procedural tool designed
to ensure the protections of the Fourth Amendment. 35 The
exclusionary rule functions to suppress from the record any
evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure. This can
include evidence obtained during execution of an overbroad
warrant and evidence that falls outside the scope of the warrant.
36
The exclusionary rule does not proceed directly from the
Fourth Amendment as a means of "cur[ing] the invasion of the
defendant's rights which he has already suffered,, 37 but rather
developed as a judicially created remedy designed to deter
personal knowledge of the suspect's name and a neighbor's word that the
suspect lived in the "fifth mobile home" could not cure a warrant that failed to
name the suspect, did not describe the premises to be searched, and erroneously
pinpointed the premises as the "third mobile home" when none of the searching
officers had previously observed the mobile home and thus had no other
knowledge by which to narrow the search).
30 See, e.g., In re Search of Office of Tylman, 245 F.3d 978, 980-81 (7th Cir.
2001); United States v. Towne, 997 F.2d 537, 548 (9th Cir. 1993).
31 463 F.3d 445 (6th Cir. 2006).
321d at 471.
33 157 F.3d 541 (8th Cir. 1998).
34 Id at 547-49.
31 Id at 549.
36 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 398 (1914); Investigations and Police Practices, supra note 24, at 40-
41; Winick, supra note 25, at 80, 85.
37 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)).
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constitutional violations.38 Thus, where the exclusion of evidence
would not advance the purpose of the rule, the court will allow its
introduction under the so-called good faith exception.39 For
example, in United States v. Leon,40 the district court found that the
magistrate who had granted the warrant had done so in error, as the
evidence submitted with the warrant application failed to establish
probable cause.41 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court declined to
suppress evidence on the grounds that the exclusionary rule
"cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter
objectively reasonable law enforcement activity." 42 The good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule thus highlights the importance
of issuing warrants based on a proper articulation of places to be
searched and items to be seized.
B. The "I Have Nothing To Hide" Retort
A person will likely feel that the government has violated
his right to privacy if agents begin rummaging through the
medicine cabinet to search for stolen fifty-inch flat screens, which
clearly cannot fit next to the Aspirin. The same person, however,
may fail to perceive an examination of every file on his computer
as intrusive. The obscure nature of the digital search, and the lack
of any spatial correlation between the evidence sought and the files
examined, can mask potential privacy violations. It is easy to
discount the danger of the general digital search and argue
complacently, "So what if the government looks through every file
on my computer? I have nothing to hide. I'd rather sacrifice a little
privacy for the sake of bringing criminals to justice." On this view,
justice should trump privacy: government intrusion into digital
data would be a threat to criminals, but not to law abiding citizens.
Most people do not sympathize with the white-collar criminal who
gets caught with child pornography during a search of his
computer for evidence of investment fraud. Most proponents of the
"nothing to hide" viewpoint would argue that only criminals need
fear a general search of digital media.
43
38 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906; Investigations and Police Practices, supra note 24,
at 201.
39 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 919-20; Investigations and Police Practices, supra note
24, at 204-06.
40 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
41 Id. at 900-03.
42Id. at 919.
43 See Daniel J. Solove, "I've Got Nothing To Hide" and Other
Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 745, 746-47 (2007) ("The
argument that no privacy problem exists if a person has nothing to hide is
frequently made in connection with many privacy issues .... The nothing to
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Scholar Daniel Solove addresses this common retort by
pointing out that "[p]rivacy . . . is not the trumpeting of the
individual against society's interests, but the protection of the
individual based on society's own norms and values .... [P]rivacy
has a social value. '4 4 Solove argues persuasively that a society
without the cushion of privacy would be unlivable; life in a free
society necessitates rules that may unintentionally shield criminal
behavior.
45
Furthermore, even those who think they have nothing to
hide might find themselves unpleasantly surprised by what might
turn up in a probing search of their digital media. Solove captures
this possibility with a colorful quotation from Friedrich
Durrenmatt's novella Traps, in which a man who believes himself
innocent inquires as to his crime: "'An altogether minor matter,'
the prosecutor replie[s] . . . 'A crime can always be found.' ' 46 In a
world where computers facilitate and store oceans of data about
every aspect of our lives, it seems certain that some type of crime
can always be found among the bits and bytes of the average hard
drive.
II. LET'S GET DIGITAL! DIGITAL!
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has evolved to suit
searches conducted in a physical world with the human senses.
47
"In the time before the atom, what we could see with our eyes was
all there was. Similarly, when the country was young and the
universe of searchable data was limited to 'papers, and effects,'
law enforcement agents were able to literally see everything
covered by Fourth Amendment protections." 48 This is no longer
true. Technology now allows us to conduct much of our social and
professional lives in cyberspace, while storing hoards of
information of all types in digital format. People today use
computers to store images, movies, documents, personal records,
and correspondence. 49 Computers double as "photo albums,




46 Id. at 750 (quoting FRIEDRICH DURRENMATT, TRAPS 23 (Richard & Clara
Winston trans., 1960)).
47 See Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure,
105 COLuM. L. REv. 279, 290 (2005); infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text
(discussing the plain view doctrine and its sensory corollaries).
48 Aaron Stanley, Note, The Continuing Evolution of Consent and Authority in
Digital Search and Seizure, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 179,
188 (2008).
49 See RayMing Chang, Why the Plain View Doctrine Should Not Apply To
Digital Evidence, 12 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 31, 35 (2007),
114
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 12 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol12/iss1/5
12 Yale J.L. & Tech. 311 (2010)
stereos, telephones, desktops, file cabinets, waste paper baskets,
and televisions," 50 "postal services, playgrounds, jukeboxes, dating
services, movie theaters, daily planners, shopping malls, personal
secretaries, virtual diaries, and more." 51 The storage capacity of
computers today is astonishing. As of April of 2009, the highest
capacity commercial hard drives were capable of storing two
terabytes of data. A terabyte can hold approximately 1000 hours of
video, 250,000 four-minute songs, 1,000,000 thick books of about
500 pages each, or as much information as can be printed on the
paper from 50,000 trees. A desktop hard drive might store between
120 gigabytes and two terabytes.5 2 Even a measly 80-gigabyte
desktop drive stores the equivalent of 40 million pages of text.
53
When investigators decide to search a suspect's computer,
they face vast quantities of information. If stored in written form,
that data might fill an entire library. As technology advances to
allow a user to squeeze larger quantities of data into tinier spaces,
the amount of information that can be contained in digital format
will continue to grow.54 Furthermore, in addition to the wealth of
information stored on files purposely saved by an individual,
investigators mine the hard drive for deleted files and glean
information from metadata.
55
http://ssrn.com/abstract-id=949575. See generally Encyclopedia Britannica
Online, Living in Cyberspace, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/
130429/computer/216089/Living-in-cyberspace (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
50 Trepel, supra note 15, at 128.
51 United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Orin S.
Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARv. L. REv. 531, 569
(2005)).
52 See Darren Murph, Western Digital's 2TB Caviar Green HDD on sale in
Australia, ENGADGET (Jan. 26, 2009, 11:47 PM) http://www.engadget.com/
2009/01/26/western-digitals-2tb-caviar-green-hdd-on-sale-in-australia (Jan. 26,
2009, 11:47 p.m.); Hard Drive Help, The Spacious Terabyte Hard Drive,
http://www.hard-drive-help.com/terabyte-hard-drive.html (last visited Mar. 28,
2010); Wisegeek, How Much Text Is in a Kilobyte or Megabyte?,
http://www.wisegeek.com/how-much-text-is-in-a-kilobyte-or-megabyte.htm
(last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
53 Trepel, supra note 15, at 128-29.
54 "North Carolina State University engineers have created a new material that
would allow a fingernail-size computer chip to store the equivalent of 20 high-
definition DVDs or 250 million pages of text, far exceeding the storage
capacities of today's computer memory systems." Researchers Develop
Material That Could Boost Data Storage, Save Energy, PHYSORG.COM, Oct.
20, 2009, http://www.physorg.com/newsl75252581.html.
55 Metadata consists of information that characterizes the digitally stored data
and answers the "who, what, when, where, why, and how about every facet of
the data that are being documented" on a digital storage device. USGS,
Frequently-Asked Questions on FGDC Metadata, http://geology.usgs.gov/tools/
metadata/tools/doc/faq.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2009); see also Trepel, supra
note 15, at 129.
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A. Digital Context Complications
The advanced storage capabilities of today's digital media
complicate the scope of digital searches. For one, the particularity
requirement can malfunction in the digital context because
searching for evidence of a crime on a computer is akin to
searching for a needle in a haystack. Investigators usually cannot
predict where, or in what format, they might find the relevant
information, and thus cannot "particularly describ[e]" the "place to
be searched" or the "things to be seized. 56 As Professor Orin Kerr
points out, "[i]n the physical world, different spatial regions are
used for different purposes. This allows the police to make
educated guesses as to where evidence may or may not be found
.... , In the physical world, one might look for an incriminating
letter in a file folder or a desk drawer. Drugs or guns might be
stored in shoeboxes or bedside tables. The money might be under
the mattress. In the computer context, however, the location of
evidence does not necessarily depend on the character of the
evidence itself. Information stored on a computer is represented by
"zeros and ones of electricity," 58 making the format and location of
any stored information flexible, and difficult to predict.
Investigators searching a suspect's house for stolen stereo
equipment can logically rule out the medicine cabinet as a possible
location, but anticipating the location of electronic evidence is
inherently more difficult because "electronic evidence can be
located anywhere. . . . [T]he investigator can never rule out a
particular part of the hard drive ex ante."
59
Some courts resolve the issue by allowing warrants to
describe the media to be searched in general terms, without
requiring investigators to pinpoint the particular files they plan to
search.6( This rule recognizes the concern that investigators might
not be able to predict whether evidence will be located on a
suspect's computer, an external hard drive, a CD, a flash drive, or
some other external storage device.6 1 Other courts have taken a
56 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Kerr, supra note 47, at 303.
57 Kerr, supra note 47, at 303.
581d. at 284.
59Id at 304.
60 See United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[T]his type of
generic classification is acceptable 'when a more precise description is not
possible."' (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Cardwell, 680 F.2d
75, 78 (9th Cir. 1982)).
61 Regensburger, supra note 3, at 1157; Stanley, supra note 48, at 217; see, e.g.,
United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The government
knew Lacy had downloaded computerized visual depictions of child
pornography, but did not know whether the images were stored on the hard drive
or on one or more of his many computer disks ... there was no way to specify
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more restrictive approach by requiring investigators to name at
least the type of evidence sought.62 Most courts, however, allow
broad particularity designations when investigators cannot predict
precisely which files contain evidence. These courts recognize that
investigators may need to seize information that appears
innocuous, but that may later prove incriminating in conjunction
with other evidence.
63
B. Current Law Enforcement Methods for Conducting
Digital Searches
So how might investigators wade through this quagmire of
data? The simplest option would be for the officer to sit down at
the suspect's computer and examine the data manually. The officer
would simply turn the computer on, and begin opening files one-
at-a-time in search of something incriminating.
Practical drawbacks, however, preclude the use of this
method.64 For one, the investigator would have to sift through a
forest's worth of documents, making the search extremely
inefficient. Such a search would fail to locate incriminating files
deleted by the suspect, and the officer would risk destroying
evidence during the search process. Simply opening a file or
turning on a computer can overwrite deleted data, and may alter
time stamps on the data, which investigators might need to show
what hardware and software had to be seized to retrieve the images
accurately.").
62 See, e.g., United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 862 (10th Cir. 2005).
63 See United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1349 (11th Cir. 1982)
("[C]rimes may require the assembly of a 'paper puzzle' from a large number of
seemingly innocuous pieces of individual evidence: 'The complexity of an
illegal scheme may not be used as a shield to avoid detection when the State has
demonstrated probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and
probable cause to believe that evidence of this crime is in the suspect's
possession.' It is universally recognized that the particularity requirement must
be applied with a practical margin of flexibility, depending on the type of
property to be seized, and that a description of property will be acceptable if it is
as specific as the circumstances and nature of activity under investigation
permit." (quoting Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 481 n.10 (1976)));
Regensburger, supra note 3, at 1156-57; see also United States v. Jacob, 657
F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1981) (recognizing the complexity of the alleged crime as a
factor in determining whether the warrant met with particularity requirements);
United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 548 (1st Cir. 1980) (Campbell, J.,
concurring) ("The investigators usually do not, and often cannot, know in
advance precisely what they will find when they search through files pursuant to
a warrant. They, therefore, may find it difficult to describe what they are
seeking, other than to say that they expect to find, and will seize, documents
constituting evidence of the particular fraud.").
64 See G. Robert McLain, Jr., Note, United States v. Hill: A New Rule, But No
Clarity for the Rules Governing Computer Searches and Seizures, 14 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1071, 1092-93 (2007).
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the time the suspect created or last accessed a file. Not only would
this method erase possibly relevant information, it would also
defeat investigators' attempts to authenticate the evidence and
disprove tampering. An investigator might as well "walk[] into a
murder scene with muddy boots, remov[e], bare-handed, a knife
from the victim, drop[] it in his coat pocket and return[] to the
office."
65
It is nearly impossible to search a hard drive without the
assistance of some kind of software program.66 To search digital
media properly, investigators elicit the help of digital forensics
specialists, who use a number of tools and forensics techniques.
67
Courts have consistently recognized that requiring police to search
digital media at the suspect's home or office could create an
extreme burden on both the individual's privacy, as well as on
police resources. Investigators might need to camp out for days to
conduct a thorough search, which would severely disrupt the
suspect's life or business. Forensic analysts would need to cart
their own computers, equipped with forensic tools and special
programs, to the scene of every search. This would create an
enormous hassle and burden investigative resources. To alleviate
these concerns, courts generally permit removal of digital media to
an off-site location for examination by experts, although some
courts urge investigators to return equipment as soon as possible to
minimize disruption of an individual's activities.
6 8
65 Id at 1094.
66 United States v. Long, 425 F.3d 482, 487 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[W]e observe that
it is impossible to search computer hardware or software without using some
type of software."); Interview with Chris Beeson, Director of the Regional
District Forensics Lab for the Northern District of California (Dec. 2, 2009). The
Regional District Forensics Lab for the Northern District of California is one of
fourteen regional computer forensics laboratories across the country. Regional
computer forensic labs conduct digital forensic examinations for all law
enforcement agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, within
each region. Interview with Chris Beeson, supra.
67 Interview with Chris Beeson, supra note 66; see also McLain, supra note 64,
at 1093; Regensburger, supra note 3, at 1155. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, available at http://www.cybercrime.
gov/ssmanual/ssmanual2009.pdf [hereinafter DOJ GUIDELINES] (setting forth
guidelines for searches and seizures of digital media).
68 See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment Aspects of Computer
Searches and Seizure: A Perspective and a Primer, 75 MISS. L.J. 193, 267
(2006); Orin Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV.
531, 541 (2005); McLain, supra note 64, at 1093-94; see also, e.g., United
States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 985 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hay, 231
F.3d 630, 637 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535-36
(1st Cir. 1999) (upholding seizure and subsequent off-site search of computer
for "needles in the computer haystack"); United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d
1081, 1089 (C.D. Cal. 2004) ("To be certain that the medium in question does
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To avoid contaminating or damaging any digital evidence,
forensic investigators first make a "bitstream" copy of the media
they plan to search. The bitstream image captures every piece of
information on the target drive, including files accessible by the
normal user, deleted files, metadata, and empty space.
Investigators save the bitstream copy in "read only" format to
ensure they do not accidentally alter the evidence during analysis.
69
Forensic investigators then narrow the set of data to be searched
using "known fingerprints" or "hash value" programs, and forensic
tools such as EnCase or Forensic Tool Kit (FTK).7 °
Before analyzing investigators' search methods under the
Fourth Amendment, one must have a basic understanding of how
hash value programs operate. A "hash value" is an identifier that
characterizes a data set. The relationship between a hash value and
its data set compares roughly to the relationship between an
organism and its DNA sequence; analysis of two separate data sets
will rarely return the same hash value. Just as forensic analysts use
DNA to determine the identities of criminal suspects or victims,
digital forensic investigators use hash values to identify data-
programs, images, files, etc.--on a computer.
7 1
A hash value program converts each data set on the target
drive into its corresponding identifier and matches the resulting
identifiers with known identifiers. For example, investigators
might suspect an individual of using a specific hacking program, or
of downloading a particular image of child pornography. By
comparing hash values from the suspect's computer with known
values for the hacking program or the image, investigators can
not contain any seizable material, the officers would have to examine every one
of what may be thousands of files on a disk-a process that could take many
hours and perhaps days. Taking that much time to conduct the search would not
only impose a significant and unjustified burden on police resources, it would
also make the search more intrusive." (internal citation omitted)); cf United
States v. Leveto, 343 F. Supp. 2d 434, 441 (W.D. Pa. 2004) (approving of
investigators' steps to minimize upheaval of defendant's business, including
downloading and copying files at the scene rather than removing them for off-
site review); United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 583 (D. Vt. 1998) ("At
the very least, the government should copy and return the equipment as soon as
possible.").
69 See Clancy, supra note 68, at 265-67; Interview with Chris Beeson, supra
note 66.
70 McLain, supra note 64, at 1094; Interview with Chris Beeson, supra note 66;
Interview with Hanley Chew, Assistant U.S. Att'y, U.S. Attorney's Office, San
Jose Branch (Nov. 16, 2009).
71 Interview with Chris Beeson, supra note 66; Interview with Hanley Chew,
supra note 70; see also Kerr, supra note 68, at 541 ("A hash is a complicated
mathematical operation, performed by a computer on a string of data, that can be
used to determine whether two files are identical.").
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determine if either exists on the suspect's hard drive. 72 Hash
programs can also recognize "normal" files, such as Microsoft
Windows or Word Perfect, which commonly turn up on
computers. Forensic investigators negatively screen out these
common operating system files and applications to reduce the size
of the data set they will search.73
Forensic tools such as EnCase and FTK allow investigators
to access deleted files, eliminate common operating system files,
preview image files, flag encrypted files, and search the entire hard
drive or active files by keyword or phrase. These tools also allow
investigators to identify mismatched file extensions. For instance,
if a suspect attempts to hide incriminating evidence and mislead
investigators by changing the .jpg extensions on images of child
pornography to .doc extensions, the forensic program will alert the
investigator to the altered files.74 However, criminals may devise
other strategies for disguising incriminating evidence, which
forensic tools will not detect. For example, the suspect might
embed the image of child pornography within a word document, as
opposed to changing the file extension. A forensic investigator
searching for images in .jpg files may overlook the embedded
evidence in the .doc file. The forensic program will not flag such
files as altered or suspicious.
75
III. DEVELOPING DIGITAL RULES
As digital media searches have become more frequent,
courts face the challenge of applying Fourth Amendment
principles, which were designed for discrete physical-world
searches, to vast and amorphous digital spaces. Courts and scholars
remain divided on the issue, and have roughly separated into two
camps. 76 Adherents of one viewpoint advocate for application of
existing rules to digital searches, and argue that computers are
nothing more than glorified containers holding files that represent
physical documents.77 Followers of the other viewpoint argue that
the "container analogy" is inadequate, and search of digital media
72 Kerr, supra note 68, at 541; Interview with Hanley Chew, supra note 70.
Forensic analysts also use hashes to ensure the bitstream copy accurately
matches the original drive. Kerr, supra note 68, at 546.
73 Interview with Chris Beeson, supra note 66.
74 McLain, supra note 64, at 1094-95.
75 Interview with Chris Beeson, supra note 66.
76 See Clancy, supra note 68, at 196.
77 See, e.g., id. at 271 (arguing that "there is nothing 'special' in the nature of
computer searches that differentiate [sic] them in any principled way from other
document and container searches.").
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requires a "special approach" with new rules and procedures. 78 The
prevailing concern in both camps remains the same: whether
existing principles suffice in the digital arena to prevent every
digital search from becoming the kind of general, exploratory
search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
A. Traditional Rules Allow Investigators To Scan All
Digital Media Files-No Search Protocol Required
Courts willing to compare computers to file cabinets
recognize that the versatility and massive storage capacity of
computers complicate the task of parsing through intermingled
files. Investigators examining computers face a plethora of
intermingled data and cannot avoid combing through oceans of
material not specified in the warrant. 79 Courts have resolved this
issue with respect to physical documents by allowing investigators
to scan all documents in order to ascertain their relevancy. 80 InAndresen v. Maryland, the court noted:
We recognize that there are grave dangers inherent
in executing a warrant authorizing a search and
seizure of a person's papers that are not necessarily
present in executing a warrant to search for physical
objects whose relevance is more easily
ascertainable. In searches for papers, it is certain
that some innocuous documents will be examined,
at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they
78 See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 & n.7 (10th Cir. 1999)
(discrediting the comparison of computer searches to searches of file cabinets,
and advocating for a "special approach" with respect to search and seizure of
digital evidence); Winick, supra note 25, at 110 ("An analogy between a
computer and a container oversimplifies a complex area of Fourth Amendment
doctrine and ignores the realities of massive modem computer storage.").
79 See United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 583 (D. Vt. 1998)
("Computer searches present the same problem as document searches-the
intermingling of relevant and irrelevant material-but to a heightened degree.").
80 See, e.g, Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); United States v.
Schandl, 947 F.2d 462, 465 (11th Cir. 1991) ("It was inevitable that some
irrelevant materials would be seized as agents searched through numerous
documents for evidence of tax evasion and failure to file, crimes that are
generally only detected through the careful analysis and synthesis of a large
number of documents."); United States v. Slocum, 708 F.2d 587, 604 (1 1th Cir.
1983) ("[A]n officer acting pursuant to such a warrant is entitled to examine any
document he discovers, but that 'the perusal must cease at the point of which the
warrant's inapplicability to each document is clear."' (quoting United States v.
Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1981))); United States v. Abbell, 963 F.
Supp. 1178, 1198 (S.D. Fla. 1997) ("When executing a search warrant for
documents, searching agents are entitled to at least cursorily examine each
document at the specified search location.").
2009-2010
121
Witte: IT'S MY NEWS Too!
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2010
COURTING CHAOS: THE NEED FOR CLEARER RULES TO GOVERN
THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE
are, in fact, among the papers authorized to be
seized.8'
By allowing investigators to peruse all documents in a
suspect's possession, as opposed to only those stored in folders
with relevant labels, courts "recognize[] the reality that few people
keep documents of their criminal transactions in a folder marked
'drug records."
82
Accordingly, most courts that accept the comparison
between computers and file cabinets allow investigators to open
and scan all digital files to ascertain the responsiveness of the
data.83 In United States v. Gray,84 the court noted that "[c]omputer
records are extremely susceptible to tampering, hiding, or
destruction" and concluded that the searching agent "was not
required to accept as accurate any file name or suffix and limit his
search accordingly." 85 The courts in United States v. Hunter and
United States v. Hill also declined to limit investigators' search
methods on the grounds that criminals can easily mask
incriminating evidence so it will not be discovered using rigid,
86 8predictable protocols. In United States v. Fumo,87 the court stated
that
regardless of the search protocols or keywords used
by the government, the government may open and
briefly examine each computer file to determine
whether it is in the description recited in the
warrant. . . . 'no tenet of the Fourth Amendment
prohibits a search merely because it cannot be
performed with surgical precision.'
88
Some scholars argue that limiting the ability of
investigators to scour digital media might encourage criminals to
hide evidence outside the range of the search. They contend that
81 Andresen, 427 U.S. at 482 n.ll.
82 United States v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1990).
83 See Clancy, supra note 68, at 198. For example, United States v. Gray
compared digital evidence to paper records and documents, which "unlike
illegal drugs or other contraband, may not appear incriminating on their face. As
a result, in any search for records or documents, 'innocuous records must be
examined to determine whether they fall into the category of those papers
covered by the search warrant."' 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 528 (E.D. Va. 1999)
(quoting United States v. Kufrovich, 997 F. Supp. 246, 264 (D. Conn. 1997)).
84 78 F. Supp. 2d 524.
85 Id. at 529.
86 United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090-91 (C.D. Cal. 2004); United
States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 583 (D. Vt. 1998).
87 No. 06-319, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80543 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2007).
88Id. at *16-17.
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because criminals can disguise files, investigators have probable
cause to view every file and should not be forced to employ
restrictive search methods. 89 Supporting the stance against search
protocols, the Supreme Court has ruled outside the digital search
context that warrants need not outline the methods investigators
plan to employ in conducting a search:
Often in executing a warrant the police may find it
necessary to interfere with privacy rights not
explicitly considered by the judge who issued the
warrant.... It would extend the Warrant Clause to
the extreme to require that, whenever it is
reasonably likely that Fourth Amendment rights
may be affected in more than one way, the court
must set forth precisely the procedures to be
followed by the executing officers.
90
This reasoning has been applied in the digital search
scenario.91 In fact, DOJ tuidelines expressly direct prosecutors to
oppose restrictions imposed by magistrates that require the
government to specify how it will examine digital media to find
evidence responsive to the warrant. 92 Nevertheless, allowing
agents to search every digital media file creates very real concerns.
Many courts and commentators have reacted to this broad
authorization by claiming that it operates with the plain view
doctrine to transform every digital search into the type of general
search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
93
89 See, e.g., Chang, supra note 49, at 48-50; Clancy, supra note 68;
Regensburger, supra note 3, at 1196-97.
90 Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257-58 (1979) (holding that government
agents need not specify the means by which they would execute installation of a
wiretap authorized by warrant).
91 See, e.g, United States v. Vilar, No. S3 05-CR-621, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26993, at *121-25 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007) (citing Dalia for the proposition that
officers should not be required to specify ahead of time how they planned to
search defendants computers, and stating that "[t]he majority view rejecting a
protocol requirement makes good sense as there is no principle in the law that
requires law enforcement officers to limit their investigative techniques ex ante,
before conducting any kind of search.").
92 DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 80.
93 See Chang, supra note 49, at 43-44; Kerr, supra note 47, at 304-05; Trepel,
supra note 15, at 137-38; Winick, supra note 25, at 107-09.
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B. Problems with the Plain View Doctrine in the Context
of Digital Searches
The plain view doctrine operates as one of several
exceptions to the warrant requirement. 94 Under the plain view
doctrine, investigators may seize incriminating evidence without a
warrant if they encounter the evidence in plain view during lawful
observation of the area.95 Horton v. California96 established three
requirements that investigators must meet before lawfully seizing
evidence in plain view. First, the investigator must have lawful
authority to be in the position from which he had occasion to
observe the evidence. Second, the evidence must be in plain view.
Third, the incriminating character of the evidence must be
"immediately apparent"-the plain view doctrine does not
authorize further investigation to determine the evidentiary value
of the evidence. 97 A number of courts have expanded the plain
view doctrine to encompass "plain touch,"98 "plain smell," 99 and
"plain hearing,"'100 corollaries.
The plain view doctrine applies easily to items that appear
incriminating at first glance, such as drugs or guns, and some
documents such as fake ID's, gambling records, and documents
94 See Investigations and Police Practices, supra note 24, at 44 (" [C]ertain kinds
of searches and seizures are valid as exceptions to the probable cause and
warrant requirements, including investigatory stops, investigatory detentions of
property, warrantless arrests, searches incident to a valid arrest, seizures of items
in plain view, searches and seizures justified by exigent circumstances, consent
searches, searches of vehicles, searches of containers, inventory searches, border
searches, searches at sea, administrative searches, and searches in which the
special needs of law enforcement make the probable cause and warrant
requirements impracticable.").
9' See id. at 74-75.
96 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
97 See id. at 136-37; Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-28 (1987) (noting that
allowing further investigation beyond a cursory examination would "especially
erode the plurality's warning in Coolidge that the 'plain view' doctrine may not
be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges' (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971)).
98 See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) ("We think that [the
plain view] doctrine has an obvious application by analogy to cases in which an
officer discovers contraband through the sense of touch during an otherwise
lawful search.").
99 See, e.g., United States v. Staula, 80 F.3d 596, 602 (1st Cir. 1996)
("[O]lfactory evidence furnishes the officer with probable cause to conduct a
search of the confined area.").
100 See United States v. Ceballos, 385 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing a
"'plain hearing' exception to the search warrant requirement"); United States v.
Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 1973) (likening the plain view doctrine to a
situation in which officers eavesdropped on suspects from their rented hotel
room).
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linking co-defendants. 1 1 It is less clear that incriminating evidence
is in "plain view" when discovered as investigators examine
intermingled documents in an attempt to separate responsive from
non-responsive items. Difficult cases are easy to conceive. For
example, imagine investigators have obtained a warrant to search a
suspect's belongings for evidence of bank fraud. The warrant
allows the investigators to scan each letter in a stack of letters to
determine which, if any, contain evidence of bank fraud. An
investigator reads the first paragraph of one letter, but cannot
determine whether the letter is relevant, so he continues reading. In
the middle of the second paragraph, he reads the statement, "I hid
the cocaine in the cookie jar. Just ask Jim for the 'fresh baked
goods' and leave the money with him." Assuming the remainder of
the letter contains nothing relevant to bank fraud, its contents
clearly fall outside the scope of the investigators' warrant. The
investigators would like to use the evidence against the suspect in a
subsequent drug trial. Given that the investigator had to read the
first two paragraphs of the letter before discovering any evidence
of drug trafficking, was the evidence really "immediately
apparent" as required by the plain view doctrine?
Courts answer this question with respect to physical
evidence by allowing a "brief perusal of documents in plain view
in order to determine whether probable cause exists for their
seizure under the warrant. If in the course of that perusal, their
otherwise incriminating character becomes obvious, they may be
seized."'10 2 Courts have generally permitted investigators to seize
documents discovered in "plain view," accepting without much
discussion that the investigators must conduct some degree of
perusal to ascertain the relevance of the documents. 1
03
Investigators need not be "absolutely certain" that documents or
other items discovered in plain view constitute evidence of the
crime at hand, 10 4 and may "test their belief by proceeding with a
limited inspection of the 'incriminating object."' However,
"perusal must cease at the point at which the warrant's
inapplicability to each document is clear."'
10 5
101 See Regensburger, supra note 3, at 1197.
102 United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
103 See United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1258 n.8 (2d Cir. 1979).
104 See, e.g., id. at 1258; United States v. Duckett, 583 F.2d 1309, 1314 (5th Cir.
1978) ("There is no rule of law which requires an officer to know with absolute
certainty that all elements of a putative crime have been completed when he
seizes an article which reasonably appears to be incriminating evidence.");
United States v. Pugh, 566 F.2d 626, 627 (8th Cir. 1977); Mapp v. Warden, 531
F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Smollar, 357 F. Supp. 628, 632
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("The plain view exception would be worthless if officers had
to be 'absolutely certain' that what they saw was seizable").
105 Heldt, 668 F.2d at 1267.
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Courts have begun to apply this reasoning to digital data.
Most cases involve application of the plain view doctrine to digital
evidence that is incriminating on its face. The visual nature of child
pornography makes it the most common type of evidence seized
under the plain view doctrine during searches of digital property. 1
06
However, courts have suggested the plain view doctrine would
apply to admit evidence that is not graphic in nature if found after
a brief scan of data on a computer screen.
107
This practice arguably transforms all digital search
warrants into general warrants and raises the question: what if
investigators are always in a position from which they can view
everything on the computer screen? If courts authorize
investigators to scan every piece of data on a hard drive to
determine its relevancy, then investigators will always be in a
lawful position from which to view evidence of unrelated crimes.
The warrant's scope would lose all relevance because any evidence
not covered by the warrant could be seized under the plain view
doctrine. Digital searches would become fishing expeditions.
10 8
The majority joining Chief Judge Kozinski's ruling in CDT must
have recognized this danger. The majority took the drastic view
that to "avoid this illogical result, the government should, in future
warrant applications, forswear reliance on the plain view doctrine
or any similar doctrine that would allow it to retain data to which it
has gained access only because it was required to segregate
seizable from non-seizable data."'
10 9
The plain view doctrine, however, serves an important
function in both physical and digital contexts. If police come upon
out-of-scope evidence during the course of an otherwise lawful
search it could be "dangerous-to the evidence or to the police
106 See, e.g., United States v. Wong, 334 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 2003); Frasier v.
State, 794 N.E.2d 449, 465-66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (applying the plain view
doctrine when police searching a suspect's computer for evidence of marijuana
happened upon child pornography).
107 See, e.g, United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 531 n.11 (E.D. Va.
1999) ("Agent Ehuan could have continued his systematic search of defendant's
computer files pursuant to the first search warrant, and, as long as he was
searching for the items listed in the warrant, any child pornography discovered
in the course of that search could have been seized under the 'plain view'
doctrine."); State v. Mays, 829 N.E.2d 773, 779 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (holding
that an officer's observation of the words "he will die today" on defendant's
computer screen while lawfully present in defendant's home fell within the
ambit of the plain view doctrine); Commonwealth v. Hinds, 768 N.E.2d 1067
(Mass. 2002) (holding that the officer "was not obligated to disregard files listed
in plain view on the 'Chuck' directory whose titles suggested contents that were
contraband").
108 See Chang, supra note 49 (arguing for the abolition of the plain view doctrine
in order to prevent general searches of digital property).
109 CDTII, 579 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2009).
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themselves-to require them to ignore it."' 110 A search for evidence
of tax evasion might yield evidence that the suspects plans to kill
his wife for insurance money. Police may need to seize out-of-
scope evidence to prevent a heinous crime.
Requiring investigators to forswear reliance on the plain
view doctrine in the Ninth Circuit has already had deleterious
effects on law enforcement efforts to uphold the law and protect
vulnerable individuals. In the Western District of Washington,
federal agents received information from their
counterparts in San Diego that two individuals had
filmed themselves raping a four-year-old girl and
traded the images via the internet. The agents did
not obtain a warrant to search the suspects'
computers, however, because of concerns that any
evidence discovered about other potential victims
could not be disclosed by the filter team.
I II
Fortunately, federal agents could refer the case to state authorities,
who are not bound by the restrictions outlined in CDT. This
example stresses that a blanket elimination of the plain view
doctrine could create more threats to society than it prevents.
Eliminating the plain view doctrine may have less
dramatic, but equally serious effects. If investigators could not
seize out-of-scope evidence in plain view, investigators might
"result in the loss of highly probative evidence about the very
crime under investigation." 112 This could occur, for example,
"when a warrant contains a date restriction but the resulting search
turns up evidence that the crime began or continued after officers
previously had reason to believe." 113 Investigators have a
legitimate interest in pursuing out-of-scope evidence to uphold
society's laws and thwart criminal activity, when possible.
C. Plain View Problems for Privileged Data and Third
Parties
The view-all-use-all practices that result from the direct
application of traditional rules to digital searches also raise hackles
where privileged documents and third parties are concerned."
4
110 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971).
ill Brief for the United States in Support of Rehearing En Banc by the Full
Court, supra note 1, at 6-7.112 Id. at 14.
113 Id.
114 See United States v. Abbell, 963 F. Supp. 1178, 1198-99 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
(allowing perusal of all files, and approving of the government's use of a taint
team to protect privileged materials); State v. Viatical Servs., Inc., 741 So. 2d
2009-2010
127
Witte: IT'S MY NEWS Too!
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2010
COURTING CHAOS: THE NEED FOR CLEARER RULES TO GOVERN
THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE
Investigators may peruse all intermingled data to ascertain its
relevancy, and in doing so may examine privileged documents or
third party information regardless of whether it falls within the
scope of the warrant. Incriminating information in "plain view"
may be seized and used to charge third parties previously
considered innocent. 115
In order to protect third party privacy, the Attorney General
has issued rules requiring federal officers to pursue relevant
evidence in the hands of disinterested third parties by issuing
subpoenas rather than warrants. 1 16 Pursuant to these rules, federal
officers may only seek a warrant to obtain materials from a
disinterested third party when it appears that "the use of a
subpoena, summons, request, or other less intrusive alternative
means of obtaining the materials would substantially jeopardize the
availability or usefulness of the materials sought." 7 This policy
sounds promising, but third parties receive little protection once
the government decides to pursue evidence with a warrant because
"failure to comply with this policy 'may not be litigated, and a
court may not entertain such an issue as the basis for the
suppression or exclusion of evidence.'
118
560, 563 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) ("[T]he court must fashion a remedy to
protect the privacy rights of innocent third parties while still allowing the state
to proceed with its criminal investigation."); Chang, supra note 49, at 58
(discussing privilege as a possible limitation on the plain view doctrine);
Regensburger, supra note 3, at 1153, 1170-72 (expressing concern that a third
party will get "caught up in the government's dragnet," and analyzing the use of
taint teams to prevent prosecutors from accessing privileged data).
115 See, e.g., CDTII, 579 F.3d 989, 1005 (9th Cir. 2009) (The directory searched
by the government "contained a huge number of drug testing records, not only
of the ten players for whom the government had probable cause but hundreds of
other professional baseball players, thirteen other sports organizations, three
unrelated sporting competitions, and a non-sports business entity-thousands of
files in all, reflecting the test results of an unknown number of people, most
having no relationship to professional baseball except that they had the bad luck
of having their test results stored on the same computer as the baseball
players.").
116 See DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 111 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 59.4(a)(1)
(2009)).
117 28 C.F.R. § 59.4(a)(1).
118 See DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 111 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 59.5(b)).
Congress has enacted statutory schemes to offer a higher degree of protection to
third party internet service providers, and third party publishers, journalists,
authors, or other individuals where a search of his or her possessions may
implicate First Amendment concerns. See id. at 101-09, 112-33. The Stored
Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006), regulates
government access to electronic records stored by third-party service providers.
See DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 112. The Privacy Protection Act (PPA),
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa, governs federal computer searches when agents have
reason to believe they will encounter materials relating to freedom of
expression. See DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 101. However, both acts
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Where the government has obtained a warrant to search
digital media containing privileged information, the DOJ
Guidelines offer strategies for reviewing privileged computer files:
First, the court itself may review the files in
camera. Second, the presiding judge may appoint a
neutral third party known as a "special master" to
the task of reviewing the files. Third, a team of
prosecutors or agents who are not working on the
case may form a "filter team" or "taint team" to
help execute the search and review the files
afterwards. The filter team sets up a so-called
"ethical wall" between the evidence and the
prosecution team, permitting only unprivileged files
to pass over the wall." 19
To protect privileged information, the Department of Justice
prefers to segregate data using taint teams composed of attorneys
or agents who are not members of the prosecution team. However,
the use of taint teams is not mandatory, nor do all jurisdictions
condone the use of taint teams.120 Computers belonging to medical
and legal professionals often contain a spectrum of confidential or
privileged material such as client or patient communications,
medical records, or attorney work product. 12 1 "[T]he use of
computerized equipment for the storage and exchange of sensitive
confidential information has become commonplace."' 122 If a
comprehensive search requires investigators to review every file, it
seems that privileged documents must suffer some type of scrutiny.
The fact that the scrutinizing eyes do not belong directly to the
harbor loopholes with respect to warrants. If the government obtains a warrant
to search data held by an internet service provider, the SCA allows investigating
agents to obtain everything associated with an account, and does not require
agents to notify customers or subscribers that the agents have obtained
information from the provider. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703. The PPA purports to
require the use of a subpoena to obtain materials relating to freedom of
expression, but "[t]he PPA does not apply in a search for or seizure of
'documentary materials' as defined by § 2000aa-7(a), if a subpoena has proven
inadequate or there is reason to believe that a subpoena would not result in the
production of the materials." DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 104; see 42
U.S.C. § 2000aa(b)(3)-(4).
119 See DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 110. The "ethical wall" is also
referred to as a "Chinese wall." See In re Search Warrant for Law Offices, 153
F.R.D. 55, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).120 See Chang, supra note 49, at 58.
121 See id.; United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1037
(D. Nev. 2006).122 Black v. United States, 172 F.R.D. 511, 514 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
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prosecution team may offer little comfort. 123 Courts have vacillated
on whether in camera review, review by special master, or review
by a taint team most effectively protects privileged digital
materials without unduly hampering the government's
investigation.
The court in United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc.
124
noted, "[f]ederal courts have taken a skeptical view of the
Government's use of 'taint teams' as an appropriate method for
determining whether seized or subpoenaed records are protected by
the attorney-client privilege."' 125 The court in In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas126 cautioned that taint teams might leak confidential
information. The government has an interest in uncovering every
scrap of evidence to further the investigation, and while some leaks
occur through human error, human nature may lead taint-team
attorneys to violate their ethical obligations. 127  "[T]he
government's fox is left in charge of the appellants' henhouse, and
may err by neglect or malice, as well as by honest differences of
opinion.
128
Courts have also noted the drawbacks to using a special
master or neutral magistrate to separate privileged materials. In
Black v. United States129 the court pointed out that using special
masters can incur high costs and fees, and they may take a
prohibitive amount of time to review the contested materials. In
one instance, appointment of a special master delayed a criminal
trial for two and a half years.' 30 Such a delay could "effectively
deprive the Government of any access to any of the seized
information."' 131 A magistrate or special master might have many
duties that conflict with the task of reviewing millions of computer
123 See id. at 516 ("The Plaintiffs have a serious concern that disclosure to taint
team prosecutors would not protect the confidentiality and privacy rights they
here assert.").
124SDIFuture Health, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1027.125 Id. at 1037.
126In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 454 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2006).
127 Id. at 523.
128 Id.; see also United States v. Abbell, 914 F. Supp. 519 (S.D. Fla. 1995)
(deciding that privileged materials should be reviewed by a special master
despite the government's appointment of a taint team); In re Search Warrant for
Law Offices, 153 F.R.D. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[T]his Court notes that
reliance on the implementation of a Chinese Wall, especially in the context of a
criminal prosecution, is highly questionable, and should be discouraged."); cf
United States v. Neill, 952 F. Supp. 834, 841 n.14 (D.D.C. 1997) (criticizing the
use of taint teams, but noting that "[h]owever unwise this policy decision may
be, absent a showing of harm, it does not offend the Constitution").129 Black v. United States, 172 F.R.D. 511, 514 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
130 Id. at 514 n.4, 516 (citing Abbell, 914 F. Supp. 519).
131 Id. at 516.
130
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files, whereas a taint team specifically designated to segregate
privileged materials could do so in a timely manner.1
32
The court in the case of In re 5444 Westheimer Rd. Suite
1570133 determined that the lengthy amount of time a special
master or magistrate judge would require to review privileged
materials outweighed the protection this method might afford.
Instead, the court allowed the government to proceed with taint
team review.134 The court noted that the government's taint team
procedure did not prejudice defendants because the use of a taint
team gave defendants the opportunity to challenge the taint team's
privilege determinations in front of the court. The court would then
resolve any privilege disputes before the taint team could disclose
materials classified as unprivileged to the prosecution team. 135 In
contrast, a neutral magistrate or special master may not offer the
defendants the same opportunity to challenge privilege
determinations.
136
The controversy incited by the government's seizure of
third party drug records in CDT demonstrates how computers'
massive storage capacities have magnified the problem. The fact
that the targeted computers contained vast quantities of third party
data allowed the government to seize "thousands of medical
records and test results involving every single Major League
Baseball player," and "thousands of other medical records for
individuals in thirteen other major sports organizations, three
unaffiliated business entities, and three sports competitions,"
despite the fact that the government only had a search warrant for a
small handful of MLB players, and none of the other individuals
were the subject of any criminal inquiry.13 7 This result highlights
the distinction between physical and digital searches: "people now
have personal data that are stored with that of innumerable
strangers. Seizure of, for example, Google's email servers to look
132 See DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 110; Black, 172 F.R.D. at 516 n.8.
133 No. H-06-238, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48850 (S.D. Tex. July 6, 2006).134 Id. at *9.
135 Id. at *9, *11 n.5.
136 See United States v. Grant, which approved the use of a taint team. No. 04
CR 207, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9462 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2004). The court
noted that "after the initial privilege determination is made by the special master
or judicial officer, the Government would not have the opportunity to brief or
argue the ruling aided by the contents of the documents. Without the benefit of
such a review, the privilege team would likely be unable to argue, for example,
that no attorney-client privilege attached to the communication because of the
crime-fraud exception, or that a document should be available for use at trial,
regardless of work-product contents, because of necessity and unavailability by
other means." Id. at *4-5.
137 CDTI, 513 F.3d 1085, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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for a few incriminating messages could jeopardize the privacy of
millions.'
138
Investigators searching a suspect's home or office could
rarely net such an abundance of evidence. The court in Black v.
United States might have been speaking to privileged documents
when it called for "a re-thinking of some of the traditional
approaches Courts have made in years gone by,"'139 but it was not
alone in seeking a new approach to regulating search and seizure
of digital media.
D. The Carey-Winick "Special Approach" to Digital
Searches
Both scholars and courts have referenced the enormous
storage capabilities of digital media to justify the viewpoint that
digital searches cannot and should not be compared to physical-
world searches. 140 In his influential article, Ralph Winick
emphasized that the "very quantity and variety of information" on
a computer "increases the likelihood that highly personal
information, irrelevant to the subject of the lawful investigation,
will also be searched or seized.",141 Winick recognized the threat
created by allowing investigators to examine intermingled
documents, and argued that application of traditional rules to
searches of digital media "allows officers to gain a window into all
aspects of a suspect's life.' 42 Instead, Winick advocated for
applying the "intermingled-document" approach outlined in United
States v. Tamura14 3 to digital media searches. In his proposal for a
new approach, Winick discredited the theory that comprehensive
computer searches require investigators to peruse every file on the
hard drive. Instead of conducting a full review of digital files, he
proposed investigators limit their search of the data by file type, or
use key word searches to locate relevant files. He opined that
government agents should seal any intermingled files, and submit
specific search protocol to a neutral magistrate for approval before
proceeding with review of those files.
144
131 CDTII, 579 F.3d 989, 1005 (9th Cir. 2009).
139 172 F.R.D. 511, 514 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
140 See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999);
Chang, supra note 49, at 35-36; Kerr, supra note 47, at 301-03.
141 Winick, supra note 25, at 105.
142 Id. at 111.
143 694 F.2d 591, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1982) ("In the comparatively rare instances
where documents are so intermingled that they cannot feasibly be sorted on site,
we suggest that the Government and law enforcement officials generally can
avoid violating fourth amendment rights by sealing and holding the documents
pending approval by a magistrate of a further search ...
144 Winick, supra note 25, at 107-09.
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The Tenth Circuit has been the strongest proponent of
using a "special approach" for digital media searches. 145 The court
in United States v. Carey 146 became the first to adopt Winick's
"special approach" explicitly. 147 Carey expanded upon Winick's
"special approach" by suggesting that investigators should obtain a
second warrant before seizing out-of-scope evidence discovered in
plain view. 148
While some have approved of the "Carey-Winick"
approach, 149 others have been quick to point out its flaws. Courts
rejecting the approach have continued to allow investigators to
peruse all intermingled documents because requiring search
methods would be too restrictive. 15 Scholars also questioned the
wisdom of limiting the extent to which investigators could open
and view files, citing the argument that criminals may disguise
evidence in ways investigators may not be able to predict.'
5 '
145 Regensburger, supra note 3, at 1157.
146 United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).
147 See id. at 1275-76; Trepel, supra note 15, at 130.
141 Carey, 172 F.3d at 1271, 1276. DOJ guidelines note that when agents
discover evidence in plain view that is not identified by the warrant, it would be
a "safe practice" to obtain a second warrant. However, this practice is not
mandatory. See DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 90.
149 The term "Carey-Winick" was coined by David Ziff in a 2005 piece
criticizing the approach's limitations. See David J.S. Ziff, Note, Fourth
Amendment Limitations on the Execution of Computer Searches Conducted
Pursuant to a Warrant, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 841, 842 & n.4 (2005). For
examples of courts approving of the Carey-Winick limitations, see United States
v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 862 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Walser, 275
F.3d 981, 986-87 (10th Cir. 2001); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 411 n.2 (4th
Cir. 2001); and People v. Carratu, 755 N.Y.S.2d 800 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
150 See United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090-91 (C.D. Cal. 2004) ("Forcing police
to limit their searches to files that the suspect has labeled in a particular way
would be much like saying police may not seize a plastic bag containing a
powdery white substance if it is labeled 'flour' or 'talcum powder.' There is no
way to know what is in a file without examining its contents, just as there is no
sure way of separating talcum from cocaine except by testing it."); United States
v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (E.D. Va. 1999); Commonwealth v.
McDermott, 864 N.E.2d 471, 488-89 (Mass. 2007) (specifically declining to
adopt the special approach outlined in Carey).
151 See Clancy, supra note 68, at 207-08 ("[T]here are significant reasons to
reject [Carey's] position that a search be restricted by file names or file types.
Professional investigators recognize that computer users attempt to conceal
criminal evidence by storing it 'in random order with deceptive file names,' thus
requiring a search of all the stored data to determine whether it is included in the
warrant." (citation omitted)); Trepel, supra note 15, at 134 ("According to Kerr,
the process required by the Carey-Tamura approach is flawed for the very
practical reason that 'computer forensics is contingent, fact-bound, and quite
unpredictable.' An investigator will not know beforehand which operating
system is on the device to be searched, which software is on it, or whether the
suspect attempted to hide or disguise any incriminating files." (footnote
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Others have criticized the suggestion that a neutral
magistrate should determine which files the government should
access. When Winick first outlined his proposal, the idea of
magistrate oversight was plausible: computers at that time only
held 100 megabytes of data, the equivalent of 100,000 typed pages.
Investigators could reasonably print the file directory for
magistrate review. Modern computers, however, store considerably
more information, and it would be prohibitively time consuming
for lawyers to quibble in front of a magistrate over the contents of
a huge volume of files.
152
Finally, some have found fault with the use of a second
warrant to pursue evidence discovered outside the scope of the
original warrant. A second warrant may fail to protect privacy
concerns implicated by the plain view doctrine because
investigators will have already discovered the out-of-scope
evidence without previous probable cause. Assume for the sake of
argument that investigators should forswear reliance on the plain
view doctrine when conducting digital searches. Under this rule, if
investigators searching for evidence of bank fraud come across
child pornography, they cannot seize it as evidence "in plain
view," but they can apply for a second warrant to expand their
search based on the image they have just discovered. The
application will likely be granted since investigators now have
concrete evidence of a possible second crime. For the purposes of
the second warrant, it matters not whether the evidence fell within
the scope of the first. Therefore, the second warrant procedure
creates a loophole to the ban on seizing evidence in plain view by
authorizing investigators to seize the same out-of-scope evidence
without relying on the plain view doctrine. 153 According to critics,
this "easy-to-meet" procedure is "functionally equivalent to the
plain view doctrine."'
154
There has been no consensus amongst different factions as
to how investigators should execute search warrants for digital
media without violating the Fourth Amendment. This dissonance
has led to conflicting rules and results, highlighting the dire need
for lawmakers to issue guidance or regulation in this area.
IV. A STATUTORY SOLUTION
To effect a solution, federal and state legislatures should
adopt a set of rules that augment the Fourth Amendment with
omitted)); supra Parts ILA, III.A (discussing the argument that investigators
must peruse all files to circumvent attempts to conceal evidence).152 See Ziff, supra note 149, at 860-61.
153 See Chang, supra note 49, at 48, 50.
154 Id. at 50.
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respect to search and seizure of digital media. For example, Rule
41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure currently governs
search and seizure pursuant to a warrant for federal
investigations. 155 This rule and corresponding state rules could be
amended to incorporate specific sections pertaining to warrants for
search and seizure of digital property. Legislative action offers
several advantages over the solutions implemented by courts.
Legislatures are not limited by stare decisis, and thus have more
flexibility to design new rules. 156 While courts may stray from
precedent when changed conditions and increased knowledge
render existing rules unworkable, 157 a court's influence may extend
only as far as its jurisdiction. Legislatures can promulgate rules
that span jurisdictions, thus facilitating consistent practices.
An opinion issued by the Supreme Court could settle
controversy across jurisdictions, but the Supreme Court may only
address issues presented in the case before it. The Supreme Court
will never hear a case presenting every nuanced issue raised by a
digital media search. Legislatures, on the other hand, do not need
to wait until a problem presents itself. Legislatures can also effect
changes much more quickly than many courts across many
jurisdictions.1
58
Additionally, legislatures may be more competent than
courts to address the problem of digital media searches, because "it
is difficult for judges to fashion lasting guidance when
technologies are new and rapidly changing."' 159 While legislatures
receive information from a wide range of sources, including
legislative hearings, advocacy groups, constituent and public input,
national media, and special caucuses, judges receive information
funneled through the briefs and oral arguments of two parties.
160
Legislative branches are better situated to gather information about
the developing technologies that both complicate and facilitate
digital searches.
A. With Privacy and Justice for All
To walk the line between privacy and justice, legislatures
need to adopt rules for digital property searches that offer more
protection than the traditional approach to search and seizure, but
fewer restrictions than the "special approach" described by the
155 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
156 See Kerr, supra note 47, at 308.
157 See Trepel, supra note 15, at 142.
158 Id.; Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801, 868-70
(2004).
159 Kerr, supra note 158, at 858.
160 Id. at 875-76.
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Carey-Winick doctrine. The following three subsections each
describes a rule that legislatures should adopt to strike this balance.
Legislatures should: 1) require narrow search protocols, but allow
file-by-file searches where necessary; 2) require a second warrant
for the seizure of ambiguous out-of-scope evidence, but allow
investigators to seize contraband under the plain view doctrine;
and 3) require a taint team to review privileged or third party files.
The taint team should afford the defense the opportunity to
challenge privileged determinations. The third subsection also
recommends a procedure for the taint team to follow if it
encounters evidence that incriminates a third party.
1. The Narrow Search Protocol Requirement
As explained in Section IV.A, the traditional approach to
search and seizure in theory allows investigators to scan every file
in search of evidence. Investigators need not follow a pre-specified
protocol to examine digital records. In reality, however,
investigators have neither the time nor the resources to scan every
piece of data on a hard drive. Forensic investigators will use
whatever methods they can to narrow the subset of data they must
search in order to discover evidence that responds to the
warrant. 161 Creating a rule that requires investigators to use
reasonable methods to narrow their searches would serve the
interests of both the Fourth Amendment and government
investigators. Where less intrusive, more effective search methods
exist, it would be unreasonable not to require investigators to
employ those methods.
162
Legislatures should therefore require forensic investigators
to begin searching digital media with available forensic tools such
as hashing programs, EnCase, FTK, or other tools on the market.
Due to the rapid pace of technological development, it would not
be wise for legislatures to require the use of specific tools. Such a
rule would tie investigators to outdated programs upon the
invention of new search technology.
A new rule requiring the use of these programs will assuage
fears that investigators will examine every piece of data, because
investigators will always conduct hashes and key word searches as
an initial step. If these steps returned the sought-after evidence, the
search should cease. This rule would not hinder searches because
most investigators already use these programs to narrow the set of
data to be searched.
If the warrant authorizes investigators to search for images,
and hashes or key word searches cannot locate the images sought,
161 Interview with Chris Beeson, supra note 66.
162 See McLain, supra note 65, at 1097-98.
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investigators may scan all digital images, but should not extend
this file-by-file search to word documents or other file types.
However, the rule should recognize that criminals might disguise
evidence. If an investigator discovers a file with an altered
extension, the investigator would have reason to believe the
suspect attempted to conceal evidence. In this case, the investigator
may open the altered file even if that file type would not normally
contain evidence associated with the alleged crime.
Forensic tools will not flag misnamed files in all cases,
therefore, legislatures should allow investigators to begin opening
and scanning all files if, and only if, narrow search methods fail to
produce results. Investigators should not be required to obtain
permission from the court before expanding their search. Some
might argue that such a permissive rule would encourage
unscrupulous investigators to ignore the narrow search
requirement. However, codification of the narrow search
requirement will keep law enforcement in check; if a defendant
challenges the legality of the search, the law should place the
burden on investigators to prove to the court that they conducted a
narrow search before proceeding with a more intrusive one. The
above-described rules align with many restrictions described by the
Carey-Winick doctrine, but also square with traditional doctrine by
authorizing investigators to conduct a more comprehensive search
where required.
2. The Plain View Doctrine and the Second Warrant
Requirement
Requiring investigators to waive the plain view doctrine, as
described in CDT, is a drastic and dangerous step. "A search of a
computer for evidence of fraud, for example, could reveal evidence
of a planned terrorist attack or a search aimed at drug trafficking
could reveal evidence of an ongoing violent crime or sexual
abuse."' 163 Abolishing the plain view doctrine with respect to
digital searches may create risks to society that outweigh those
created by governmental intrusion into individual privacy.
64
Furthermore, if legislatures pass laws that limit digital
searches as described above in Subsection V.A.1, the plain view
doctrine becomes less problematic. Investigators will no longer
have the authority to search every file in all cases, which diffuses
the threat of the general search. If investigators discover out-of-
scope evidence during the course of their search under the new
rule, investigators may pursue evidence under the plain view
163 See Brief for the United States in Support of Rehearing En Banc by the Full
Court, supra note 1, at 14.
164 See supra Part III.B.
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doctrine if that evidence clearly demonstrates criminal behavior.
For example, a person cannot legally possess child pornography.
Thus, if child pornography exists on a person's hard drive, a crime
has occurred and investigators may seize this contraband under the
plain view doctrine.
However, investigators should obtain a second warrant
before seizing out-of-scope evidence if questions arise as to
whether the evidence meets the "immediately incriminating"
requirement of the plain view doctrine. In this scenario, the second
warrant requirement will ensure that investigators indeed have
probable cause to seize the potentially incriminating evidence. For
example, suppose investigators searching for images for child
pornography stumble upon an image of a letter that reads, "How
much would it cost to hire a hit man to kill Joe and his family on
Thursday night?" Either this statement could be evidence of
murder for hire, or it could simply be exaggerated venting, or the
exercise of a person's right to free speech under the First
Amendment. 165 Requiring investigators to submit a second warrant
application to a neutral magistrate will ensure that the government
can legally admit this evidence at trial, and shields government
agents from claims of misconduct.
In addition, a second warrant may authorize investigators to
continue searching for evidence related to the second crime.
Investigators could gather the evidence needed to bring charges
quickly, which could prevent a dangerous person from committing
an act of violence.
3. Protecting Third Parties and Privileged Documents
Searches of digital media containing privileged data, or
data pertaining to third parties require special considerations.
166
Where investigators must issue a warrant to search computers
containing either type of data, the case agents and forensic
investigators should first narrow the set of data to be searched by
using forensic tools and other reasonable limitations. If the in-
scope evidence exists amongst privileged data or data pertaining to
third parties, the most practical and protective measure would be to
allow a taint team to review those materials. The taint team should
be composed of disinterested forensic investigators, agents, and
165 Interview with Chris Beeson, supra note 66 (explaining an example of out-
of-scope evidence that does not necessarily point to illegal activity, and
emphasizing THAT this evidence must be treated with "kid gloves," unlike
evidence of child pornography, which is illegal in-and-of itself to possess).
166 See supra Part III.C (discussing the threats posed by the plain view doctrine
to third parties and privileged documents, and different methods courts endorse
to mitigate these threats).
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attorneys who would review privileged and third party materials to
cull non-responsive items.
For cases involving privileged documents, the government
should provide the defense with the opportunity to review any data
categorized as unprivileged, and allow the defense to challenge
that categorization in front of the court. In re 5444 Westheimer Rd.
Suite 1570167 approved of this procedure and noted that it did not
prejudice the defendant because privilege disputes would be
resolved by the court before the taint team could disclose materials
to the prosecution team.168 A neutral magistrate or special master
would not offer the government the same opportunity to challenge
privilege determinations. Additionally, use of a special master or
neutral magistrate would strain government and judicial resources
and slow the investigation, as described in Section IV.C.
Where an investigation involves examination of digital
media containing the data of unrelated third parties, members of
the prosecution team should not view the intermingled data. A
disinterested individual or taint team should segregate the data and
provide the prosecution team with information pertaining to the
suspect. If the taint team discovers evidence that incriminates a
third party, the taint team may disclose that information to the
prosecution team if doing so will prevent harm to another person
or entity. The taint team should consult a disinterested attorney to
determine whether the team has an ethical obligation to disclose
the evidence to prevent harm. It should be noted that the taint team
would not be authorized to scan every privileged or third party file.
Unless the narrower search failed, the taint team would be required
to conduct a narrow search using forensic tools as described in
Subsection IV.A. 1. Additionally, if the taint team refers a piece of
evidence that incriminates an unrelated third party to the
prosecution team, the prosecution team must obtain a second
warrant before pursing that evidence. The second warrant
requirement would be waived if the evidence is contraband or
clearly demonstrates that a crime has occurred. These safeguards
deter unscrupulous conduct, and ensure that the prosecution team
will not conduct an exploratory search of third party data in an
effort to discover evidence with which to charge new crimes.
CONCLUSION
Digital media has become an integral part of the lives of
many Americans, and advancements in technology will continue to
blur the line between physical and digital worlds. As we import,
167 In re 5444 Westheimer Rd. Suite 1570, No. H-06-238, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 48850 (S.D. Tex. July 6, 2006).
168 Id. at *9, *11 n.5.
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upload, or download more of our personal lives onto digital media,
privacy stakes rise. Without clarity from legislatures, courts will
continue to grapple over the application of the Fourth Amendment
to digital media searches. Courts applying traditional Fourth
Amendment principles risk eroding the relevancy of search
warrants by allowing every warrant authorize an exploratory
search. Courts crafting new guidelines risk tying the hands of
investigators and hopelessly frustrating the legitimate purposes of
law enforcement. In order to formulate sound rules for governing
the search and seizure of digital property, legislatures must strike a
balance between these competing factions. To strike this balance,
legislatures should:
1) Require narrow search protocols, but allow file-
by-file searches where necessary;
2) Require a second warrant for the seizure of out-
of-scope evidence that does not immediately
demonstrate that a crime has occurred. Investigators
may seize contraband without a second warrant
under the plain view doctrine; and
3) Require a taint team to review privileged or third
party files. The taint team should afford the defense
the opportunity to challenged privileged
determinations. If the taint team encounters
evidence incriminating a third party it should
consult a disinterested attorney to determine
whether the team should disclose the evidence.
Legislatures adopting this approach will provide courts with the
clarity needed to enforce privacy protections while preserving the
legitimate goals of law enforcement.
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